This article seeks to expose incumbents' tendencies and strategies in using charitable alms (zakat) in regional elections in two areas. Strategies identified include determining binding regulations regarding the use of zakat money, as well as the positioning of persons considered loyal and strategic to incumbents within the leadership structures of zakat institutions. Meanwhile, incumbents worked to integrate and interconnect government programmes with local zakat distribution agencies and attracting public sympathies through the sharing of zakat funds. Incumbents benefit from their power and legitimacy, and can thus easily use zakat funds as an economic resource for gathering the support of zakat recipients (mustahiq[1]). With their power and legitimacy, incumbents are able to claim credit and thus enjoy greater popularity in their re-election campaigns. This power and legitimacy, as well as its benefits, are managed strategically and intelligently to avoid giving the impression of illegality and ease social acceptance. The findings of this research are opposite to those of Samantha May; where May has found that state dominance and control of zakat has met widespread resistance, this research has found that state dominance and control of zakat has not only been well-received by society, but has also had implications for politicians' role in zakat management and distribution. This research, conducted through observation and interviews with zakat distributors/recipients, indicates how clientelism is formed through the government zakat distribution agency (Badan Amil Zakat, 'Zakat Distribution Agency'), the structural/instrumental approaches used by incumbents, and the response of zakat recipients. This article takes two elections in two regions as case studies: Kulon Progo in the 2017 regional election and Magelang Regency in the 2013 regional election.
Modelling and control of particulate systems - three industrial(ly based) case studies
