scholarly journals Game of theories: an agent-based model of how variation in contest cost-benefits determines the evolution of contest resolution rules

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nelson Silva Pinto

Game-theory based models are used to understand rules that animals use to settle contests over indivisible resources. However, the empirical literature of contests indicates controversial support to models, with some species supporting different models and other species showing no support to any model. Since strategies used to resolve contests may have different associated costs, it is possible that different conditions have determined the evolution of distinct assessment strategies used by animals. We used an agent-based model to explore the importance of the following conditions: resource availability, probability of reproduction with resource, and damage costs on evolution of assessment strategies. We used self- and mutual-assessment models as a heurist framework to build agents with different assessment strategies. In our model, agents competed for resources in scenarios with different combinations of resource availability, probability of reproduction with resource, and damage costs. We found that agents following the self-assessment with damage strategy were prevalent in scenarios with no probability of reproduction without the resource, independently of other variables. We also found that agents following the non-aggressive strategy occurred in all scenarios. However, agents using the non-aggressive strategy were prevalent only in scenarios with probability of reproduction with the resource. Finally, we observed that agents using mutual-assessment occurred only in a scenario with high risk of damage, low availability of resources, and with probability of reproduction without the resource. These results indicate that agents following the self-assessment with damage and non-aggressive strategies may be able to stay at most scenarios.

Author(s):  
Shu-Heng Chen ◽  
Umberto Gostoli

In this chapter, the authors study the self-coordination problem as demonstrated by the well-known El Farol problem (Arthur, 1994), which has become what is known as the minority game in the econophysics community. While the El Farol problem or the minority game has been studied for almost two decades, existing studies are mostly only concerned with efficiency. The equality issue, however, has been largely neglected. In this chapter, the authors build an agent-based model to study both efficiency and equality and ask whether a decentralized society can ever possibly self-coordinate a result with the highest efficiency while also maintaining the highest degree of equality. The agent-based model shows the possibility of achieving this social optimum. The two key determinants to make this happen are social preferences and social networks. Hence, not only do institutions (networks) matter, but individual characteristics (preferences) also matter. The latter part are open to human-subject experiments for further examination.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Carleton ◽  
Andre Costopoulos ◽  
Mark Collard

Monuments are perplexing from a Darwinian perspective because building them diverts energy from survival and reproduction. In the late 1980s, Dunnell proposed a solution to this conundrum. He suggested that wasting energy confers an adaptive advantage in highly variable environments. This hypothesis has been used to explain several instances of monument building but it has only been evaluated once and that study suggested it is flawed. Here, we report a series of experiments in which we used an agent-based model to assess the hypothesis while taking into account two factors that could enhance the adaptiveness of waste—restricted agent movement and spatial structure in resource availability. Waste was strongly selected against in most of the experiments. Two experiments suggested that very restricted mobility can select for waste, but this effect disappeared when environmental variation increased from moderate to high. Thus, our experiments also suggest that the waste hypothesis is flawed.


Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shun Cao ◽  
Neil G. MacLaren ◽  
Yiding Cao ◽  
Yingjun Dong ◽  
Hiroki Sayama ◽  
...  

Effective teamwork in an initially leaderless group requires a high level of collective leadership emerging from dynamic interactions among group members. Leader emergence is a crucial topic in collective leadership, yet it is challenging to investigate as the problem context is typically highly complex and dynamic. Here, we explore leadership emergence and leadership perception by means of computational simulations whose assumptions and parameters were informed by empirical research and human-subject experiments. Our agent-based model describes the process of group planning. Each agent is assigned with three key attributes: talkativeness, intelligence, and credibility. An agent can propose a suggestion to modify the group plan as a speaker or respond and evaluate others’ suggestions and leadership as a listener. Simulation results suggested that agents with high values of talkativeness, intelligence, and credibility tended to be perceived as leaders by their peers. Results also showed that talkativeness may be the most significant and instantaneous predictor for leader emergence of the three investigated attributes: talkativeness, intelligence, and credibility. In terms of group performance, smaller groups may outperform larger groups regarding their problem-solving ability in the beginning, but their performance tends to be of no significant difference in a long run. These results match the empirical literature and offer a mechanistic, operationalized description of the collective leadership processes.


Author(s):  
Mahsa Noori ◽  
Alireza Emadi ◽  
Ramin Fazloula

Abstract Despite the advancement of technical tools for the analysis of complex systems, the most important issue in solving water resource problems focuses on the interaction of human and natural systems. Agent-Based Model has been used as an effective tool for the development of integrated human and environmental models. One of the main challenges of this method is identifying and describing the main agents. In this study, three main approach including Genetic Algorithm, cooperative game theory and Agent-Based Model have been used to optimize water allocation in Tajan catchment. The proposed Agent-Based Model is a new equation for calculating stakeholder utility and simulating their interactions that can create a hydrological-environmental-human relationship for demand management and optimal water allocation. The results showed that the total benefit of cooperative game theory and Agent-Based Model relative to Genetic Algorithm has been increased 24 and 21% respectively. Although the total benefit in game theory is greater than the Agent-Based Model, but the Agent-Based Model considering the agents feedback propose a more comprehensive approach to optimal water allocation.


2001 ◽  
Author(s):  
Minoru Tabata ◽  
Akira Ide ◽  
Nobuoki Eshima ◽  
Kyushu Takagi ◽  
Yasuhiro Takei ◽  
...  

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