scholarly journals Neural processing of iterated prisoner’s dilemma outcomes indicates next-round choice and speed to reciprocate cooperation

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francisco Cervantes Constantino ◽  
Santiago Garat ◽  
Eliana Nicolaisen-Sobesky ◽  
Valentina Paz ◽  
Eduardo Martínez-Montes ◽  
...  

AbstractElecting whether to cooperate with someone else is well typified in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma (iPD) game, although the neural processes that unfold after its distinct outcomes have been only partly described. Recent theoretical models emphasize the ubiquity of intuitive cooperation, raising questions on the neural timelines involved. We studied the outcome stage of an iPD with electroencephalography (EEG) methods. Results showed that neural signals that are modulated by the iPD outcomes can also be indicative of future choice, in an outcome-dependent manner: (i) after zero-gain ‘sucker’s payoffs’ (unreciprocated cooperation), a participant’s decision thereafter may be indicated by changes to the feedback-related negativity (FRN); (ii) after one-sided non-cooperation (participant gain), by the P3; (iii) after mutual cooperation, by late frontal delta-band modulations. Critically, faster choices to reciprocate cooperation were predicted, on a single-trial basis, by P3 and frontal delta modulations at the immediately preceding trial. Delta band signaling is considered in relation to homeostatic regulation processing in the literature. The findings relate feedback to decisional processes in the iPD, providing a first neural account of the brief timelines implied in heuristic modes of cooperation.

1993 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
David B. Fogel

Evolutionary programming experiments are conducted to investigate the conditions that promote the evolution of cooperative behavior in the iterated prisoner's dilemma. A population of logical stimulus-response devices is maintained over successive generations with selection based on individual fitness. The reward for selfish behavior is varied across a series of trials. Simulations indicate three distinct patterns of behaviors in which mutual cooperation is inevitable, improbable, or apparently random. The ultimate behavior can be reliably predicted by examining the payoff matrix that defines the reward for alternative joint behaviors.


2009 ◽  
Vol 276 (1676) ◽  
pp. 4223-4228 ◽  
Author(s):  
Angèle St-Pierre ◽  
Karine Larose ◽  
Frédérique Dubois

Reciprocal altruism, one of the most probable explanations for cooperation among non-kin, has been modelled as a Prisoner's Dilemma. According to this game, cooperation could evolve when individuals, who expect to play again, use conditional strategies like tit-for-tat or Pavlov. There is evidence that humans use such strategies to achieve mutual cooperation, but most controlled experiments with non-human animals have failed to find cooperation. One reason for this could be that subjects fail to cooperate because they behave as if they were to play only once. To assess this hypothesis, we conducted an experiment with monogamous zebra finches ( Taeniopygia guttata ) that were tested in a two-choice apparatus, with either their social partner or an experimental opponent of the opposite sex. We found that zebra finches maintained high levels of cooperation in an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game only when interacting with their social partner. Although other mechanisms may have contributed to the observed difference between the two treatments, our results support the hypothesis that animals do not systematically give in to the short-term temptation of cheating when long-term benefits exist. Thus, our findings contradict the commonly accepted idea that reciprocal altruism will be rare in non-human animals.


2009 ◽  
Vol 19 (11) ◽  
pp. 3877-3885 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTIAN HILBE

In search of strategies that boost cooperation in the iterated prisoner's dilemma game (IPD), Contrite Tit for Tat is a promising candidate. It combines the necessary rigor in handling selfish strategies with contrition whenever the player has exploited its coplayer inadvertently. This paper shows that, contrary to conventional wisdom, Contrite Tit for Tat is not evolutionarily stable in general. In a relatively noisy environment with a low benefit of mutual cooperation it pays to be a defector. Additionally, errors in perception impede altruism notably.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
M Testori ◽  
M Kempf ◽  
RB Hoyle ◽  
Hedwig Eisenbarth

© 2019 Hogrefe Publishing. Personality traits have been long recognized to have a strong impact on human decision-making. In this study, a sample of 314 participants took part in an online game to investigate the impact of psychopathic traits on cooperative behavior in an iterated Prisoner's dilemma game. We found that disinhibition decreased the maintenance of cooperation in successive plays, but had no effect on moving toward cooperation after a previous defection or on the overall level of cooperation over rounds. Furthermore, our results underline the crucial importance of a good model selection procedure, showing how a poor choice of statistical model can provide misleading results.


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