Earnings management and evolution of the banking regulation

2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 150-169 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarra Hamza Elleuch ◽  
Nelia Boulila Taktak
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Mixed Model ◽  
Banking Regulation ◽  
Loan Loss ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Loan Loss Provisions ◽  
Qualitative Approaches ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Imf

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the earnings management practices of Tunisian banks after the publication of the first International Monetary Fund (IMF) report (2002) over the period 1998-2007. Design/methodology/approach – The study relies on a mixed model that combines both the quantitative and qualitative approaches. First of all, we use the quantitative method to measure the discretionary loan loss provisions based on the model of Cornett et al. (2009), and then we validate the quantitative findings by using the interview approach. Findings – Since 2005, Tunisian banks have resorted less and less to accounting earnings management through the loan loss provisions, but conversely, real earnings management has been revealed instead by the sale of investment securities and the use of debt collection agencies. Despite the IMF recommendations, Tunisian banks continue to manage their earnings by changing only their strategies. Practical implications – The findings of this study show that the regulation cannot avoid earnings management. Even if the regulation limits the discretion of the manager, the latter finds new alternatives to manipulate the earnings. Originality/value – This is the first study that analyses the impact of the IMF recommendations on earnings management in an emerging economy.

Loan loss provision models in Brazilian banks

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Fernando Galdi ◽  
André De Moura ◽  
Robson França
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Mixed Model ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Regulatory Capital ◽  
Loan Loss ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Loan Loss Provision ◽  
The Impact

Purpose This paper investigates which loan loss provision (LLP) model [International Accounting Standards39 (IAS39) based on incurred losses and Brazilian Central Bank Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) based on a mixed model] presents higher quality in terms of predictability, and which model is less susceptible to earnings management practices using LLP. Design/methodology/approach To test the difference between the explanatory power of the mixed model and incurred loss model in explaining the LLP, this paper runs a two-stage fixed-effect panel regression model to evaluate the association between LLP of each model and variables representatives of non-discretionary aspects related to the quality of the loan portfolio, business cycles and qualitative evidence indicated in each GAAP. Then, this paper tests the relationship between the errors generated in each regression and the discretion of bank managers and banks’ characteristics. Findings This paper finds that the mixed model results in higher R2 demonstrating that the number produced under this regime is more related to observable variables than the number produced under the incurred losses model. Further, this paper finds no evidence that there is a difference in earnings management between the two standards and this paper does not find that banks manage earnings through regulatory capital. Nevertheless, this paper finds that earnings management is higher in private than in listed banks. Originality/value This paper takes advantage of the unique feature of the Brazilian Central Bank regulation to investigate the impact of two different accounting standards on LLP in a perfect setting.

Earnings management and equity incentives: evidence from the European banking industry

2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 244-261 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohammad Alhadab ◽  
Bassam Al-Own
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Banking Industry ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Loan Loss ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Loan Loss Provisions ◽  
Equity Incentives ◽  
European Banking ◽  
European Banks

Purpose This study aims to examine the effect of equity incentives on earnings management that occurs via the use of loan loss provisions by using a sample of 204 bank-year observations over the period 2006-2011. Design/methodology/approach The authors use the data of 39 European banks to test the main hypothesis. Several valuation models and regressions are used to measure the main proxies for executives’ compensation and the determinant factors of loan loss provisions. Findings The empirical results reveal that earnings management that occurs via discretionary loan loss provisions is associated with equity incentives in the banking industry. In particular, European banks’ executives with high equity incentives are found to manage reported earnings upwards by reducing loan loss provisions. The results therefore show that income-increasing earnings management via discretionary loan loss provisions is widely practised by the executives of European banks and that this is partly motivated by executives’ compensation. Practical implications The findings of this paper present important implications for regulators in the European Union, who should take further steps to reform the regulatory environment to monitor and mitigate the earnings management practices that occur via the manipulation of loan loss provisions. Earnings management practices do not just negatively affect subsequent performance but are also found to lead to firms’ failure. Thus, regulators should take the necessary reforms to protect the wealth of stakeholders (investors, creditors, etc.). Originality/value This study provides the first evidence on the relationship between equity incentives and earnings management in the European banking industry. The study sheds more light on an issue of great interest to a broad audience that does not receive much attention in the prior research, thus opening new avenues for future research.

Risk Assessment and Earning Management in Banking of Indonesia: Corporate Governance Mechanisms

2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 01-07
Author(s):  
Trinandari Prasetya Nugrahanti
Keyword(s):  
Risk Assessment ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Banking Sector ◽  
Loan Loss ◽  
Loan Loss Provisions ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Impact

Objective - The aim of this study to investigate the impact of risk assessment using the risk inherent and quality implementation of quality risk management in the operational activities of banking operations to earnings management practices through loss loan provisions and examine whether the mechanism of corporate government bank covering structure of corporate governance and quality of corporate governance can reduce the impact increase in earnings management in Banking sector of Indonesian. Methodology/Technique - We used data pooled from 2012 through 2014. By exploring the purposive sampling method, the 36 banking listed on the Stock Exchange Indonesian were selected as a sample of this study. A panel data multivariate regression methodology is used. Findings - The result of this study that (1) risk assessment strengthens the decrease in the earning management implementation after the adoption of IFRS in IAS 39; (2) corporate governance mechanisms can weaken the decrease in the earnings management practices through loan loss provisions. The final conclusions are IFRS in IAS No. 39 and Basel II Accord generally evidence to improve in bank's financial report quality. Novelty - This study could not find an empirical evidence on the impact of corporate government mechanisms covering structure of corporate governance and quality of corporate governance can reduce the increase in earnings management in banking sector of Indonesian Type of Paper - Empirical Keywords: Risk Assessment, Corporate Governance, Earnings Management, Loan Loss Provisions.

