Optimal allocation of decision rights for value‐adding in venture capital

2007 ◽  
Vol 45 (5) ◽  
pp. 897-909 ◽  
Author(s):  
Derek Eldridge
2019 ◽  
Vol 95 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim Baldenius ◽  
Beatrice Michaeli

ABSTRACT We consider the optimal allocation of decision rights over noncontractible specific investments. Risk-averse business unit managers each engage in general (stand-alone) operations and invest in joint projects that benefit their own and other divisions. Which of the managers should have the authority to choose these investments? With scalable investments, we show that decision rights should be bundled in the hands of the manager facing the more volatile environment. With discrete (lumpy) investments, on the other hand, decision rights should be split between the managers, provided they face comparable levels of uncertainty in their general operations. Splitting decision rights better leverages the inherent investment complementarity, counter to conventional wisdom. Our model generates empirical predictions for the equilibrium association of organizational structure and managers' incentive contracts: bundling of decision rights results in pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) divergence across divisions; splitting them results in PPS convergence. JEL Classifications: M41; D23; D86.


2013 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steffen Reichmann ◽  
Anna Rohlfing-Bastian

ABSTRACT To provide efficient incentives, the three components of an incentive system (i.e., performance measurement, rewards, and the allocation of decision rights) need to be balanced against each other. In practice, the authority to decide on these components is frequently distributed across hierarchical levels, thus requiring adjusting centralized decisions with regard to decentralized authority. This paper investigates the centralized design of incentive contracts when decision authority, with respect to the allocation of tasks, is delegated to lower hierarchical levels. It provides an analysis of the optimal allocation of authority (i.e., “who should be the boss”) and considers the interdependencies between organizational design choices and the design of optimal incentives.


2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (17) ◽  
pp. 129-146
Author(s):  
Martin Krause

Corporate governance focuses its attention on the structure of the firm and the allocation of decision rights between owners and managers basically, plus other stakeholders. The field has developed extensively during the last decades inspiring reforms and practices as well as learning from them. Most of the analysis though takes into consideration the XXth Century firm, rightfully so since CG is a very practical field in the overlapping map of law, economics and finance. The firm has probably been one of the most successful institutional innovations of the last centuries. Five hundred years ago only a few of them existed, today they are pervasive. Nevertheless, we cannot expect the firm to be the same a hundred years from now as it is today. And if companies are going to be different, how will their corporate governance be affected? The present article does not expect to give an answer to such question. It only attempts to provoke debate and speculation about a possible evolution of the firm based on one single aspect of change: the increased use of dispersed knowledge. After suggesting some development and analyzing present innovations in that direction, we will open up to consideration how those potential changes may affect corporate governance. Of course, there are no specific conclusions, just a call to open our minds to future possible scenarios.


2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 355-381 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuanyuan Liu ◽  
Ting Luo ◽  
Heng Yue

This article examines the determinants of allocation of decision rights between the parent company and its subsidiaries, and the economic consequence of suboptimal power structure. Based on China’s unique double disclosure for the parent company and the whole group, we construct a decentralization index to measure how decision rights are allocated within the group companies. We find a more decentralized (centralized) power structure for the groups with more uncertain (certain) external environment and with poorer (better) internal information quality. We also show that the groups with suboptimal power structure have weaker future performance.


2011 ◽  
pp. 216-254
Author(s):  
Petter Gottschalk

In many organizations, information technology has become crucial in the support, the sustainability and the growth of the business. This pervasive use of technology has created a critical dependency on IT that calls for a specific focus on IT governance. IT governance consists of the leadership and organizational structures and processes that ensure that the organization’s IT sustains and extends the organization’s strategy and objectives (Grembergen et al., 2004). IT governance matters because it influences the benefits received from IT investments. Through a combination of practices (such as redesigning business processes and well-designed governance mechanisms) and appropriately matched IT investments, top-performing enterprises generate superior returns on their IT investments (Weill, 2004). IT governance can be defined as specifying decision rights and accountability framework to encourage desirable behavior in the use of IT (Weill & Ross, 2004). This is the definition we will use here. Other definitions are for example: (i) IT governance is the structures and processes that ensure that IT supports the organization’s mission. The purpose is to align IT with the enterprise, maximize the benefits of IT, use IT resources responsibly and manage IT risks, (ii) A structure of relationships and processes to direct and control the enterprise in order to achieve the enterprise’s goals by adding value while balancing risk versus return over IT and its processes, (iii) IT governance is the responsibility of the board of directors and executive management. It is an integral part of enterprise governance and consists of the leadership and organizational structures and processes that ensure that the organization’s IT sustains and extends the organization’s strategies and objectives, and (iv) IT governance is the system by which an organization’s IT portfolio is directed and controlled. IT Governance describes (a) the distribution of decision-making rights and responsibilities among different stakeholders in the organization, and (b) the rules and procedures for making and monitoring decisions on strategic IT concerns (Peterson, 2004a). IT governance has attracted substantial attention in recent years (e.g., Chin et al., 2004; Grembergen & Haes, 2004a, 2004b; McManus, 2004; Meyer, 2004; O’Donnell, 2004; Peterson, 2004a, 2004b; Rau, 2004; Read, 2004, Robbins, 2004; Trites, 2004; Weill & Ross, 2004, 2005). Here we will discuss IT governance in terms of resource mobilization, allocation of decision rights as well as strategic alignment.


Author(s):  
Petter Gottschalk

Most scholars seem to agree that a critical part of IT governance is allocation of decision rights. Allocation is concerned with identifying decision makers and decision categories.


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