Current developments in money laundering and terrorism financing

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabian Maximilian Johannes Teichmann

Purpose Whilst the existing literature focuses on developing prevention mechanisms for banks, this paper aims to demonstrate the ongoing feasibility of money laundering and financing terrorism undetected. This study thereby reveals that the current anti-money-laundering and anti-terrorism-financing mechanisms can easily be circumvented. Design/methodology/approach A three-stage research process was used, including both qualitative and quantitative methods. The empirical findings are based on a qualitative content analysis of 50 informal interviews with illegal financial services providers and 50 formal interviews with compliance experts and law enforcement officers. Findings During these interviews, specific methods of financing terrorism and limiting the risks of being prosecuted were discussed. Hence, specific methods of money laundering and terrorism financing have been analyzed. Research limitations/implications The findings thus convey only the perspectives of the 100 interviewees, such that generalizability is limited. Practical implications The practical implications include suggestions for financial regulators, financial institutions and compliance officers on how to more effectively combat money laundering and terrorism financing. Although the empirical findings are limited to Europe, the results could be applied globally. Originality/value This paper reveals new insights about criminals’ actions, which help to develop more effective compliance mechanisms.

2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 90-95
Author(s):  
Fabian Maximilian Johannes Teichmann

Purpose This paper aims to focus on developing prevention mechanisms for banks, this paper shows the ongoing feasibility of laundering money and financing terrorism undetected. It, thereby highlights that the current anti-money-laundering and anti-terrorism-financing mechanisms can be easily circumvented. Design/methodology/approach A three-step research process, including both qualitative and quantitative methods, was used. The empirical findings are based on qualitative content analysis of 35 informal interviews with illegal financial services providers and 35 formal interviews with compliance experts and law enforcement officers. Findings During those interviews, concrete and specific methods of financing terrorism and limiting the risks of being prosecuted were discussed. To assess compliance officers’ awareness of those methods, a quantitative survey of 190 compliance officers was subsequently conducted to determine what leads to investigations. Research limitations/implications The findings only convey the perspectives of the 70 interviewees and 190 survey participants. Practical implications The practical implications include suggestions for financial regulators, financial institutions and compliance officers on how to more effectively combat money laundering and terrorism financing. Originality/value While the empirical findings are based in Europe, the results could be applied globally.


2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 782-795
Author(s):  
Fabian Maximilian Johannes Teichmann

Purpose Whilst the existing literature focuses on developing prevention mechanisms for banks, this paper aims to show how feasible it still is in Austria, Germany, Liechtenstein and Switzerland to finance terrorism without getting detected. Design/methodology/approach A three-step research process, including both qualitative and quantitative methods, was applied. The empirical findings are based upon qualitative content analysis of 15 informal interviews with illegal financial services providers and 15 formal interviews with compliance experts and law enforcement officers. Findings During those interviews, concrete and specific methods of financing terrorism and limiting the risks of facing a criminal prosecution were discussed. The interviews were analyzed based upon a qualitative content analysis. To assess the risk, which criminals, a quantitative survey among 181 compliance officers was conducted to determine what leads to investigations. Research limitations/implications The findings are limited to the 30 interviewees’ and 181 survey participants’ perspective. Practical implications The practical implications include suggestions for providing law enforcement and intelligence agencies with new tools, such as remote online searches of electronic devices. Originality/value Whilst the empirical findings are based upon Austria, Germany, Liechtenstein and Switzerland, the results could be applied on European level.


2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 2-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabian Maximilian Teichmann

Purpose This paper aims to investigate how criminals launder money and finance terrorism through the financial system. Design/methodology/approach In total, 70 interviews were conducted with criminals and white-collar crime prevention experts, whose responses were subjected to qualitative content analysis. Based on the findings, a quantitative survey of 200 compliance officers was carried out. Findings The interviews and survey revealed concrete techniques of laundering money and financing terrorism through the financial services industry and its affiliates. Evidently, the compliance mechanisms aimed at preventing money laundering and terrorism financing can be easily circumvented. Research limitations/implications This study’s findings are limited to the perspectives of 70 interviewees. Hence, it is possible that a study with a larger sample conducted in different countries or at a different time could have yielded different results. Practical implications Identifying the concrete methods of laundering money and financing terrorism should provide both compliance officers and legislators with valuable insights into criminal activity. By better understanding the specific steps taken by criminals, compliance officers should be able to more effectively combat both money laundering and terrorism financing. Originality/value While prior literature focuses on the organizations and mechanisms involved in combating money laundering and terrorism financing, this paper instead explores how criminals avoid detection by taking into account existing compliance mechanisms and criminal perspectives.


