Loan loss provision models in Brazilian banks

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Fernando Galdi ◽  
André De Moura ◽  
Robson França
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Mixed Model ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Regulatory Capital ◽  
Loan Loss ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Loan Loss Provision ◽  
The Impact

Purpose This paper investigates which loan loss provision (LLP) model [International Accounting Standards39 (IAS39) based on incurred losses and Brazilian Central Bank Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) based on a mixed model] presents higher quality in terms of predictability, and which model is less susceptible to earnings management practices using LLP. Design/methodology/approach To test the difference between the explanatory power of the mixed model and incurred loss model in explaining the LLP, this paper runs a two-stage fixed-effect panel regression model to evaluate the association between LLP of each model and variables representatives of non-discretionary aspects related to the quality of the loan portfolio, business cycles and qualitative evidence indicated in each GAAP. Then, this paper tests the relationship between the errors generated in each regression and the discretion of bank managers and banks’ characteristics. Findings This paper finds that the mixed model results in higher R2 demonstrating that the number produced under this regime is more related to observable variables than the number produced under the incurred losses model. Further, this paper finds no evidence that there is a difference in earnings management between the two standards and this paper does not find that banks manage earnings through regulatory capital. Nevertheless, this paper finds that earnings management is higher in private than in listed banks. Originality/value This paper takes advantage of the unique feature of the Brazilian Central Bank regulation to investigate the impact of two different accounting standards on LLP in a perfect setting.

Earnings management and evolution of the banking regulation

2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 150-169 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarra Hamza Elleuch ◽  
Nelia Boulila Taktak
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Mixed Model ◽  
Banking Regulation ◽  
Loan Loss ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Loan Loss Provisions ◽  
Qualitative Approaches ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Imf

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the earnings management practices of Tunisian banks after the publication of the first International Monetary Fund (IMF) report (2002) over the period 1998-2007. Design/methodology/approach – The study relies on a mixed model that combines both the quantitative and qualitative approaches. First of all, we use the quantitative method to measure the discretionary loan loss provisions based on the model of Cornett et al. (2009), and then we validate the quantitative findings by using the interview approach. Findings – Since 2005, Tunisian banks have resorted less and less to accounting earnings management through the loan loss provisions, but conversely, real earnings management has been revealed instead by the sale of investment securities and the use of debt collection agencies. Despite the IMF recommendations, Tunisian banks continue to manage their earnings by changing only their strategies. Practical implications – The findings of this study show that the regulation cannot avoid earnings management. Even if the regulation limits the discretion of the manager, the latter finds new alternatives to manipulate the earnings. Originality/value – This is the first study that analyses the impact of the IMF recommendations on earnings management in an emerging economy.

Did corporate governance mechanisms affect earnings management? Further evidence from GCC Islamic banks

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 2-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohamed Chakib Kolsi ◽  
Rihab Grassa
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Loan Loss ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Loan Loss Provision ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Impact

Purpose The aim of this paper is to examine the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on earnings management practice for a sample of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Islamic banks (IBs) using a new model of earnings management. Design/methodology/approach First, the authors estimate discretionary accruals based on loan loss provisions discretionary loan loss provision (DLLP) using the procedure derived from Jones’ (1991) original model. Second, the authors run a multivariate regression model to check the linkage between corporate governance characteristics and discretionary loan loss provision. Finally, the authors use an additional sensitivity check analysis to assess whether the results are robust to the estimation procedure and to other exogenous factors. Findings Using as sample of 26 IBs pertaining to the GCC region with a total of 223 firm-year observations and a nine-year period (2004-2012), the results are conclusive and show that first, IBs with large Shariah Board size manage less DLLP. Secondly, Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions membership positively impacts earnings management through DLLP in IBs. Third, there is a negative relationship between boards of director’s independence the extent to which IBs manage DLLP. Fourth, the existence of block holders positively affects earnings management by IBs. Fifth, there is a negative relationship between audit committee meetings and DLLP. Finally, institutional ownership and bank size have no effect on earnings management through DLLPs. Research limitations/implications In this research, the authors do not take into account all governance factors that are supposed to impact earnings management in IBs. Future research should explore the impact of additional IBs governance structures including chief executive officer bonus, experience, gender and the extent to which IBs use real earnings management with Murabaha, Mudaraba and Musharaka transactions. Practical implications The paper is a very useful source of information that may provide relevant guidelines in helping the future development of corporate governance of IBs. In addition, the findings could prove to be useful for regulators because they are responsible for the acceptable level of corporate governance standards. Thus, they must consider strengthening governance mechanisms either through new legislation or stronger enforcement where earnings management is of such magnitude to that serious impedes information transparency and financial reporting quality of IBs. Originality/value This study associates the corporate governance characteristics with earnings management by IBs. The study contributes to the growing body of literature on earnings management and corporate governance in IBs. It should be useful to researchers, regulators, investors, analysts and creditors as well as other players in the capital markets, as it presents a new and important aspect that needs to be accounted for when assessing the quality of IBs’ accounting information in GCC countries.

