Incentives to and countermeasures for China's current illegal salt rampancy: A perspective from a static game of complete information

Author(s):  
Ting-ting Wu
2014 ◽  
Vol 912-914 ◽  
pp. 1865-1873
Author(s):  
Xing You Gao

Equilibrium production, equilibrium price and equilibrium total revenue in the case of implementing third-degree price discrimination and unified pricing were analyzed under the condition of two oligopoly firms with 2 sub markets by complete information static game method, and the relationship between the three indexes of the two cases were studied. The results showed that, under the condition of linear demand functions of the two sub markets, the equilibrium output of unified pricing was equal to the equilibrium output of discriminative pricing; the equilibrium price of unified pricing was weighted average of the equilibrium prices of two sub markets while discriminative pricing; the equilibrium total revenue of unified pricing was less than the equilibrium total revenue of discriminative pricing.


2012 ◽  
Vol 524-527 ◽  
pp. 3589-3593
Author(s):  
Xiao Hong Zhao ◽  
Jun Xin Cao

The feasibility of area ecological cooperation without government interaction, and the possibility of building up effective ecological cooperation mechanism are the main questions need to be studied for ecological construction and area harmonious development. This article used the game among upstream and downstream villages as an example, analyzed upstream and downstream village under static game of complete information, single stage game and repeated game model, and stated that the sanction among upstream and downstream ecological cooperation is very low without government interaction, however, this result can be remodeled at certain degree through changing the rules of the game and payoff matrix of both game side.


2018 ◽  
Vol 131 ◽  
pp. 832-840
Author(s):  
Qiang Leng ◽  
Yingjie Yang ◽  
Ruixuan Pan ◽  
Hao Hu

2014 ◽  
Vol 505-506 ◽  
pp. 571-576
Author(s):  
Xiang Xu ◽  
Xing Chen Zhang ◽  
Bin Xu

Firstly, established the optimization model based on complete information static game theory, which see evaluation index as the participants of a game, capacity strengthening strategies as the strategies of participants, and the strategies contained in the Nash equilibrium of the game as the first step optimization results. Then structure an algorithm to secondary selection, which makes there is only one strategy in the final result. At last given a case study combined with Baoshen railway capacity strengthening scheme decision. The result indicated that the model has good applicability, and can reduce the subjective error effectively.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document