2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 32-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabian Maximilian Johannes Teichmann

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how criminals need to proceed to launder money and finance terrorism through the use of consulting firms. Design/methodology/approach A qualitative content analysis of 58 semi-standardized expert interviews with both illegal financial services providers and prevention experts led to the identification of concrete techniques for money laundering and terrorism financing through consulting companies. Findings Consulting firms could be considered to be “criminals’ best friends”. Terrorists could either buy or set up consulting firms in reputable countries, such as Switzerland or the UK. Subsequently, they could combine real consulting services along with fake clients to cover their illicit activities. Research limitations/implications As the findings are based on semi-standardized interviews, they are limited to the 58 interviewees’ perspectives. Practical implications The identification of gaps in current prevention mechanisms is meant to provide legislators, compliance officers, law enforcement agencies and intelligence offices with insights into how criminals finance terrorism and launder money. Originality/value While the existing literature focuses on simply naming areas that could play a part in money laundering or the financing of terrorism, this paper describes a concrete method. It takes both prevention and criminal perspectives into account.


2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabian Maximilian Johannes Teichmann ◽  
Marie-Christin Falker

Purpose This paper aims to illustrate how illegally obtained funds are laundered through raw diamonds in Austria, Germany, Liechtenstein and Switzerland. Design/methodology/approach To identify specific money laundering techniques involving raw diamonds, this study used a qualitative content analysis of data collected from 60 semi-standardized interviews with both criminals and prevention experts and a quantitative survey of 200 compliance officers. Findings Raw diamonds are extraordinarily suitable for money laundering in European German-speaking countries. In particular, they may be used in all three stages of the laundering process, namely, placement, layering and integration. Research limitations/implications Because the qualitative findings are based on semi-standardized interviews, their insights are limited to the perspectives of the 60 interviewees. Practical implications Identifying gaps in existing anti-money laundering mechanisms should provide compliance officers, law enforcement agencies and legislators with valuable insights into how criminals operate. Originality/value While prior studies focus on the methods used by organizations to combat money laundering and how to improve anti-money laundering measures, this paper investigates how money launderers operate to avoid detection, thereby illustrating authentic experiences. Its findings provide valuable insights into the minds of money launderers and combines criminal perspective with that of prevention experts.


2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 410-416 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabian Maximilian Johannes Teichmann

Purpose This paper aims to demonstrate how criminals launder money in the antiquities trade in Austria, Germany, Liechtenstein and Switzerland. Design/methodology/approach A qualitative content analysis of 58 semi-structured expert interviews with both criminals and prevention experts and a quantitative survey of 184 compliance officers revealed the concrete techniques used to launder money in the European antiquities trade. Findings The antiquities market facilitates the placement, layering and integration of the transfer of assets to terrorist organizations. Most importantly, it is among the few profitable methods of laundering money. Research limitations/implications As the findings of the qualitative study are based on semi-standardized interviews, they are limited to the 58 interviewees’ perspectives. Practical implications The identification of concrete methods of money laundering and terrorism financing aims to provide compliance officers, law enforcement agencies and legislators with valuable insight into criminal activity. Originality/value While the existing literature focuses on organizations fighting money laundering and the financing of terrorism, this study instead describes how criminals avoid detection by taking into account prevention and criminal perspectives.


