Using the Shapley value of stocks as systematic risk

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 459-468
Author(s):  
Haim Shalit

Purpose This study aims to propose the Shapley value that originates from the game theory to quantify the relative risk of a security in an optimal portfolio. Design/methodology/approach Systematic risk as expressed by the relative covariance of stock returns to market returns is an essential measure in pricing risky securities. Although very much in use, the concept has become marginalized in recent years because of the difficulties that arise estimating beta. The idea is that portfolios can be viewed as cooperative games played by assets aiming at minimizing risk. With the Shapley value, investors can calculate the exact contribution of each risky asset to the joint payoff. For a portfolio of three stocks, this study exemplifies the Shapley value when risk is minimized regardless of portfolio return. Findings This study computes the Shapley value of stocks and indices for optimal mean-variance portfolios by using daily returns for the years 2016–2019. This results in the risk attributes allocated to securities in optimal portfolios. The Shapley values are analyzed and compared to the standard beta estimates to determine the ranking of assets with respect to pertinent risk and return. Research limitations/implications An alternative approach to value risk and return in optimal portfolios is presented in this study. The logic and the mechanics of Shapley value theory in portfolio analysis have been explained, and its advantages relative to standard beta analysis are presented. Hence, financial analysts when adding or removing specific assets from present positions will have the true and exact impact of their actions by using the Shapley value instead of the beta. Practical implications When computing the Shapley value, portfolio risk is decomposed exactly among its assets because it considers all possible coalitions of portfolios. In that sense, financial analysts when adding or removing specific securities from present holdings will be able to predict the true and exact impact of their transactions by using the Shapley value instead of the beta. The main implication for investors is that risk is ultimately priced relative to their holdings. This prevents the subjective mispricing of securities, as standard beta is not used and might allow investors to gain from arbitrage conditions. Originality/value The logic and the methodology of Shapley value theory in portfolio analysis have been explained as an alternative to value risk and return in optimal portfolios by presenting its advantages relative to standard beta analysis. The conclusion is that the Shapley value theory contributes much more financial optimization than to standard systematic risk analysis because it enables looking at the contribution of each security to all possible coalitions of portfolios.

2021 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 78-85
Author(s):  
Ester Livshits ◽  
Leopoldo Bertossi ◽  
Benny Kimelfeld ◽  
Moshe Sebag

Database tuples can be seen as players in the game of jointly realizing the answer to a query. Some tuples may contribute more than others to the outcome, which can be a binary value in the case of a Boolean query, a number for a numerical aggregate query, and so on. To quantify the contributions of tuples, we use the Shapley value that was introduced in cooperative game theory and has found applications in a plethora of domains. Specifically, the Shapley value of an individual tuple quantifies its contribution to the query. We investigate the applicability of the Shapley value in this setting, as well as the computational aspects of its calculation in terms of complexity, algorithms, and approximation.


2016 ◽  
Vol 80 ◽  
pp. 21-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Koji Yokote ◽  
Yukihiko Funaki ◽  
Yoshio Kamijo

Author(s):  
SILVIU GUIASU

A solution of n-person games is proposed, based on the minimum deviation from statistical equilibrium subject to the constraints imposed by the group rationality and individual rationality. The new solution is compared with the Shapley value and von Neumann-Morgenstern's core of the game in the context of the 15-person game of passing and defeating resolutions in the UN Security Council involving five permanent members and ten nonpermanent members. A coalition classification, based on the minimum ramification cost induced by the characteristic function of the game, is also presented.


2012 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 169-180 ◽  
Author(s):  
Victor Ginsburgh ◽  
Israël Zang

AbstractWe suggest a new game-theory-based ranking method for wines, in which the Shapley Value of each wine is computed, and wines are ranked according to their Shapley Values. Judges should find it simpler to use, since they are not required to rank order or grade all the wines, but merely to choose the group of those that they find meritorious. Our ranking method is based on the set of reasonable axioms that determine the Shapley Value as the unique solution of an underlying cooperative game. Unlike in the general case, where computing the Shapley Value could be complex, here the Shapley Value and hence the final ranking, are straightforward to compute. (JEL Classification: C71, D71, D78)


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Gray ◽  
Jason Hall ◽  
Grant Pollard ◽  
Damien Cannavan

Purpose In the context of public-private partnerships (PPPs), it has been argued that the standard valuation framework produces a paradox whereby government appears to be made better off by taking on more systematic risk. This has led to a range of approaches being applied in practice, none of which are consistent with the standard valuation approach. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that these approaches are flawed and unnecessary. Design/methodology/approach The authors step through the proposed alternative valuation approaches and demonstrate their inconsistencies and illogical outcomes, using theory, logic and mathematical proof. Findings In this paper, the authors demonstrate that the proposed (alternative) approaches suffer from internal inconsistencies and produce illogical outcomes in some cases. The authors also show that there is no problem with the current accepted theory and that the apparent paradox is not the result of a deficiency in the current theory but is rather caused by its misapplication in practice. In particular, the authors show that the systematic risk of cash flows is frequently mis-estimated, and the correction of this error solves the apparent paradox. Practical implications Over the past 20 years, PPP activity around the globe amounts to many billions of dollars. Decisions on major infrastructure funding are of enormous social and economic importance. Originality/value To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to demonstrate the flaws and internal inconsistencies with proposed valuation framework alternatives for the purposes of evaluating PPPs.


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