Overlapping influences shape motor activity during hasty sensorimotor decisions

Humans and other animals are able to adjust their speed-accuracy tradeoff (SAT) at will depending on the urge to act, favoring either cautious or hasty decision policies in different contexts. An emerging view is that SAT regulation relies on influences exerting broad changes on the motor system, tuning its activity up globally when hastiness is at premium. The present study aimed to test this hypothesis. Fifty subjects performed a task involving choices between left and right index fingers, in which incorrect choices led either to a high or to a low penalty in two contexts, inciting them to emphasize either cautious or hasty policies. We applied transcranial magnetic stimulation on multiple motor representations, eliciting motor evoked potentials (MEP) in nine finger and leg muscles. MEP amplitudes allowed us to probe activity changes in the corresponding finger and leg representations, while subjects were deliberating about which index to choose. Our data indicate that hastiness entails a broad amplification of motor activity, though this amplification was limited to the chosen side. On top of this effect, we identified a local suppression of motor activity, surrounding the chosen index representation. Hence, a decision policy favoring speed over accuracy appears to rely on overlapping processes producing a broad (but not global) amplification and a surround suppression of motor activity. The latter effect may help increasing the signal-to-noise ratio of the chosen representation, as supported by single-trial correlation analyses indicating a stronger differentiation of activity changes in finger representations in the hasty context.

Download Full-text

Confidence predicts speed-accuracy tradeoff for subsequent decisions

10.1101/466730 ◽

2018 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Kobe Desender ◽

Annika Boldt ◽

Tom Verguts ◽

Tobias H. Donner

Keyword(s):

Decision Model ◽

Previous Trial ◽

Decision Confidence ◽

Decision Outcomes ◽

Decision Policies ◽

Choice Tasks ◽

Speed Accuracy ◽

The Brain ◽

Speed And Accuracy ◽

Accuracy Tradeoff

AbstractWhen external feedback about decision outcomes is lacking, agents need to adapt their decision policies based on an internal estimate of the correctness of their choices (i.e., decision confidence). We hypothesized that agents use confidence to continuously update the tradeoff between the speed and accuracy of their decisions: When confidence is low in one decision, the agent needs more evidence before committing to a choice in the next decision, leading to slower but more accurate decisions. We tested this hypothesis by fitting a bounded accumulation decision model to behavioral data from three different perceptual choice tasks. Decision bounds indeed depended on the reported confidence on the previous trial, independent of objective accuracy. This increase in decision bound was predicted by a centro-parietal EEG component sensitive to confidence. We conclude that the brain uses internally computed confidence signals for the ongoing adjustment of decision policies.

Download Full-text

Confidence predicts speed-accuracy tradeoff for subsequent decisions

eLife ◽

10.7554/elife.43499 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 8 ◽

Cited By ~ 6

Author(s):

Kobe Desender ◽

Annika Boldt ◽

Tom Verguts ◽

Tobias H Donner

Keyword(s):

Decision Model ◽

Previous Trial ◽

Neural Signals ◽

Decision Confidence ◽

Decision Outcomes ◽

Decision Policies ◽

Choice Tasks ◽

Speed Accuracy ◽

Speed And Accuracy ◽

Accuracy Tradeoff

When external feedback about decision outcomes is lacking, agents need to adapt their decision policies based on an internal estimate of the correctness of their choices (i.e., decision confidence). We hypothesized that agents use confidence to continuously update the tradeoff between the speed and accuracy of their decisions: When confidence is low in one decision, the agent needs more evidence before committing to a choice in the next decision, leading to slower but more accurate decisions. We tested this hypothesis by fitting a bounded accumulation decision model to behavioral data from three different perceptual choice tasks. Decision bounds indeed depended on the reported confidence on the previous trial, independent of objective accuracy. This increase in decision bound was predicted by a centro-parietal EEG component sensitive to confidence. We conclude that internally computed neural signals of confidence predict the ongoing adjustment of decision policies.

Download Full-text

The Neural and Computational Basis of Controlled Speed-Accuracy Tradeoff during Task Performance

Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience ◽

10.1162/jocn.2008.20146 ◽

2008 ◽

Vol 20 (11) ◽

pp. 1952-1965 ◽

Cited By ~ 121

Author(s):

Vincent van Veen ◽

Marie K. Krug ◽

Cameron S. Carter

Keyword(s):

Response Threshold ◽

Response Preparation ◽

Baseline Activity ◽

Dorsolateral Prefrontal ◽

The Cost ◽

Parietal Cortices ◽

Speed Accuracy ◽

Premotor Areas ◽

Accuracy Tradeoff ◽

At Will

People are capable, at will, of trading speed for accuracy when performing a task; they can focus on performing accurately at the cost of being slow, or emphasize speed at the cost of decreased accuracy. Here, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging to investigate the neural correlates of this ability. We show increased baseline activity during speed emphasis in a network of areas related to response preparation and execution, including the premotor areas of the frontal lobe, the basal ganglia, the thalamus, and the dorsolateral prefrontal and left parietal cortices. Furthermore, speed emphasis was associated with reduced transient response-related activation in several of these structures, suggesting that because of the greater baseline activity under speed emphasis, less activation is needed in these structures to reach response threshold, consistent with the assumptions of several computational theories. Moreover, we identify the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex as providing the top-down control signal that increases this baseline activity.

