scholarly journals Time-based binding as a solution to and a limitation for flexible cognition

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mehdi Senoussi ◽  
Pieter Verbeke ◽  
Tom Verguts

Why can't we keep as many items as we want in working memory? It has long been debated whether this resource limitation is a bug (a downside of our fallible biological system) or instead a feature (an optimal response to a computational problem). We propose that the resource limitation is a consequence of a useful feature. Specifically, we propose that flexible cognition requires time-based binding, and time-based binding necessarily limits the number of (bound) memoranda that can be stored simultaneously. Time-based binding is most naturally instantiated via neural oscillations, for which there exists ample experimental evidence. We report simulations that illustrate this theory and that relate it to empirical data. We also compare the theory to several other (feature and bug) resource theories.

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 12
Author(s):  
Ming D. Lim ◽  
Damian P. Birney

Emotional intelligence (EI) refers to a set of competencies to process, understand, and reason with affective information. Recent studies suggest ability measures of experiential and strategic EI differentially predict performance on non-emotional and emotionally laden tasks. To explore cognitive processes underlying these abilities further, we varied the affective context of a traditional letter-based n-back working-memory task. In study 1, participants completed 0-, 2-, and 3-back tasks with flanking distractors that were either emotional (fearful or happy faces) or non-emotional (shapes or letters stimuli). Strategic EI, but not experiential EI, significantly influenced participants’ accuracy across all n-back levels, irrespective of flanker type. In Study 2, participants completed 1-, 2-, and 3-back levels. Experiential EI was positively associated with response times for emotional flankers at the 1-back level but not other levels or flanker types, suggesting those higher in experiential EI reacted slower on low-load trials with affective context. In Study 3, flankers were asynchronously presented either 300 ms or 1000 ms before probes. Results mirrored Study 1 for accuracy rates and Study 2 for response times. Our findings (a) provide experimental evidence for the distinctness of experiential and strategic EI and (b) suggest that each are related to different aspects of cognitive processes underlying working memory.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marianna Semprini ◽  
Gaia Bonassi ◽  
Federico Barban ◽  
Elisa Pelosin ◽  
Riccardo Iandolo ◽  
...  

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kate A. Yurgil ◽  
Miguel A. Velasquez ◽  
Jenna L. Winston ◽  
Noah B. Reichman ◽  
Paul J. Colombo

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Hviid Del Pin ◽  
Zuzanna Skóra ◽  
Kristian Sandberg ◽  
Morten Overgaard ◽  
Michał Wierzchoń

Abstract The theoretical landscape of scientific studies of consciousness has flourished. Today, even multiple versions of the same theory are sometimes available. To advance the field, these theories should be directly compared to determine which are better at predicting and explaining empirical data. Systematic inquiries of this sort are seen in many subfields in cognitive psychology and neuroscience, e.g. in working memory. Nonetheless, when we surveyed publications on consciousness research, we found that most focused on a single theory. When ‘comparisons’ happened, they were often verbal and non-systematic. This fact in itself could be a contributing reason for the lack of convergence between theories in consciousness research. In this paper, we focus on how to compare theories of consciousness to ensure that the comparisons are meaningful, e.g. whether their predictions are parallel or contrasting. We evaluate how theories are typically compared in consciousness research and related subdisciplines in cognitive psychology and neuroscience, and we provide an example of our approach. We then examine the different reasons why direct comparisons between theories are rarely seen. One possible explanation is the unique nature of the consciousness phenomenon. We conclude that the field should embrace this uniqueness, and we set out the features that a theory of consciousness should account for.


2010 ◽  
Vol 473 (3) ◽  
pp. 172-177 ◽  
Author(s):  
Massoud Stephane ◽  
Nuri F. Ince ◽  
Michael Kuskowski ◽  
Arthur Leuthold ◽  
Ahmed H. Tewfik ◽  
...  

2011 ◽  
Vol 25 ◽  
pp. 176-194 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jakub Szymanik ◽  
Marcin Zajenkowski

This paper presents experimental evidence on the differences in a sentence–picture verification task under additional memory load between parity and proportional quantifiers. We asked subjects to memorize strings of four or six digits, then to decide whether a quantified sentence was true for a given picture, and finally to recall the initially given string of numbers. The results show that: (a) proportional quantifiers are more difficult than parity quantifiers with respect to reaction time and accuracy; (b) maintaining either four or six elements in working memory has the same effect on the processing of parity quantifiers; (c) however, in the case of proportional quantifiers subjects perform better in the verification tasks under the six-digit load condition, and (d) even though the strings of four numbers were better recalled by subjects after judging parity there is no difference between quantifiers in the case of the six-element condition. We briefly outline two alternative explanations for the observed phenomena rooted in the computational model of quantifier verification and the different theories of working memory.


2012 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 145-153 ◽  
Author(s):  
Massoud Stephane ◽  
Arthur Leuthold ◽  
Michael Kuskowski ◽  
Kate McClannahan ◽  
Tinting Xu

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