A game-theoretic approach to evaluating the competitiveness of container carriers in the Northeast Asian shipping market

2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 854-869 ◽  
Author(s):  
Byung-In Park ◽  
Hokey Min
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Asia Pacific ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Maritime Logistics ◽  
Actual Case ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Northeast Asian ◽  
Pricing Schemes

Purpose In times of increasing shipping risks and uncertainty, the purpose of this paper is to analyze fiercely competitive shipping markets in the Asia-Pacific region and help the carriers develop the optimal pricing schemes, shipping networks (e.g. routes and shipping frequency), and future investment plans. Design/methodology/approach This paper develops viable maritime logistics strategies based on the non-cooperative game theory which determines the optimal vessel size/type, shipping route, and shipping frequency, while taking into account multiple cost components and unpredictable shipping market dynamics. Findings This study revealed that the container carrier’s optimal shipping strategy was insensitive to changes in freight rates, fuel prices, and loading/unloading fees at the destination ports. However, it tends to be more sensitive to an increase in the shipping volume than the aforementioned parameters. In other words, aggressive pricing schemes and drastic cost-cutting measures alone cannot enhance carrier competitiveness in today’s shipping markets characterized by overcapacity and weak demand. Originality/value This paper is one of a few attempts to identify a host of factors influencing the container carrier’s competitiveness using the game theory and develop an optimal shipping strategy in the presence of conflicting interests of multiple stakeholders (e.g. carriers, shippers, and port authorities). To validate the rigor and usefulness of the proposed game-theoretic model, the authors also experiment it with an actual case study of container carriers serving the Northeast Asian shipping market.

A game-theoretic model for roadway performance management

2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 40-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hesham Osman ◽  
Mazdak Nikbakht
Keyword(s):  
Asset Management ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Political Decision ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Road Users ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Asset Managers

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to present a socio-technical approach to modeling the behavior of roadway users, asset managers, and politicians toward roadway performance and asset management. This approach models the complex interactions that occur between these agents in a complex system. Most modeling approaches in the domain of infrastructure asset management take a purely asset-centric approach and fail to address these socio-technical interactions. Design/methodology/approach – Interactions among political decision makers, asset management strategy developers, and road users are modeled using a game-theoretic approach. The interactions are modeled as a non-cooperative game in which politicians, asset managers, and road users are the main players. Each player is autonomous and aims to come up with the set of moves to maximize their respective level of satisfaction in response to other players’ moves. Multi-attribute utility theory is used to deal with multitude of players’ goals, and the Nash equilibria of the game are south out to develop appropriate strategies for different players. Findings – An illustrative example for a road network of a Canadian city is used to demonstrate the developed methodology. The developed methodology demonstrates how behaviors of various agents involved in the sphere of asset management impacts their collective decision-making behavior. Originality/value – The developed framework provides asset managers and political decision makers with a valuable tool to evaluate the impact of public policy decisions related to asset managers on road performance and the overall satisfaction of road users.

Coordination mechanisms for digital and sustainable textile supply chain

2022 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Patanjal Kumar ◽  
Dheeraj Sharma ◽  
Peeyush Pandey
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Deterministic Model ◽  
Virtual Organization ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Sustainable Supply Chain ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Coordination Model ◽  
Game Theoretic

PurposeSupply chain network is complicated to manage due to the involvement of a number of agents. Formation of virtual organization using Industry 4.0 (I4.0) is an approach to improve the efficiency and effectiveness and to overcome the complexities of the channel. However, the task of managing the channel further becomes complicated after incorporating sustainability into the supply chain. To fill this gap, this paper focuses on designing of mechanism and demonstration of I4.0-based virtual organization to coordinate sustainable supply chain.Design/methodology/approachIn this paper, we model and compare I4.0-based virtual organization models using four other traditional contracts with centralized supply chain. The non-cooperative game theoretic approach has been used for the analysis of models.FindingsOur game-theoretic analysis shows that investment in I4.0 and sustainable innovation are beneficial for the overall supply chain. Our results show that linear two-part tariff contract and I4.0-based virtual organization model can perfectly coordinated with the supply chain.Research limitations/implicationsThis study consider deterministic model settings with full information game. Therefore researchers are encouraged to study I4.0-based coordination models under information asymmetry and uncertain situations.Practical implicationsThe paper includes implications for the development of I4.0-based coordination model to tackle the problems of channel coordination.Originality/valueThis study proposes I4.0-based game-theoretic model for the sustainable supply chain coordination.

