The evolution of cooperation with diversity of extortion under the normalized payoff framework on scale-free networks

Author(s):  
Yajun Mao ◽  
Xiongrui Xu ◽  
Qian Zhao ◽  
Chuyi Guo ◽  
Zhihai Rong
2012 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 301-319 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shade T. Shutters

Altruistic punishment occurs when an agent incurs a cost to punish another but receives no material benefit for doing so. Despite the seeming irrationality of such behavior, humans in laboratory settings routinely pay to punish others even in anonymous, one-shot settings. Costly punishment is ubiquitous among social organisms in general and is increasingly accepted as a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. Yet if it is true that punishment explains cooperation, the evolution of altruistic punishment remains a mystery. In a series of computer simulations I give agents the ability to punish one another while playing a continuous prisoner's dilemma. In simulations without social structure, expected behavior evolves—agents do not punish and consequently no cooperation evolves. Likewise, in simulations with social structure but no ability to punish, no cooperation evolves. However, in simulations where agents are both embedded in a social structure and have the option to inflict costly punishment, cooperation evolves quite readily. This suggests a simple and broadly applicable explanation of cooperation for social organisms that have nonrandom social structure and a predisposition to punish one another. Results with scale-free networks further suggest that nodal degree distribution plays an important role in determining whether cooperation will evolve in a structured population.


2009 ◽  
Vol 80 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jorge Peña ◽  
Henri Volken ◽  
Enea Pestelacci ◽  
Marco Tomassini

2019 ◽  
Vol 286 (1895) ◽  
pp. 20181949 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaojie Chen ◽  
Åke Brännström ◽  
Ulf Dieckmann

Dispersal is a key process for the emergence of social and biological behaviours. Yet, little attention has been paid to dispersal's effects on the evolution of cooperative behaviour in structured populations. To address this issue, we propose two new dispersal modes, parent-preferred and offspring-preferred dispersal, incorporate them into the birth–death update rule, and consider the resultant strategy evolution in the prisoner's dilemma on random-regular, small-world, and scale-free networks, respectively. We find that parent-preferred dispersal favours the evolution of cooperation in these different types of population structures, while offspring-preferred dispersal inhibits the evolution of cooperation in homogeneous populations. On scale-free networks when the strength of parent-preferred dispersal is weak, cooperation can be enhanced at intermediate strengths of offspring-preferred dispersal, and cooperators can coexist with defectors at high strengths of offspring-preferred dispersal. Moreover, our theoretical analysis based on the pair-approximation method corroborates the evolutionary outcomes on random-regular networks. We also incorporate the two new dispersal modes into three other update rules (death-birth, imitation, and pairwise comparison updating), and find that similar results about the effects of parent-preferred and offspring-preferred dispersal can again be observed in the aforementioned different types of population structures. Our work, thus, unveils robust effects of preferential dispersal modes on the evolution of cooperation in different interactive environments.


2018 ◽  
Vol 29 (09) ◽  
pp. 1850077 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tianhang Wu ◽  
Hanchen Wang ◽  
Jian Yang ◽  
Liang Xu ◽  
Yumeng Li ◽  
...  

In human societies, personal heterogeneity may affect the strategy adoption capability of the individuals. In this paper, we study the effects of heterogeneous learning ability on the evolution of cooperation by introducing heterogeneous imitation capability of players. We design a pre-factor [Formula: see text] to represent the heterogeneous learning ability of players, which is related to the degree of players. And a parameter [Formula: see text] is used to tune the learning levels. If [Formula: see text], the learning ability of players decreases and the low-degree player has the higher reduction level, but if [Formula: see text], the learning ability of low-degree players enhances to a higher level. By carrying out extensive simulations, it reveals that the evolution of cooperation is influenced significantly by introducing player’s heterogeneous learning ability and can be promoted under the right circumstances. This finding sheds some light on the important effect of individual heterogeneity on the evolutionary game.


2017 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Genki Ichinose ◽  
Hiroki Sayama

It is well known that cooperation cannot be an evolutionarily stable strategy for a non-iterative game in a well-mixed population. In contrast, structured populations favor cooperation, since cooperators can benefit each other by forming local clusters. Previous studies have shown that scale-free networks strongly promote cooperation. However, little is known about the invasion mechanism of cooperation in scale-free networks. To study microscopic and macroscopic behaviors of cooperators' invasion, we conducted computational experiments on the evolution of cooperation in scale-free networks where, starting from all defectors, cooperators can spontaneously emerge by mutation. Since the evolutionary dynamics are influenced by the definition of fitness, we tested two commonly adopted fitness functions: accumulated payoff and average payoff. Simulation results show that cooperation is strongly enhanced with the accumulated payoff fitness compared to the average payoff fitness. However, the difference between the two functions decreases as the average degree increases. As the average degree increases, cooperation decreases for the accumulated payoff fitness, while it increases for the average payoff fitness. Moreover, for the average payoff fitness, low-degree nodes play a more important role in spreading cooperative strategies than for the accumulated payoff fitness.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yu Kong ◽  
Tao Li ◽  
Yuanmei Wang ◽  
Xinming Cheng ◽  
He Wang ◽  
...  

AbstractNowadays, online gambling has a great negative impact on the society. In order to study the effect of people’s psychological factors, anti-gambling policy, and social network topology on online gambling dynamics, a new SHGD (susceptible–hesitator–gambler–disclaimer) online gambling spreading model is proposed on scale-free networks. The spreading dynamics of online gambling is studied. The basic reproductive number $R_{0}$ R 0 is got and analyzed. The basic reproductive number $R_{0}$ R 0 is related to anti-gambling policy and the network topology. Then, gambling-free equilibrium $E_{0}$ E 0 and gambling-prevailing equilibrium $E_{ +} $ E + are obtained. The global stability of $E_{0}$ E 0 is analyzed. The global attractivity of $E_{ +} $ E + and the persistence of online gambling phenomenon are studied. Finally, the theoretical results are verified by some simulations.


IEEE Access ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-1
Author(s):  
Jinlong Ma ◽  
Junfeng Zhang ◽  
Yongqiang Zhang

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