Pakistan will be pragmatic on Lashkar-e-Taiba

Subject Pakistan's relationship with Laskhar-e-Taiba. Significance The intergovernmental Financial Action Task Force (FATF) at a plenary meeting last week decided to keep Pakistan on its ‘grey list’ of jurisdictions which have weak measures against terrorist financing, although it acknowledged the progress it has made in improving safeguards. As part of its attempts to come off the grey list, Pakistan has jailed Hafiz Saeed, leader of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) militant group. Pakistan’s politically powerful military has long leveraged LeT as a proxy. Impacts Some Pakistan-based militant groups may begin targeting the Pakistani state if deprived of outlets in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Islamabad is unlikely to be taken off the FATF grey list after the body’s next plenary meeting in June, but it may be later in the year. Pakistan will face immense external criticism if there are signs of the military tightening rather than loosening relations with militants.

Subject Pakistan's status with the Financial Action Task Force. Significance The intergovernmental Financial Action Task Force (FATF) said on October 18 it would keep Pakistan on its ‘grey list’ of jurisdictions with deficient measures against terrorist financing. Islamabad had been at risk of consignment to a blacklist, which would potentially expose it to measures such as economic sanctions. It now has until February 2020 to convince the FATF of compliance with an action plan to improve its safeguards. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Imran Khan’s government is attempting to spur an economic recovery, aided by a recent IMF bailout. Impacts Islamabad will try to secure further financial assistance from partners such as Beijing and Riyadh, hoping to ease macroeconomic pressures. Pakistan will show that it is arresting more terrorists, although the military will be reluctant to cut ties with useful militant proxies. The support that Malaysia and Turkey demonstrated for Pakistan at the FATF will expose them to trade pressure from India.


Subject Prospects for Pakistan in 2020. Significance In early 2020, Pakistan will again face a challenge to convince the intergovernmental Financial Action Task Force (FATF) that it has strengthened its measures against terrorist financing. Islamabad wants to avoid being put on the organisation’s ‘blacklist’, which would expose it to a risk of sanctions at a time when it is trying to spur an economic revival. Meanwhile, Pakistan is looking to bolster its relations with allies as tensions with enemy India simmer over the disputed Kashmir region.


Subject Prospects for Pakistan to end-2019. Significance Key challenges for Pakistan in the second half of this year include finalising its latest loan programme with the IMF and extricating itself from the intergovernmental Financial Action Task Force (FATF) ‘grey list’. While the IMF bailout will require consent from Fund executives in Washington, Islamabad will need to convince the FATF that it has taken steps to crack down on terrorist financing.


Significance The legislation significantly increases the executive’s power to determine what constitutes terrorism. The government of the fledgling Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, in the Philippine south, had requested Duterte not to endorse it, believing it will be used primarily against people there. Impacts Authorities will use the law to curb communists, whom Duterte regards as terrorists, as well as suspected Islamist militants. The law may help keep the Philippines off a Financial Action Task Force watchlist of states with weak measures against terrorist financing. Legal challenges to the law will not lead to significant changes to it.


2019 ◽  
Vol IV (IV) ◽  
pp. 281-290
Author(s):  
Abid Hussain

Pakistan is facing great challenges of terrorism which have posed serious threats towards integrity and stability of the country. It is unanimously agreed that finance serves as lifeline for execution of terrorist activities. Terrorist groups generate funds through multiple sources and transfer them by exploiting the loopholes existing in financial system. Despite, Pakistan has taken sufficient steps to counter the financing of terrorism (CFT), nonetheless, money is still transmitting due to some regulatory flaws of the financial system. Owing to terrorist financing related deficiencies, Pakistan has been placed on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) “Grey list”. FATF has warned Pakistan to be blacklisted if precipitate actions to address TF related deficiencies are not taken until February 2020. The paper evaluates the present CFT legal framework and recommends certain legal initiatives required to be taken by Pakistan prior dead line of February 2020.


2017 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 127-151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Doron Goldbarsht

This article focuses on the Australian implementation of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations, so-called ‘soft law’ instruments, which represent the international standards in Counter Terrorist Financing (CTF) but which force legislators to conform. The article will fill the gaps existing in the literature today by focusing on the origins and motives of broad CTF legislation in Australia, then detailing each of the FATF's CTF Recommendations and the ways in which they are implemented in Australia. This approach differs significantly from other literature in the field, which deals solely with Australian implementation of one of the FATF's components. The current paper's examination will reveal the CTF regime in Australia, a decade after the FATF's first CTF Mutual Evaluation Report on Australia, and its decisive influence.