The philosophical interpretation of language game theory

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nick Zangwill
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Language Game ◽  
Linguistic Meaning ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Philosophical Interpretation ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

Abstract I give an informal presentation of the evolutionary game theoretic approach to the conventions that constitute linguistic meaning. The aim is to give a philosophical interpretation of the project, which accounts for the role of game theoretic mathematics in explaining linguistic phenomena. I articulate the main virtue of this sort of account, which is its psychological economy, and I point to the casual mechanisms that are the ground of the application of evolutionary game theory to linguistic phenomena. Lastly, I consider the objection that the account cannot explain predication, logic, and compositionality.

Game Models in Various Applications

2014 ◽  
pp. 44-128 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Academic Research ◽  
Viable Alternative ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Original Game ◽  
Technical Problems ◽  
Research Areas ◽  
History Of ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

Recently, game-theoretic models have become famous in many academic research areas. Therefore, many applications and extensions of the original game theoretic approach appear in many of the major science fields. Despite all the technical problems, the history of game theory suggests that it would be premature to abandon the tool, especially in the absence of a viable alternative. If anything, the development of game theory has been driven precisely by the realization of its limitations and attempts to overcome them. This chapter explores these ideas.

scholarly journals A Game Theoretic Approach to Swarm Robotics

2006 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 131-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. N. Givigi ◽  
H. M. Schwartz
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Reinforcement Learning ◽  
Personality Traits ◽  
Evolutionary Psychology ◽  
Learning Process ◽  
Swarm Robotics ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Intelligent Robots ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

In this article, we discuss some techniques for achieving swarm intelligent robots through the use of traits of personality. Traits of personality are characteristics of each robot that, altogether, define the robot's behaviours. We discuss the use of evolutionary psychology to select a set of traits of personality that will evolve due to a learning process based on reinforcement learning. The use of Game Theory is introduced, and some simulations showing its potential are reported.

A game theoretic approach to optimal pricing of flights and passengers at congested airports

2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 434-454 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ata Allah Taleizadeh ◽  
Moeen Sammak Jalali ◽  
Shib Sankar Sana
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Congestion Pricing ◽  
Influential Factors ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Numerical Examples ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
Managerial Implications ◽  
Game Theoretic

Purpose This paper aims to embark a mathematical model based on investigation and comparison of airport pricing policies under various types of competition, considering both per-passenger and per-flight charges at congested airports. Design/methodology/approach In this model, four-game theoretic strategies are assessed and closed-form formulas have been proved for each of the mentioned strategies. Numerical examples and graphical representations of the optimal solutions are provided to illustrate the models. Findings The rectitude of the presented formulas is evaluated with sensitivity analysis and numerical examples have been put forward. Finally, managerial implications are suggested by means of the proposed analysis. Research limitations/implications The represented model is inherently limited to investigate all the available and influential factors in the field of congestion pricing. With this regard, several studies can be implemented as the future research of this study. The applications of other game theoretic approaches such as Cartel games and its combination with the four mentioned games seem to be worthwhile. Moreover, it is recommended to investigate the effectiveness of the proposed model and formulations with a large-scale database. Originality/value The authors formulate a novel strategy that put forwards a four-game theoretic strategy, which helps managers to select the best suitable ones for their specific airline and/or air traveling companies. The authors find that by means of the proposed model, the application of Stackelberg–Bertrand behavior in the field of airport congestion pricing will rebound to a more profitable strategy in contrast with the other three represented methods.

Scheduling Multi-Workflows Over Heterogeneous Virtual Machines With a Multi-Stage Dynamic Game-Theoretic Approach

2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 82-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lei Wu ◽  
Yuandou Wang
Keyword(s):  
Virtual Machines ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Scientific Workflow ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Multi Stage ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Heterogeneous Cloud ◽  
Cloud Infrastructures

Cloud computing, with dependable, consistent, pervasive, and inexpensive access to geographically distributed computational capabilities, is becoming an increasingly popular platform for the execution of scientific applications such as scientific workflows. Scheduling multiple workflows over cloud infrastructures and resources is well recognized to be NP-hard and thus critical to meeting various types of Quality-of-Service (QoS) requirements. In this work, the authors consider a multi-objective scientific workflow scheduling framework based on the dynamic game-theoretic model. It aims at reducing make-spans, cloud cost, while maximizing system fairness in terms of workload distribution among heterogeneous cloud virtual machines (VMs). The authors consider randomly-generated scientific workflow templates as test cases and carry out extensive real-world tests based on third-party commercial clouds. Experimental results show that their proposed framework outperforms traditional ones by achieving lower make-spans, lower cost, and better system fairness.