Do corporate diversification and earnings management practices affect capital structure?

2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 360-378 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ranjitha Ajay ◽  
R Madhumathi
Keyword(s):  
Capital Structure ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Corporate Diversification ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Diversification Strategies ◽  
Market Product ◽  
Diversified Firms ◽  
The Impact

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to empirically examine the impact of earnings management on capital structure across firm diversification strategies. Design/methodology/approach – The study focuses on firms operating in the manufacturing sector (diversified and focused). Panel data methodology compares diversification strategies and identifies the impact of diversification strategy with earnings management practices on capital structure decision. Findings – International and product diversified firms have lower levels of leverage than focused firms in their capital structure. Asset-based earnings management is positive for diversified (market/product) firms. Earnings management using discretionary expenditure (project based) is found to be higher for market diversified but product-focused firms. Earning smoothing method is found to be significant for focused firms and shows a negative relationship with capital structure. Originality/value – This study offers an insight into the relationship between corporate diversification, earnings management and capital structure decisions of manufacturing firms. The results provide an important contribution to accounting and strategy literature. A distinction is made between market- and product-diversified firms and influence of earnings management practices (asset-based, project-based and earnings smoothing (ESM)) on capital structure decisions. Diversified firms (market/product) tend to have lower levels of leverage than focused firms and earnings management practices within firm groups significantly influence the capital structure decisions.

Earnings management and audit quality at Damascus securities exchange: Does managerial ownership matter?

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Zukaa Mardnly ◽  
Zinab Badran ◽  
Sulaiman Mouselli
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Emerging Market ◽  
Ordinary Least Squares ◽  
Managerial Ownership ◽  
External Audit ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Impact

Purpose The purpose of this study is to examine the individual and combined effect of managerial ownership and external audit quality, as two control mechanisms, on earnings management. Design/methodology/approach This study applies ordinary least squares estimates on fixed-time effects panel regression model to test the impact of the investigated variables on earnings management for the whole population of banks and insurance companies listed at Damascus Securities Exchange (DSE) during the period from 2011 to 2018. Findings The empirical evidence suggests a negative non-linear relationship between managerial ownership (as proxied by board of directors’ ownership) on earnings management. However, neither audit quality nor the simultaneous effect of the managerial ownership and audit quality (Big 4) affects earnings management. Research limitations/implications DSE is dominated by the financial sector and the number of observations is constrained by the recent establishment of DSE and the small number of firms listed at DSE. In addition, the non-availability of data on executive directors’ and foreign ownerships restrict our ability to uncover the impact of different dimensions of ownership structure on earnings management. Practical implications First, it stimulates investors to purchase stocks in financial firms that enjoy both high managerial ownership, as they seem enjoying higher earnings quality. Second, the findings encourage external auditors to consider the ownership structure when choosing their clients as the financial statements’ quality is affected by this structure. Third, researchers may need to consider the role of managerial ownership when analyzing the determinants of earnings management. Originality/value It fills the gap in the literature, as it investigates the impact of both managerial ownership and audit quality on earnings management in a special conflict context and in an unexplored emerging market of DSE. It suggests that managerial ownership exerts a significant role in controlling earnings management practices when loose regulatory environment combines conflict conditions. However, external audit quality fails to counter earnings management practices when conditions are fierce.

scholarly journals Does the New European Banking Regulation discourage Earnings Management?

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (10) ◽  
pp. 45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giuseppe Di Martino ◽  
Grazia Dicuonzo ◽  
Graziana Galeone ◽  
Vittorio Dell'Atti
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Banking Sector ◽  
Banking Regulation ◽  
Regulatory Framework ◽  
Loan Loss ◽  
Minimum Capital ◽  
Loan Loss Provisions ◽  
European Banking ◽  
Single Rulebook

In the recent past, the financial crisis has shown important lacks in the EU regulation relating to the banking sector, making the introduction of a unified regulatory framework necessary. Since June 2009 the European Council has recommended a “Single Rulebook”, that is a unique and harmonizing discipline applicable to all financial institutions in the Single Market, become effective on January 2014. This prudential discipline requires much more minimum capital, liquidity and information transparency and it defines format and minimum standards of contents.The aim of this research is to investigate the relation between the new mandatory disclosure and earnings management policies in banking sector realized through Loan Loss Provisions (LLP), the component of income statement mainly subject to manipulations, especially in form of earnings smoothing. Because the new integrated regulatory framework requires a more transparent disclosure, we expected that accruals manipulation (basically LLP) could be discouraged. The empirical analysis is based on a sample of 116 listed European banks over the period prior (2011-2012-2013) and after (2014-2015-2016) the effective date of the Single Rulebook. The evidence confirm our hypothesis suggesting that this banking reform discourages earnings manipulation and improves earnings quality, making financial reporting more useful for investors. The results are important to the regulatory institutions (such as European Union and European Central Bank) supporting more stringent discipline introduced by Basel III.