Earnings management and equity incentives: evidence from the European banking industry

2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 244-261 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohammad Alhadab ◽  
Bassam Al-Own
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Banking Industry ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Loan Loss ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Loan Loss Provisions ◽  
Equity Incentives ◽  
European Banking ◽  
European Banks

Purpose This study aims to examine the effect of equity incentives on earnings management that occurs via the use of loan loss provisions by using a sample of 204 bank-year observations over the period 2006-2011. Design/methodology/approach The authors use the data of 39 European banks to test the main hypothesis. Several valuation models and regressions are used to measure the main proxies for executives’ compensation and the determinant factors of loan loss provisions. Findings The empirical results reveal that earnings management that occurs via discretionary loan loss provisions is associated with equity incentives in the banking industry. In particular, European banks’ executives with high equity incentives are found to manage reported earnings upwards by reducing loan loss provisions. The results therefore show that income-increasing earnings management via discretionary loan loss provisions is widely practised by the executives of European banks and that this is partly motivated by executives’ compensation. Practical implications The findings of this paper present important implications for regulators in the European Union, who should take further steps to reform the regulatory environment to monitor and mitigate the earnings management practices that occur via the manipulation of loan loss provisions. Earnings management practices do not just negatively affect subsequent performance but are also found to lead to firms’ failure. Thus, regulators should take the necessary reforms to protect the wealth of stakeholders (investors, creditors, etc.). Originality/value This study provides the first evidence on the relationship between equity incentives and earnings management in the European banking industry. The study sheds more light on an issue of great interest to a broad audience that does not receive much attention in the prior research, thus opening new avenues for future research.

Do corporate diversification and earnings management practices affect capital structure?

2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 360-378 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ranjitha Ajay ◽  
R Madhumathi
Keyword(s):  
Capital Structure ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Corporate Diversification ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Diversification Strategies ◽  
Market Product ◽  
Diversified Firms ◽  
The Impact

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to empirically examine the impact of earnings management on capital structure across firm diversification strategies. Design/methodology/approach – The study focuses on firms operating in the manufacturing sector (diversified and focused). Panel data methodology compares diversification strategies and identifies the impact of diversification strategy with earnings management practices on capital structure decision. Findings – International and product diversified firms have lower levels of leverage than focused firms in their capital structure. Asset-based earnings management is positive for diversified (market/product) firms. Earnings management using discretionary expenditure (project based) is found to be higher for market diversified but product-focused firms. Earning smoothing method is found to be significant for focused firms and shows a negative relationship with capital structure. Originality/value – This study offers an insight into the relationship between corporate diversification, earnings management and capital structure decisions of manufacturing firms. The results provide an important contribution to accounting and strategy literature. A distinction is made between market- and product-diversified firms and influence of earnings management practices (asset-based, project-based and earnings smoothing (ESM)) on capital structure decisions. Diversified firms (market/product) tend to have lower levels of leverage than focused firms and earnings management practices within firm groups significantly influence the capital structure decisions.

Earnings management and audit quality at Damascus securities exchange: Does managerial ownership matter?