The impacts of adaptive attacking and defending strategies on mitigation of intentional threats

Kybernetes ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 39 (5) ◽  
pp. 825-837 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jing Zhang ◽  
Shifei Shen ◽  
Rui Yang
Keyword(s):  
Information Disclosure ◽  
Stochastic Game ◽  
Adaptive Strategies ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Strategic Decision ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Disclosure Policy ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to focus on resource allocation and information disclosure policy for defending multiple targets against intentional attacks. The intentional attacks, like terrorism events, probably cause great losses and fatalities. Attackers and defenders usually make decisions based on incomplete information. Adaptive attacking and defending strategies are considered, to study how both sides make more effective decisions according to previous fights.Design/methodology/approachA stochastic game‐theoretic approach is proposed for modeling attacker‐defender conflicts. Attackers and defenders are supposed both to be strategic decision makers and partially aware of adversary's information. Adaptive strategies are compared with different inflexible strategies in a fortification‐patrol problem, where the fortification affects the security vulnerability of targets and the patrol indicates the defensive signal.FindingsThe result shows that the intentional risk would be elevated by adaptive attack strategies. An inflexible defending strategy probably fails when facing uncertainties of adversary. It is shown that the optimal response of defenders is to adjust defending strategies by learning from previous games and assessing behaviors of adversaries to minimize the expected loss.Originality/valueThis paper explores how adaptive strategies affect attacker‐defender conflicts. The key issue is defense allocation and information disclosure policy for mitigation of intentional threats. Attackers and defenders can adjust their strategies by learning from previous fights, and the strategic adjustment of both sides may be asynchronous.

scholarly journals Zur Dynamik prosozialen Verhaltens in einem asymmetrischen sozialen Dilemma: ein Beitrag zur experimentellen Spieltheorie / The Dynamics of Pro-social Behavior in an Asymmetric Social Dilemma: A Behavioral Game-Theoretic Approach

2011 ◽  
Vol 40 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sonja Vogt ◽  
Werner Raub ◽  
Jeroen Weesie ◽  
Vincent Buskens
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Social Behavior ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Behavioral Game Theory ◽  
Prosoziales Verhalten ◽  
Behavioral Game ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Pro Social Behavior ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

ZusammenfassungIn diesem Beitrag untersuchen wir prosoziales Verhalten im Sinne wechselseitiger Hilfeleistungen. Als formales Modell verwenden wir ein asymmetrisches wiederholtes Solidaritätsspiel zwischen zwei Akteuren. Wir modellieren Asymmetrie in drei Dimensionen: (1.) Nutzen, den ein Akteur aus der Hilfeleistung des anderen zieht, (2.) Kosten der eigenen Hilfeleistung und (3.)Wahrscheinlichkeit, mit der ein Akteur Hilfe benötigt. Wir untersuchen die Effekte von Asymmetrie auf die Dynamik wechselseitiger Hilfeleistungen im Verlauf des Spiels. Wir nehmen an, dass die Häufigkeit, mit der sich die Akteure helfen, vom Nutzen und den Kosten der Hilfeleistungen sowie von der Wahrscheinlichkeit abhängt, Hilfe zu benötigen. Unser Beitrag zur Theoriebildung ist ein einfaches adaptives Verhaltensmodell für die Erklärung wechselseitiger Hilfeleistungen, das an das Forschungsprogramm der experimentellen Spieltheorie („behavioral game theory“) anschließt. Wir präsentieren zwei Varianten eines solchen Modells: eine sozialpsychologisch inspirierte Variante und eine Variante, die auf spieltheoretischen Verhandlungsmodellen beruht. Unser Modell ist robust in dem Sinn, dass beide Varianten zu ähnlichen Vorhersagen führen. Empirische Daten aus zwei Laborexperimenten bestätigen diese Vorhersagen.

Hobbes's State of Nature: A Modern Bayesian Game-Theoretic Analysis

2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 485-508 ◽  
Author(s):  
HUN CHUNG
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
The State ◽  
The Other ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Bayesian Game ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
State Of Nature ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

ABSTRACT:Hobbes's own justification for the existence of governments relies on the assumption that without a government our lives in the state of nature would result in a state of war of every man against every man. Many contemporary scholars have tried to explain why universal war is unavoidable in Hobbes's state of nature by utilizing modern game theory. However, most game-theoretic models that have been presented so far do not accurately capture what Hobbes deems to be the primary cause of conflict in the state of nature—namely, uncertainty, rather than people's egoistic psychology. Therefore, I claim that any game-theoretic model that does not incorporate uncertainty into the picture is the wrong model. In this paper, I use Bayesian game theory to show how universal conflict can break out in the state of nature—even when the majority of the population would strictly prefer to cooperate and seek peace with other people—due to uncertainty about what type of person the other player is. Along the way, I show that the valuation of one's own life is one of the central mechanisms that drives Hobbes's pessimistic conclusion.

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