Board characteristics, external auditing quality and earnings management

2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neila Boulila Taktak ◽  
Ibtissem Mbarki
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Good Practice ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
External Audit ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Board Characteristics ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
The Impact

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of board characteristics and external audit quality on earnings management among major Tunisian banks over the period 2003-2007. Design/methodology/approach – Multivariate regressions are employed to test the effect of board structure and external audit quality on discretionary provisions as a proxy for earnings management. Findings – Results indicate that among the characteristics of the board, CEO duality is associated with higher levels of discretionary provisions. However, the presence of directors affiliated to the largest shareholder tends to constrain earnings management practices. The results reveal also that a co-audit belonging to the BIG 4 provides incentives to manage earnings while the capacity of the external auditor to disclose reservations impacts negatively the manager's discretion. Practical implications – First, it is not desirable to appoint a co-audit both belonging to the BIG 4. Second, the presence of affiliated directors reduces the discretionary practices except in cases where directors are affiliated to families. In this case, banks should strengthen the presence of independent directors. Finally, the delineation of the leeway left in the Tunisian accounting standards would provide more transparent financial information. Originality/value – This study contributes to the literature on governance and its impact on earnings management among Tunisian banks by introducing two variables that have not been tested before which are affiliated directors and co-audit. The paper will be of value to banks willing to comply with the Governance Good Practice Guide adopted recently in Tunisia.

The impact of corporate governance mechanisms on earnings management in Islamic banks in the Middle East region

2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 318-348 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hounaida Mersni ◽  
Hakim Ben Othman
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Middle East ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Islamic Banks ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Loan Loss ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Impact

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine whether corporate governance mechanisms affect the reporting of loan loss provisions by managers in Islamic banks in the Middle East region. Design/methodology/approach This empirical study uses balanced panel data from 20 Islamic banks, from seven Middle East countries for the period 2007 to 2011. The regression model is estimated using random effects specifications. Findings The empirical results show that discretionary loan loss provisions (DLLP) are negatively related to board size and the existence of an audit committee. Results also report a positive relationship between sharia board size and DLLP. This indicates that small sharia supervisory boards are more effective than larger ones, which could be due to the higher costs and negative effects of large groups on decision-making. Results also highlight that the existence of scholars with accounting knowledge sitting on the sharia board reduces discretionary behavior. Additional results provide evidence that an external sharia audit committee is also found to reduce discretion in Islamic banks. The conclusions are found to be robust to endogeneity issues and potentially omitted variables. Practical implications The findings are potentially useful for regulators and shareholders. Regulators could use the findings to focus on corporate governance mechanisms that restrain earnings management practices in Islamic banks and implement regulations to strengthen them. Additionally, this study gives shareholders further insight which enables them to better monitor the actions of managers and thus increase their control over their investments. Originality/value This study provides two contributions to the literature on Islamic banking. First, to the authors’ knowledge, this study is only the second piece of research focused on the impact of corporate governance on earnings management in Islamic banks. Second, the authors have examined the effect of some new corporate governance mechanisms that have not been studied previously in the research literature.

Exploring the potentials of clawbacks to check earnings management practices and enhance financial reporting quality: perceptions from the UAE

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kahkashan Mahmood ◽  
Yasser Barghathi ◽  
Alhashmi Aboubaker Lasyoud
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
United Arab Emirates ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Set Up ◽  
The Impact

Purpose For investors to wholeheartedly entrust their finances to the supposed executives, there is the need to set up policies to checkmate the excesses of such executives, hence clawback policy. This study aims to explore the perceptions of professionals regarding the impact of clawback provisions on earnings management (EM) and financial reporting quality in the context of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Design/methodology/approach The application of a qualitative approach in an EM is of great significance in this study. For convenience, perceptions of the professionals were collected through semi-structured face-to-face interviews, internet forums and telephone conversations from which the data were initially transcribed and analyzed using thematic analysis. Findings The findings of the study indicate that clawbacks will have a significant impact on EM and financial reporting quality, and apart from this, other firm-level factors have also been supporting clawbacks. Practical implications EM has been a widespread practice; this research may potentially assist directors and regulatory bodies to comprehend factors that should be considered to reduce it. It may also provide practical insights from professionals regarding clawbacks and their bearing on EM and the quality of financial information from an emerging economy perspective. Originality/value A significant gap in the contemporary literature regarding the impact of clawback provisions on EM and financial reporting quality has been filed by this work, in the context of the UAE economy. Consequently, it provides a great insight into the effect of clawback in a business setting and how it can help checkmate the excesses of company executives.

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