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Zukaa Mardnly ◽  
Zinab Badran ◽  
Sulaiman Mouselli
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Emerging Market ◽  
Ordinary Least Squares ◽  
Managerial Ownership ◽  
External Audit ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Impact

Purpose The purpose of this study is to examine the individual and combined effect of managerial ownership and external audit quality, as two control mechanisms, on earnings management. Design/methodology/approach This study applies ordinary least squares estimates on fixed-time effects panel regression model to test the impact of the investigated variables on earnings management for the whole population of banks and insurance companies listed at Damascus Securities Exchange (DSE) during the period from 2011 to 2018. Findings The empirical evidence suggests a negative non-linear relationship between managerial ownership (as proxied by board of directors’ ownership) on earnings management. However, neither audit quality nor the simultaneous effect of the managerial ownership and audit quality (Big 4) affects earnings management. Research limitations/implications DSE is dominated by the financial sector and the number of observations is constrained by the recent establishment of DSE and the small number of firms listed at DSE. In addition, the non-availability of data on executive directors’ and foreign ownerships restrict our ability to uncover the impact of different dimensions of ownership structure on earnings management. Practical implications First, it stimulates investors to purchase stocks in financial firms that enjoy both high managerial ownership, as they seem enjoying higher earnings quality. Second, the findings encourage external auditors to consider the ownership structure when choosing their clients as the financial statements’ quality is affected by this structure. Third, researchers may need to consider the role of managerial ownership when analyzing the determinants of earnings management. Originality/value It fills the gap in the literature, as it investigates the impact of both managerial ownership and audit quality on earnings management in a special conflict context and in an unexplored emerging market of DSE. It suggests that managerial ownership exerts a significant role in controlling earnings management practices when loose regulatory environment combines conflict conditions. However, external audit quality fails to counter earnings management practices when conditions are fierce.

Board characteristics, external auditing quality and earnings management

2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neila Boulila Taktak ◽  
Ibtissem Mbarki
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Good Practice ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
External Audit ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Board Characteristics ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
The Impact

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of board characteristics and external audit quality on earnings management among major Tunisian banks over the period 2003-2007. Design/methodology/approach – Multivariate regressions are employed to test the effect of board structure and external audit quality on discretionary provisions as a proxy for earnings management. Findings – Results indicate that among the characteristics of the board, CEO duality is associated with higher levels of discretionary provisions. However, the presence of directors affiliated to the largest shareholder tends to constrain earnings management practices. The results reveal also that a co-audit belonging to the BIG 4 provides incentives to manage earnings while the capacity of the external auditor to disclose reservations impacts negatively the manager's discretion. Practical implications – First, it is not desirable to appoint a co-audit both belonging to the BIG 4. Second, the presence of affiliated directors reduces the discretionary practices except in cases where directors are affiliated to families. In this case, banks should strengthen the presence of independent directors. Finally, the delineation of the leeway left in the Tunisian accounting standards would provide more transparent financial information. Originality/value – This study contributes to the literature on governance and its impact on earnings management among Tunisian banks by introducing two variables that have not been tested before which are affiliated directors and co-audit. The paper will be of value to banks willing to comply with the Governance Good Practice Guide adopted recently in Tunisia.

The impact of corporate governance mechanisms on earnings management in Islamic banks in the Middle East region

2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 318-348 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hounaida Mersni ◽  
Hakim Ben Othman
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Middle East ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Islamic Banks ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Loan Loss ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Impact

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine whether corporate governance mechanisms affect the reporting of loan loss provisions by managers in Islamic banks in the Middle East region. Design/methodology/approach This empirical study uses balanced panel data from 20 Islamic banks, from seven Middle East countries for the period 2007 to 2011. The regression model is estimated using random effects specifications. Findings The empirical results show that discretionary loan loss provisions (DLLP) are negatively related to board size and the existence of an audit committee. Results also report a positive relationship between sharia board size and DLLP. This indicates that small sharia supervisory boards are more effective than larger ones, which could be due to the higher costs and negative effects of large groups on decision-making. Results also highlight that the existence of scholars with accounting knowledge sitting on the sharia board reduces discretionary behavior. Additional results provide evidence that an external sharia audit committee is also found to reduce discretion in Islamic banks. The conclusions are found to be robust to endogeneity issues and potentially omitted variables. Practical implications The findings are potentially useful for regulators and shareholders. Regulators could use the findings to focus on corporate governance mechanisms that restrain earnings management practices in Islamic banks and implement regulations to strengthen them. Additionally, this study gives shareholders further insight which enables them to better monitor the actions of managers and thus increase their control over their investments. Originality/value This study provides two contributions to the literature on Islamic banking. First, to the authors’ knowledge, this study is only the second piece of research focused on the impact of corporate governance on earnings management in Islamic banks. Second, the authors have examined the effect of some new corporate governance mechanisms that have not been studied previously in the research literature.

