Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard Based Incentive Mechanism for Full-Duplex Relay Systems

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruqiu Ma ◽  
Li Wang ◽  
Gordon Stuber
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Full Duplex ◽  
Relay Systems ◽  
Full Duplex Relay

scholarly journals Research Issues, Challenges, and Opportunities of Wireless Power Transfer-Aided Full-Duplex Relay Systems

IEEE Access ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 8870-8881 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhongxiang Wei ◽  
Xu Zhu ◽  
Sumei Sun ◽  
Yufei Jiang ◽  
Ahmed Al-Tahmeesschi ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Wireless Power Transfer ◽  
Full Duplex ◽  
Power Transfer ◽  
Wireless Power ◽  
Research Issues ◽  
Relay Systems ◽  
Challenges And Opportunities ◽  
Full Duplex Relay

Mechanism Design for R&D Outsourcing with Double-Sided Moral Hazard and Double-Sided Adverse Selection

2011 ◽  
Vol 204-210 ◽  
pp. 1569-1574
Author(s):  
Xu Ding ◽  
Wei Dong Meng ◽  
Bo Huang ◽  
Feng Ming Tao
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Transfer Payment

It is studied that how to use profit sharing arrangement as an incentive mechanism to stimulate both parties of R&D outsourcing to reveal their private information and commit enough R&D resources or efforts. First, it is proved that the double-sided moral hazard in R&D outsourcing can not be totally prevented under traditional profit-sharing arrangement, namely, fixed, proportional or mixed profit-sharing arrangement. And a new mixed profit sharing arrangement is proposed, which is composed of a fixed transfer payment and allocation proportion, and proved to be able to prevent the double-sided moral hazard, and motivate both parties to reveal their private information and commit enough efforts.

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