Xi's common prosperity uses old methods on new targets

Significance The meeting ended with a call for high incomes to be regulated and for the rich to 'give back' more. It followed a series of dramatic regulatory actions against large private firms and super-rich individuals. Impacts Inequality has become a higher priority in recent years; many further attempts to address it will emerge. The Party has not soured on private business in general or in principle; most private firms and entrepreneurs will not be targets. Comparisons to Mao and the Cultural Revolution are misplaced. Next year's Party Congress is particularly sensitive, so the customary crackdowns ahead of it may be commensurately intense.

2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Feng Deng

Purpose Many studies on witch killings in Africa suggest that “witchcraft is the dark side of kinship.” But in Chinese history, where patriarchal clan system has been emphasized as the foundation of the society, there have been few occurrences of witch-hunting except a large-scale one in the Cultural Revolution in 1966. The purpose of this paper is to explain the above two paradoxes. Design/methodology/approach Theoretical analysis based on preference falsification problem with regard to the effect of social structure on witch-hunting is carried out. Findings There is a “bright side of kinship” due to two factors: first, it would be more difficult to pick out a person as qualitatively different in Chinese culture; second, the hierarchical trust structure embedded in the Chinese culture can help mitigate the preference falsification problem, which acts as the leverage for witch-hunting. In this sense, an important factor for the Cultural Revolution is the decline of traditional social institutions and social values after 1949. Originality/value This paper is the first to advance the two paradoxes and offer an explanation from the perspective of social structure.


Slavic Review ◽  
1988 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 414-433 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Kenez

The NEP was an inherently unstable social and political system: It contained within itself the seeds of its own destruction. The Bolsheviks carried out policies in which they did not fully believe and with implications that worried them. Although the Tenth Party Congress in 1921 forbade factions within the party, the struggle for power during Lenin's final illness and after his death inevitably created factions. The struggle for power and the conflict between contrasting views concerning the future of society came to be intertwined. For the sake of economic reconstruction the party allowed private enterprise to reemerge. As time went on, many Bolshevik leaders came to be convinced supporters of the mixed economic system; others, on the basis of their reading of Marxist ideology, found such policies distasteful.


Significance Since he took office, private firms have suffered most from attempts to rein in corporate debt, while state firms have benefited from flagship initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative and Made In China 2025. Now, a series of reforms and assertive regulatory actions is targeting sectors dominated by private firms, including internet platforms and education. Impacts Private firms will further increase their presence in the Chinese economy, although at a slower pace than before. More emphasis will be put on support for small and medium-sized firms as major employers and drivers of economic growth. Preferential treatment of state-owned enterprises will remain a pillar of government policy.


1973 ◽  
Vol 55 ◽  
pp. 478-510 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin Mackerras

The theatrical life of the Chinese in recent years has closely reflected the evolution of Chinese society as a whole since the Cultural Revolution. Although the ninth Party Congress in April 1969 confirmed the success of the Maoist line established in the Cultural Revolution, deciding exactly how to apply that ideological system has not always been easy. Debate has continued in all sections of the community, and is reflected very clearly in the newspapers and media. Amid these debates enough concrete decisions have been reached to begin new cultural activity, largely suspended while the issues were being thrashed out during the Cultural Revolution, and with the passing of time the pace of the revival in the arts has quickened. The resurgence is based on Maoist theory, and it may conseqeuntly be useful to begin with a discussion of how the Chinese are formulating their ideas on what the theatre is all about.


1970 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
pp. 1-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Bridgham

In his keynote political report to the Ninth Party Congress, Lin Piao discussed at some length the history of the “great proletarian cultural revolution” from its formal inception at a May 1966 Central Committee work conference to its nominal conclusion at the Party Congress in April 1969. Although he listed the objectives of the Cultural Revolution as ideological, political and economic in character, Lin stressed that “the fundamental question in the current revolution” is “the question of political power, a question of which class holds leadership.”


1983 ◽  
Vol 94 ◽  
pp. 282-303
Author(s):  
Paul J. Hiniker

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution began with the publication of Yao Wenyuan's article, “Comment on the new historical play ‘Hai Rui Dismissed from Office’,” which alluded to Chairman Mao's summary dismissal of Defence Minister Peng Dehuai six years earlier. The article first appeared in the 10 November 1965 issue of the Shanghai Wen Hui Daily under Chairman Mao's personal direction through the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee. The curious unrolling of the Cultural Revolution during the subsequent three years through the consolidating Ninth Party Congress in the spring of 1969, exhibited three essential characteristics: first of all, an unprecedented increase in proselytizing for the Thought of Mao Zedong; secondly, an unprecedented leftist purging of the majority of the Politburo and Central Committee leadership; and finally, an unprecedented infusion of outside youth and soldiers of the People's Liberation Army to fill the vacated leadership posts.


2010 ◽  
Vol 201 ◽  
pp. 79-103 ◽  
Author(s):  
Victor Shih ◽  
Wei Shan ◽  
Mingxing Liu

AbstractCan one man dominate the Chinese Communist Party? This has been a much debated issue in the field of Chinese politics. Using a novel database that tracks the biographies of all Central Committee (CC) members from 1921 to 2007, we derive a measure of top CCP leaders' factional strength in the CC. We show that Mao could not maintain a commanding presence in the Party elite after the Eighth Party Congress in 1956, although the Party chairman enjoyed a prolonged period of consolidated support in the CC at a time when the CCP faced grave external threats. No Chinese leader, not even Mao himself, could regain the level of influence that he had enjoyed in the late 1940s. Our results, however, do not suggest that a “code of civility” has developed among Chinese leaders. The Cultural Revolution saw the destruction of Liu Shaoqi's faction. Although violent purges ended after the Cultural Revolution, Chinese leaders continued to promote followers into the CC and to remove rivals' followers.


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