Risk of conflict will rise in the South China Sea

Subject Risk of armed conflict in the South China Sea. Significance US patrols close to Chinese installations in the South China Sea, in the context of growing willingness among China, Vietnam and the Philippines to assert maritime claims by force, raise fears of lethal clashes. These have occurred before, between China and Vietnam in 1974 and 1988, leading respectively to around 70 and 60 deaths. Impacts Neither China's rival claimants nor the United States are likely to risk physically disrupting China's island-building activities. Unintended conflict is more likely than calculated use of force. Conflict between China and Vietnam is the most likely conflict scenario. Washington's need to preserve credibility as a treaty ally and security guarantor would force it to intervene in conflicts.

Significance However, China's navy already has an operational sea-based nuclear deterrent based on Hainan Island. The deployment of nuclear-armed submarines, and their need to reach the mid-Pacific to threaten the continental United States, makes the South China Sea an arena not just of maritime disputes but of US-China military rivalry. Impacts The strategic importance of the Philippines, Taiwan and Singapore to the United States will increase. A new defence agreement with the Philippines will, as of last month, support US military activities in the area. Washington will encourage greater Japanese involvement in the South China Sea; as long as Shinzo Abe is prime minister, Japan will oblige.


Subject The South China Sea dispute. Significance China and the United States increased their military activities in the South China Sea in January and February, with US ‘freedom of navigation operations’ (FONOPs) pushing back on Chinese maritime jurisdictional claims in the area. The Philippines before June 2016 contested China’s expansive claims. Increased rivalry between Beijing and Washington in South-east Asia raises the risk of a dangerous naval confrontation. Impacts The Philippines will continue to solicit investment from China. China is unlikely to undertake actions in the South China Sea that would seriously irk the Philippines. South-east Asian countries will emphasise the importance of the region not becoming a theatre for China-US rivalry.


Subject ASEAN-US defence and security ties outlook. Significance The 'Shangri-La Dialogue' held in Singapore between May 29 and 31 evidenced the growing China-US divide over the South China Sea, particularly over China's island-building activities. The frictions will be revisited at the ASEAN Regional Forum, in Malaysia on June 10. Burgeoning tensions in the South China Sea increase pressure on South-east Asian countries, and ASEAN, to maintain equilibrium in relations with China and the United States as individual ASEAN countries pursue their own maritime interests. Impacts The Philippines will seek further US defence support, and develop security ties with Vietnam and Japan. Singapore will push for a South China Sea code of conduct, but China is unlikely to consent to a binding code. US Pacific Command leadership will provide some US strategy continuity in the Asia-Pacific region.


Significance Duterte’s initial decision to scrap the pact was in line with his personal antipathy towards the United States, and his wish for better ties with Washington’s rival, Beijing, despite Philippine-Chinese tensions regarding the South China Sea. Separately, the Philippines and Japan held their first-ever combined air force exercise earlier this month. Impacts The Philippines will strengthen defence ties with India and South Korea as well as Japan. US vaccine supplies should help the Philippines speed up its COVID-19 inoculation programme. Duterte will continue to encourage investment from China and downplay Beijing’s assertiveness in the South China Sea.


2011 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 77-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlyle A. Thayer

This article reviews Chinese assertive behaviour towards the Philippines and Vietnam over South China Sea issues in 2011. The article compares and contrasts Chinese diplomatic behaviour in the period before and after the adoption by ASEAN member states and China of Guidelines for the Implementation the Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in July. In the first period China aggressively asserted its claims to sovereignty by interfering with commercial fishing and oil exploration activities of vessels operating in the Exclusive Economic Zones of Vietnam and the Philippines. Both states resisted Chinese actions. The Philippines allocated increased funding for defence modernization, lobbied ASEAN states and shored up its alliance with the United States. Vietnam too protested Chinese action and undertook symbolic steps to defend national sovereignty. In the second period all states moved to contain South China Sea tensions from affecting their larger bilateral relations. It remains to be seen, however, if proposed confidence building measures will ameliorate Chinese assertiveness.


