West African governments will struggle with unrest

Significance This is due to a combination of factors, including high rates of vaccine hesitancy and inadequate supply to meet current demand. The Omicron variant has raised fears that economic recovery could be stifled. Meanwhile, inflation has increased in the region amid political and social unrest in many of its countries. Impacts Vaccine roll-out will continue to lag in West Africa. Coastal states may experience an uptick in jihadist attacks in border areas. Public sector strikes and street protests will occur frequently across the region.

Significance A rise in cases and deaths has increased pressure on the government over its sluggish vaccine roll-out. Despite an announcement recently that a local laboratory will soon begin producing the Russian Sputnik V vaccine, questions over vaccine negotiations and planned AstraZeneca supplies are mounting. Impacts Political concerns will increase vaccine hesitancy. Renewed lockdown measures will generate little compliance and will have more impact on the economy than the pandemic. A severe new winter wave would undermine prospects for economic recovery this year.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Buno (Okenyebuno) Emmanuel Nduka ◽  
Giwa Sechap

Purpose Designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs) are important actors both in the formal and informal sectors owing to the nature of services they offer. The DNFBPs are key players in financial and economic development and thus are highly vulnerable to money laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (TF) risks. Globally, and indeed, within the West African region, typologies studies have indicated several instances of misuse of DNFBPs for the laundering of proceeds of crime and to a lesser extent, TF. Factors that make DNFBPs vulnerable to ML and TF in the region, include limited understanding of ML/TF risk and anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) obligations, and poor implementation of AML/CFT measures by the sector. As reporting institutions, DNFBPs are required to implement appropriate measures to mitigate the ML/TF risk facing them. Mutual evaluation reports (MERs) of countries in the region noted weak implementation of AML/CFT measures by DNFBPs compares to financial institutions. These coupled with the general poor monitoring and supervision of DNFBPs for compliance, make them a weak link in member states’ AML/CFT regime. This study examined how Economic Community of West African States member states can plug the loopholes in the DNFBPs to strengthen their AML/CFT regime and thus improve their performance during mutual evaluation. This study reviewed data from the publications of Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and other credible sources. Design/methodology/approach This study is more of desk-review based on secondary data, including information obtained from GIABA, and FATF publications, and websites as well as information obtained from reliable sources on the internet. The authors reviewed the MERs of GIABA member states that have been assessed under the second round, especially that of Ghana, Senegal, Cape Verde, Mali and Burkina Faso, with particular focus on sections of the reports relating to preventive measures and supervision. In general, this paper adopts a policy approach with a view to explaining the importance and benefits of implementing AML/CFT preventive measures by reporting entities, especially the DNFBPs. Findings This study found that there is a general lack of information on the exact size of DNFBPs across member states, the risk of ML/TF associated with DNFBPs is generally identified as high across member states (albeit at different levels), the extent and level of monitoring/supervision of DNFBPs for AML/CFT compliance trails what is obtainable in financial institutions; the institutional and operational frameworks for regulating, supervising and monitoring DNFBPs are either weak or poorly defined in many member states; and the focus of AML/CFT technical assistance has been more on financial institutions than DNFBPs. Although the number of MERs reviewed for this work may be few, the findings and conclusions in the concluded MERs reflect regional peculiarities, including high informality of the economies, preponderance use of cash in transactions, diversity of DNFBPs and the general weak application of AML/CFT preventive measures by these entities, and the weak AML/CFT supervision or monitoring of DNFBPs which cut across all GIABA member states. Although efforts to address the weaknesses in the DNFBPs, including training and supervision, have commenced, in most member states, these are still at rudimentary levels. Research limitations/implications However, this study is limited by the fact that it was desk-based review without direct inputs of industry players (DNFBPs and their supervisors). Practical implications In general, this paper adopts a policy approach with a view to explaining the importance and benefits of implementing AML/CFT preventive measures by reporting entities, especially the DNFBPs. It aims to bring to the fore the weaknesses of the DNFBPs in the implementation of AML/CFT preventive measures and therefore will be useful to national authorities who are striving toward strengthening their national AML/CT regimes and to DNFBPs who wish to protect the integrity and stability of their system. Originality/value It is imperative to mention that the weak compliance by DNFBPs, and indeed other challenges inhibiting effective implementation of preventive measures, is not peculiar to West Africa. A review of MERs of 17 African countries (eight countries in the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti Money Laundering Group region, five in GIABA region and three in the Middle East and North Africa region assessed under the current round as on October 2020, show a similar pattern of weak ratings under Immediate Outcome 4.


Significance While the overall number of incidents is fewer than a dozen since the rise of the region's jihadist insurgencies in the early 2010s, the trend lends credence to growing warnings about the jihadist threat to coastal West African countries. Concern has focused on Ivory Coast and Benin, but there is also nervousness about Ghana, Togo and even Senegal. Impacts Western governments will boost security assistance to coastal states. Intelligence sharing and joint operations will not forestall cross-border hit-and-run attacks. Most regional states will resort to security-focused responses whose abuses drive jihadist recruitment.


Subject Prospects for West Africa in 2018. Significance Ruling coalitions will emphasise economic recovery (Nigeria) and foreign investment gains (Ivory Coast), while fragile transitions beckon for post-conflict states (Sierra Leone). Militant terrorist threats are plaguing countries across the region (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Nigeria), heaping added pressure on ruling alliances to improve counter-terrorism preparedness.


Subject France's reform agenda. Significance On September 7, yellow vest protests resumed in French cities, albeit in small numbers. It is, however, a warning for President Emmanuel Macron that social unrest is still a threat as the government seeks to drive ahead with stage two of its controversial reform agenda. Impacts While France is less exposed to trade disputes than such countries as Germany, recession in the latter would slow France's growth further. Reducing unemployment and avoiding a public sector backlash will be crucial for Macron’s expected re-election bid in 2022. Marine le Pen’s far-right National Rally remains Macron’s only significant political rival, which increases his chances of re-election. Domestic stability will enable Paris to pursue a more assertive foreign policy.


Headline WEST AFRICA: Currency changes gain official momentum


Significance However, cuts to the social grants budget and a continued focus on the planned three-year wage freeze for civil servants has annoyed (among others) the ruling ANC's ‘Tripartite Alliance’ partners, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP). Impacts Pressure will grow on a joint National Treasury-Presidency initiative, ‘Operation Vulindlela’, to hasten long-promised structural reforms. The success of the government’s mass vaccination programme will depend on its efficacy and willingness to work with the private sector. The government's modest economic recovery projections could prove too optimistic if vaccine roll-out falters or further COVID-19 waves hit.


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-133
Author(s):  
Ediomo-Ubong Nelson ◽  
Isidore Obot

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to discuss priorities for effective responses to illicit drugs in West Africa in a changing international policy environment. Design/methodology/approach The paper analyzes published research, technical papers and reports on drug use and policy responses in West Africa and opines on priorities for drug policy in the region within the post-United Nations General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) 2016 policy environment. Findings Drug use and related harms continue to increase in West African countries despite efforts to reduce drug trafficking and use through legal prohibition. The UNGASS 2016 outcome document enables flexibility in policy interpretation and implementation, which provides an opportunity for governments to prioritize national needs in drug policy. West African countries should prioritize and support research and data collection, prevention, treatment and harm reduction and sustainable livelihoods. Originality/value The paper emphasizes the need for West African countries to seize the opportunity created by the ineffectiveness and weakening of the prohibition regime as well as new treaty flexibility following UNGASS 2016 to reform drug policies to prioritize regional and national needs.


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