2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabian Maximilian Johannes Teichmann

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to discuss the role of money laundering methods in circumventing sanctions against individuals. In particular, it shows how politically exposed persons can circumvent sanctions through money laundering mechanisms. Design/methodology/approach A total of 70 expert interviews were conducted, comprising 35 formal interviews with prevention experts and 35 informal interviews with money launderers. By subjecting their responses to qualitative content analysis, concrete ways of circumventing sanctions are identified. Findings Financial sanctions against individuals are highly ineffective, as they can be easily circumvented. To successfully influence political processes, alternative mechanisms are necessary. Research limitations/implications This study’s findings are limited to the perspectives of 70 interviewees. Hence, it is possible that a study with a larger sample conducted in different countries or at a different time could have yielded different results. Practical implications Identifying the gaps in anti-money-laundering mechanisms should provide compliance officers and legislators with valuable insights into why the current prevention schemes are ineffective and how sanctions against individuals can be circumvented. The findings, thus, highlight the scope to improve compliance mechanisms and the need for other tools to influence political processes. Originality/value The current sanctions against individuals are found to be ineffective means of influencing politics, as they can be easily circumvented. Hence, alternative mechanisms and tools are needed.


2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 485-500 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabian Maximilian Teichmann ◽  
Marie-Christin Falker

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how illegally obtained funds are laundered by employment of consulting companies in Austria, Germany, Liechtenstein and Switzerland. Design/methodology/approach A qualitative content analysis of 28 semi-standardized expert interviews with both criminals and prevention experts, and a quantitative survey of 200 compliance officers led to the identification of concrete money-laundering techniques involving the employment of consulting companies. Findings Consulting companies continue to be used for money laundering in European German-speaking countries, especially in the layering and integration stages of the money laundering process, during which the origins of funds are concealed, and the money is integrated into the legal economy. Research limitations/implications Qualitative findings from the analysis of semi-standardized interviews are limited to the 28 interviewees’ perspectives. Practical implications Identification of gaps in existing anti-money-laundering mechanisms provides compliance officers, law enforcement agencies and legislators with valuable insights into how criminals operate. Originality/value The existing literature focuses on organizations that combat money laundering and the improvement of anti-money-laundering measures. This paper outlines how money launderers avoid detection. Both preventative and criminal perspectives are considered.


2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 805-818
Author(s):  
Fabian Maximilian Johannes Teichmann ◽  
Marie-Christin Falker

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to exemplify how money launderers in European German-speaking countries use deposit boxes to place incriminated funds. Design/methodology/approach During a qualitative content analysis of 60 semi-standardized expert interviews with both criminals and prevention experts and a quantitative survey of 200 compliance officers, concrete money laundering techniques using deposit boxes were identified. Findings Deposit boxes may be used to place incriminated funds or prepare for their subsequent placement. Thus, the method is highly suitable to the demands of small-scale money laundering. Research limitations/implications The study’s qualitative findings are limited to the perspectives of the 60 interview partners. The interviews were conducted in a semi-standardized fashion. Practical implications The present paper aims at identifying gaps in existing anti-money laundering mechanisms to provide compliance officers, law enforcement agencies and legislators with worthwhile insights into the minds of criminals. Originality/value The present paper illustrates how money launderers operate to avoid detection, capturing the perspective of the launderer. Thus, the reader is granted access to highly valuable information that is supposed to facilitate the introduction of new anti-money laundering measures. Moreover, it shows how compliance officers view the issue and what they consider to be important to the successful implementation of compliance mechanisms. Moreover, the officers’ statements will exhibit which methods they do and do not engage with on a daily basis.


2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 337-352
Author(s):  
Fabian Maximilian Teichmann ◽  
Marie-Christin Falker

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how illegally obtained funds from Austria, Germany, Liechtenstein and Switzerland are laundered through the banking system in Dubai. Design/methodology/approach The study is conducted using a qualitative content analysis of 60 semi-structured expert interviews with both criminals and money laundering prevention experts, and a quantitative survey of 200 financial sector compliance officers. Findings Some banks in Dubai are highly suitable for all stages of the money laundering process. However, although certain banks have weak compliance mechanisms, others act in an exemplary manner. Research limitations/implications The qualitative findings are based on semi-structured interviews and are limited to the 60 interviewees’ perspectives. Practical implications Identification of gaps in anti-money laundering mechanisms provides compliance officers, law enforcement agencies and legislators with valuable insights into how money laundering criminals operate. Originality/value The existing literature focuses mainly on organizations and the methods they use to combat money laundering. This paper outlines how money launderers operate to avoid detection. Authentic experiences are illustrated. The reader is provided with valuable insights into the minds of money launderers. Both lawful and criminal perspectives are taken into account.


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