Download Full-text

Neuroticism and Speed-Accuracy Tradeoff in Self-Paced Speeded Mental Addition and Comparison

Journal of Individual Differences ◽

10.1027/1614-0001/a000021 ◽

2010 ◽

Vol 31 (3) ◽

pp. 130-137 ◽

Cited By ~ 12

Author(s):

Hagen C. Flehmig ◽

Michael B. Steinborn ◽

Karl Westhoff ◽

Robert Langner

Keyword(s):

Reaction Time ◽

Response Speed ◽

Time Variability ◽

Reaction Time Variability ◽

Comparison Task ◽

Processing Efficiency ◽

Mental Addition ◽

Speed Accuracy ◽

The Relationship ◽

Accuracy Tradeoff

Previous research suggests a relationship between neuroticism (N) and the speed-accuracy tradeoff in speeded performance: High-N individuals were observed performing less efficiently than low-N individuals and compensatorily overemphasizing response speed at the expense of accuracy. This study examined N-related performance differences in the serial mental addition and comparison task (SMACT) in 99 individuals, comparing several performance measures (i.e., response speed, accuracy, and variability), retest reliability, and practice effects. N was negatively correlated with mean reaction time but positively correlated with error percentage, indicating that high-N individuals tended to be faster but less accurate in their performance than low-N individuals. The strengthening of the relationship after practice demonstrated the reliability of the findings. There was, however, no relationship between N and distractibility (assessed via measures of reaction time variability). Our main findings are in line with the processing efficiency theory, extending the relationship between N and working style to sustained self-paced speeded mental addition.

Download Full-text

Linking Personality With Basic Cognition: Need for Closure vs. the Speed-Accuracy Tradeoff

PsycEXTRA Dataset ◽

10.1037/e528942014-512 ◽

2014 ◽

Author(s):

Babette Rae ◽

Scott Brown ◽

Maxim Bushmakin ◽

Mark Rubin

Keyword(s):

Need For Closure ◽

Speed Accuracy ◽

Basic Cognition ◽

Accuracy Tradeoff

Download Full-text

Speed/accuracy tradeoff in directed forgetting

PsycEXTRA Dataset ◽

10.1037/e536982012-049 ◽

1997 ◽

Author(s):

Jeffry S. Kellogg ◽

Xiangen Hu ◽

William Marks

Keyword(s):

Directed Forgetting ◽

Speed Accuracy ◽

Accuracy Tradeoff

Download Full-text

Faculty Opinions recommendation of One process is not enough! A speed-accuracy tradeoff study of recognition memory.

Faculty Opinions – Post-Publication Peer Review of the Biomedical Literature ◽

10.3410/f.1022398.255622 ◽

2004 ◽

Author(s):

Andrew Yonelinas

Keyword(s):

Recognition Memory ◽

Speed Accuracy ◽

Accuracy Tradeoff

Download Full-text

Trading accuracy for speed over the course of a decision

Journal of Neurophysiology ◽

10.1152/jn.00038.2021 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Gerard Derosiere ◽

David Thura ◽

Paul Cisek ◽

Julie Duqué

Keyword(s):

Late Stage ◽

Human Subjects ◽

Sensory Information ◽

Decision Task ◽

Unique Extension ◽

Dynamic Changes ◽

Performance Accuracy ◽

Accuracy Criterion ◽

Speed Accuracy ◽

Accuracy Tradeoff

Humans and other animals often need to balance the desire to gather sensory information (to make the best choice) with the urgency to act, facing a speed-accuracy tradeoff (SAT). Given the ubiquity of SAT across species, extensive research has been devoted to understanding the computational mechanisms allowing its regulation at different timescales, including from one context to another, and from one decision to another. However, animals must frequently change their SAT on even shorter timescales - i.e., over the course of an ongoing decision - and little is known about the mechanisms that allow such rapid adaptations. The present study aimed at addressing this issue. Human subjects performed a decision task with changing evidence. In this task, subjects received rewards for correct answers but incurred penalties for mistakes. An increase or a decrease in penalty occurring halfway through the trial promoted rapid SAT shifts, favoring speeded decisions either in the early or in the late stage of the trial. Importantly, these shifts were associated with stage-specific adjustments in the accuracy criterion exploited for committing to a choice. Those subjects who decreased the most their accuracy criterion at a given decision stage exhibited the highest gain in speed, but also the highest cost in terms of performance accuracy at that time. Altogether, the current findings offer a unique extension of previous work, by suggesting that dynamic changes in accuracy criterion allow the regulation of the SAT within the timescale of a single decision.

Download Full-text