Significance The bill, which now goes to the Lower House, is in line with demands from Gafilat, the Latin American affiliate of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which began a long-delayed evaluation of Paraguay’s performance on May 7. This will probably avoid Paraguay returning to the FAFT ‘grey list’ but is unlikely to placate the international financial community. Impacts Abdo Benitez will face an uphill struggle to get anti-corruption legislation through Congress. US pressures will mount with respect to purported terrorism finance in the tri-border area. Lack of progress will complicate relations with the international financial community.


2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ehi Eric Esoimeme

Purpose This paper aims to critically examine the Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Bill, 2016. It also aims to determine the level of effectiveness of the preventive measures in the Bill. Design/methodology/approach The appraisal took the form of a desk study, which analyzed various documents and reports such as the Financial Action Task Force Recommendations 2012, Mutual Evaluation Reports conducted by the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA) on Nigeria, the judgment delivered by Justice Gabriel Kolawole of the Federal High Court Abuja and the United Kingdom’s national risk assessment of money laundering and terrorist financing. Findings This paper determined that the Bill could achieve its core objectives if the following recommendations are implemented: section 15 of the Bill should be modified to include the definition of “Arrangement”; lawyers should be allowed to send their Suspicious Transaction Report to the Nigerian Bar Association, provided that there are appropriate forms of cooperation between the NBA and the Financial Intelligence Unit, and this approach is in line with the Financial Action Task Force Recommendations; the Bill should expressly prohibit retaliation by employers against whistleblowers and provide them with a private cause of action in the event that they are discharged or discriminated against by their employers, and this approach is being adopted by the US Dodd–Frank Act; a request for customer information, by the Director-General of the Nigeria Financial Intelligence Centre, should be made pursuant to an order of the Federal High Court obtained upon an ex-parte application supported by a sworn declaration by an authorized officer of the Centre, justifying the request for customer information. Originality/value This paper offers a critical appraisal of the Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Bill, 2016. The paper will identify the strengths and weaknesses of the Bill. This is the only paper to adopt this kind of approach.


Subject Likely consequences of Pakistan's imminent IMF bailout. Significance Pakistan appears on the brink of finalising a loan programme with the IMF, less than three years after the end of the last one, to help deal with a macroeconomic crisis. Separately, Prime Minister Imran Khan has made promises about welfare provision and job creation and his government last month launched a four-year plan to bolster economic growth. Impacts Pakistan’s access to international markets will depend on extrication from a Financial Action Task Force ‘grey list’ as much as an IMF loan. Hiking energy tariffs to increase revenue, in line with IMF conditionality, will probably incite anti-government protests. Islamabad will draw closer politically and economically to Riyadh.


2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 855-870
Author(s):  
Doron Goldbarsht ◽  
Hannah Harris

Purpose This paper aims to explore the case of counter-terrorist financing (CTF) within the transnational regulatory network (TRN) of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The paper demonstrates how the structure and operation of the FATF reflect those of a TRN and shows how the FATF has been successful in securing formal compliance with CTF policies. Design/methodology/approach The paper stresses that formal compliance does not guarantee actual compliance or effective enforcement. It is argued that the FATF and the CTF regime must balance concerns for legitimacy with those of flexibility and efficiency. Traditionally, TRNs have focused on flexibility, efficiency and informal cooperation over legitimacy. This paper demonstrates that legitimacy concerns cannot be ignored. Findings A lack of legitimacy may ultimately result in non-compliance and ineffectiveness. On this basis, current efforts to build legitimacy through the FATF are noted but deemed insufficient. If this balance is not struck, the FATF may be doomed to failure through an overreliance on coercive methods. Particularly in the case of CTF, coercion is insufficient for meaningful compliance. Global enforcement by diverse states is a necessary condition for the success of the regime. Originality/value This paper will fill the gaps existing in the literature by examining CTF, as well as the FATF as an example of TRN. This approach differs from other literature in the field, which deals solely with the effectiveness of the FATF and the global CTF without considering the effect of legitimacy on compliance.


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