Exploring the potentials of clawbacks to check earnings management practices and enhance financial reporting quality: perceptions from the UAE

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kahkashan Mahmood ◽  
Yasser Barghathi ◽  
Alhashmi Aboubaker Lasyoud
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
United Arab Emirates ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Set Up ◽  
The Impact

Purpose For investors to wholeheartedly entrust their finances to the supposed executives, there is the need to set up policies to checkmate the excesses of such executives, hence clawback policy. This study aims to explore the perceptions of professionals regarding the impact of clawback provisions on earnings management (EM) and financial reporting quality in the context of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Design/methodology/approach The application of a qualitative approach in an EM is of great significance in this study. For convenience, perceptions of the professionals were collected through semi-structured face-to-face interviews, internet forums and telephone conversations from which the data were initially transcribed and analyzed using thematic analysis. Findings The findings of the study indicate that clawbacks will have a significant impact on EM and financial reporting quality, and apart from this, other firm-level factors have also been supporting clawbacks. Practical implications EM has been a widespread practice; this research may potentially assist directors and regulatory bodies to comprehend factors that should be considered to reduce it. It may also provide practical insights from professionals regarding clawbacks and their bearing on EM and the quality of financial information from an emerging economy perspective. Originality/value A significant gap in the contemporary literature regarding the impact of clawback provisions on EM and financial reporting quality has been filed by this work, in the context of the UAE economy. Consequently, it provides a great insight into the effect of clawback in a business setting and how it can help checkmate the excesses of company executives.

CEO characteristics and earnings management: empirical evidence from France

2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dhouha Bouaziz ◽  
Bassem Salhi ◽  
Anis Jarboui
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Significant Relationship ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Financial Communication ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Ceo Characteristics

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of chief executive officer (CEO) characteristics on the earnings management examined by the discretionary accruals. Design/methodology/approach The sample includes 151 French firms listed on the CAC ALL shares index from 2006 to 2015. The paper uses the feasible generalized least square regression technique to test the relationship between CEO characteristics and earnings management. Findings Using discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management, the results obtained from the three models (Jones modified 1995; Kothari et al., 2005; Raman and Shahrur, 2008) indicated that there is a positive and significant relationship between CEO duality, CEO nationality and the quality of financial communication. However, no significant relationship was found between CEO board member, CEO turnover and earnings management. Originality/value A literature review finds that fewer studies have investigated the relationship between earnings management practices and personal CEO characteristics in the French context. Furthermore, no study yet has examined the influence of CEO nationality and CEO age on earnings management practices. This study provides empirical data about the impact of CEO’s characteristics on earnings management and how these different characteristics can facilitate the transition to manipulate and influence the quality of financial communication.

scholarly journals Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions, Earnings Management and Capital Management in Banks

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (7) ◽  
pp. 144
Author(s):  
Amina Zgarni ◽  
Hassouna Fedhila
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
International Standards ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
Regulatory Capital ◽  
Loan Loss ◽  
Loan Loss Provisions ◽  
Financial Scandals

The two past decades have been marked by a multitude of financial scandals (the Enron failure, WorldCom. etc.) mainly caused by the practices of earning management that have challenged the financial reporting quality disclosed. The purpose of this research is to study the determinants of discretionary loan loss provisions in banks. To achieve this objective, we selected a sample of the main Tunisian banks over the period from 2001 to 2014. The estimation results shows that the banks are opting for earnings management practices through the discretionary loan loss provisions in order to align with international standards, in particular with respect to regulatory capital. In opposition, we found a non-significant relationship between earnings before taxes and provisions and discretionary provisions.

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