The Effects of Financial Crises on American Financial Institutions Information Security

Author(s):  
Cliff Knopik ◽  
Justin Zhan
2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 503-504
Author(s):  
Dara Z. Strolovitch

“Critical analyses of the global financial crisis of 2008 (GFC) have neglected the ways in which structural inequalities around gender and race factor into (and indeed make possible) the current economic order. Scandalous Economics breaks new ground by arguing that an explicitly gendered approach to the GFC and its ongoing effects can help us to understand both the root causes of the crisis and the failure to significantly reform financial institutions and macroeconomic models.” These words, from the blurb on the back cover of Scandalous Economics, nicely summarize the book’s topic and the general approach to it. Because the book contains contributions from a number of the top political scientists writing about the gendering of political economy, and because this topic is such an important one, we have invited a range of political scientists to comment on the book and on the broader theme of the gendering of political economy.


FEDS Notes ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (2988) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Hawley ◽  
◽  
Marco Migueis ◽  

The failure of large and connected financial institutions often leads to system-wide financial crises and economic downturns (Labonte 2015). Even absent outright failure and bankruptcy, perceived weakness of a large and connected financial firm can result in decrease valuation of other firms – due to perceived linkages – and overall decrease in market liquidity.


2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 511-512
Author(s):  
Daniel W. Drezner

“Critical analyses of the global financial crisis of 2008 (GFC) have neglected the ways in which structural inequalities around gender and race factor into (and indeed make possible) the current economic order. Scandalous Economics breaks new ground by arguing that an explicitly gendered approach to the GFC and its ongoing effects can help us to understand both the root causes of the crisis and the failure to significantly reform financial institutions and macroeconomic models.” These words, from the blurb on the back cover of Scandalous Economics, nicely summarize the book’s topic and the general approach to it. Because the book contains contributions from a number of the top political scientists writing about the gendering of political economy, and because this topic is such an important one, we have invited a range of political scientists to comment on the book and on the broader theme of the gendering of political economy.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Youssef Cassis ◽  
Catherine R. Schenk

This chapter establishes the conceptual frameworks for assessing memories of financial crises and the ways that the past is used in periods of financial crisis. We use this framework to address three fundamental questions: first, are financial crises remembered, and if so how? Second, have lessons been drawn from past financial crises? And third, have past experiences been used in order to make practical decisions when confronted with a new crisis? These questions are of course related, yet they have been approached from different historical perspectives, using methodologies borrowed from different academic disciplines. One of the objectives of this book is to explore how these approaches can complement each other in order to better understand the relationships between remembering and learning from financial crises and how the past is used by financial institutions. It thus recognizes financial crisis as a recurring phenomenon and addresses the impact that this has in a range of public and policy contexts.


Author(s):  
Abdulazeem Abozaid

Financial intermediation is the core of the banking business, as its role is to mediate between the owners of surplus funds and those in need of finance, sharing the generated profit with the funds' owners. However, financial intermediation does involve some economic risks in terms of concentration of debt in financial institutions and the possibility of the inability of financed clients to repay their debts. When this happens, financial crises are inevitable, as it occurred in 2008. Islamic finance does not differ in this regard from its traditional counterparts, because the concentration of debts also holds on the concept of Islamic institutional finance, and the possibility of collective default is possible as well. The study treats the issue of financial intermediation and its risks from Maqasidi aspect using home finance as a point of comparison between conventional home finance with Islamic home finance in terms of their economic effects. The study eventually proposes a model for home financing that is free of these cautions.


2020 ◽  
Vol 68 (5) ◽  
pp. 932-947 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aris Komporozos-Athanasiou ◽  
Marianna Fotaki

This article proposes an alternative sociological framework for dealing with the imaginary constitution of financial crises. Theorisation of financial crises is often limited by dualistic juxtaposition of the rational and irrational, moral and immoral, calculative and intuitive, thus neglecting the imaginary structuring of such dyads in the construction of financial and fiscal realities. To address this lacuna, we introduce ideas from philosopher Cornelius Castoriadis, and develop a framework that unpicks the often-suppressed, mediating and generative role of imagination in finance. On the one hand, we show how dominant forms of imagination enable the financialisation of contemporary societies, serving to sustain existing debt practices and lender–debtor relationships. On the other hand, we propose a re-animated ‘sociological imagination’ that offers potential avenues for establishing alternative social visions of the future that will enable re-thinking of the nature of debt, money and financial institutions.


2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 270-305 ◽  
Author(s):  
Friederike Niepmann ◽  
Tim Schmidt-Eisenlohr

Financial institutions are increasingly linked internationally. As a result, financial crises and government intervention have stronger effects beyond borders. We provide a model of international contagion allowing for bank bailouts. While a social planner trades off tax distortions, liquidation losses, and intra- and intercountry income inequality, in the noncooperative game between governments there are inefficiencies due to externalities, a lack of burden sharing, and free riding. We show that, in absence of cooperation, stronger interbank linkages make government interests diverge, whereas cross-border asset holdings tend to align them. We analyze different forms of cooperation and their effects on global and national welfare. (JEL C72, G01, G21, G28)


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. p419
Author(s):  
Mehdi Monadjemi ◽  
John Lodewijks

The global financial crises of 2007-2009 was followed by the Great Recession which was the worst since the Great Depression of 1930s. The crises left significant adverse effects on global growth and employment. Policymakers of affected countries responded differently to the outcomes of these crises. The central banks, including US Federal Reserve Bank and Bank of England, provided ample liquidity for the financial institutions and lowered the interest rate to near zero. The policymakers and regulators realized that capital inadequacy and insufficient liquidity of financial institutions were the main problems preventing the financial firms to protect themselves against major financial crises. In addition, lack of guidelines for compensations encourages managers to take the extra risks. The US Federal Reserve Bank took the initiative, in cooperation with international central banks to introduce rules and regulations to safeguard the financial systems against another major crisis. It is not guaranteed that another episode of financial instability will not happen again. However, with existing regulations on financial institutions in force, the severity of the crises on the whole global financial system may possibly become weaker. This is a conjecture we explore here.


2000 ◽  
Vol 00 (92) ◽  
pp. 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haizhou Huang ◽  
Chenggang Xu ◽  
◽  

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