Significance South-east Asian leaders will discuss the South China Sea dispute, the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar and regional trade. ASEAN’s eight dialogue partners, including the United States and China, will be present at the talks. Impacts An eventual Code of Conduct for the South China Sea is likely to include an air code recently agreed by ASEAN defence ministers. Myanmar could face EU trade sanctions over the Rohingya crisis. ASEAN is likely to boost cooperation over counterterrorism, cybersecurity and climate change.


Author(s):  
Nataliya Gorodnia

This paper describes and discusses the major developments in the U.S.-Philippines security relations in 1991-2016, between signing an agreement to extend a rent of Subic Bay Naval base by the U.S. and inauguration of R. Duterte administration. The research has revealed three periods in the U.S.-Philippines security relations in 1991-2016. The first period started when the Philippines senate rejected to ratify the Subic Bay Agreement in September 1991, and the United States had to evacuate the naval base on November 1992. It lasted until the U.S. and the Philippines signed a Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) in 1998. The Philippines government’s interest in reaching a new agreement was caused by China’s 1995 military occupation of the Panganiban reef and other incidents at the disputed territories in the South China Sea. The Philippines claimed that they composed a part of their exclusive economic zone, according to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The second period lasted since ratification of the VFA by the Philippines parliament in 1999 until aggravation of the situation in the South China Sea in 2011. This period was featured by enhanced political and military cooperation between the U.S. and the Philippines, and significant U.S. assistance in modernization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). In September 2001–2006, the security cooperation was focused on the counterterrorism activitiesin the Philippines by military means. In 2007–2011, the focus shifted to humanitarian operations and development assistance. During the third period, in March 2011 – June 2016, B. Aquino administration refocused attention from domestic security issues to the threats in the South China Sea. In 2014, the Philippines and the U.S. signed the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, which provided American ships, aircrafts and military personnel with an access to several military bases of the AFP on a rotating basis. The Agreement essentially improved U.S. strategic position in the Southeast Asia and the South China Sea.


Significance A sweeping victory for the Philippines has dismantled any legal basis for expansive Chinese claims across much of the South China Sea. Impacts How the Philippines administration responds will shape how all affected countries interpret Philippine foreign and strategic policy to 2022. Manila may make its military more externally facing, reflected in equipment priorities; internal security capacity could suffer. More US 'freedom of navigation' exercises in the South China Sea are likely. Malaysia, Brunei and Vietnam will assess implications for their maritime disagreements with China. The ruling will exacerbate rifts in ASEAN over relations with China.


Subject Manila's case against Beijing at the UNCLOS arbitral tribunal. Significance An international tribunal is expected this month or next to rule on a landmark case brought by the Philippines against China over the South China Sea issue. The decision will have far-reaching reverberations for the South China Sea, the Law of the Sea, and international law and politics in East Asia. US officials have expressed concern that it will exacerbate tensions in the region as China responds assertively to an adverse finding. Impacts The case may provide the long-awaited legal definition of an 'island' under the UNCLOS. The arbitration could 'legalise' China's nine-dash line. The tribunal is most likely to uphold Philippine claims in waters around Scarborough Shoal. It will probably reject Chinese assertions of 'historic rights', but some key findings will favour China.


Subject The possibility of joint China-Philippines exploitation of hydrocarbons in disputed waters in the South China Sea. Significance Recent months have seen a succession of signs of a possible breakthrough in China-Philippines offshore energy cooperation. The Philippine foreign secretary has suggested the two countries may shortly reach an agreement to exploit hydrocarbon resources in a disputed area of the South China Sea. The deal would involve a 60:40 revenue-sharing arrangement in favour of the Philippines. Impacts Many Philippine politicians will support the deal because the country needs a replacement for the rapidly depleting Malampaya gas field. Even a carefully drafted arrangement may still face constitutional challenges within the Philippines. Both countries would benefit from greater energy security.


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