Research on the department budget mechanism of public finance system based on static game model with complete information

Author(s):  
Zhenru Liu
2012 ◽  
Vol 524-527 ◽  
pp. 3589-3593
Author(s):  
Xiao Hong Zhao ◽  
Jun Xin Cao

The feasibility of area ecological cooperation without government interaction, and the possibility of building up effective ecological cooperation mechanism are the main questions need to be studied for ecological construction and area harmonious development. This article used the game among upstream and downstream villages as an example, analyzed upstream and downstream village under static game of complete information, single stage game and repeated game model, and stated that the sanction among upstream and downstream ecological cooperation is very low without government interaction, however, this result can be remodeled at certain degree through changing the rules of the game and payoff matrix of both game side.


2018 ◽  
Vol 131 ◽  
pp. 832-840
Author(s):  
Qiang Leng ◽  
Yingjie Yang ◽  
Ruixuan Pan ◽  
Hao Hu

2013 ◽  
Vol 791-793 ◽  
pp. 2171-2174
Author(s):  
Yuan Fen Yin ◽  
Yun Deng ◽  
Xiu Li Sang

Behavior strategy of food enterprises exerts a direct influence on food quality and safety. Against the backdrop of value perception differences on food quality and safety between different food enterprises, this paper establishes a static game model and based on prospect theory, explores the reasons for food quality and safety issues in our food market from the perspectives of psychology and economics. Finally, it presents a more scientific food quality and safety mechanism and countermeasures.


Complexity ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiayu Wang ◽  
Shuailong Dai ◽  
Xi Chen ◽  
Xiang Zhang ◽  
Zhifei Shan

Energy inconsistency among Li-ion battery cells widely exists in energy storage systems, which contributes to the continuous deterioration of the system durability and overall performance. Researchers have proposed various kinds of battery energy equalizers to reduce such inconsistency. Among them, the inductor equalizer is a predominant type in fast equalization applications. However, it requires relatively more complex control than other types of equalizers. In order to reduce the control complexity of inductor equalizers, a bidirectional multi-input and multi-output energy equalization circuit based on the game theory is proposed in the present work. The proposed equalizer has the modularized circuit topology and the mutually independent working principle. A static game model is developed and exploited for the mathematical description and control analysis of an energy equalization circuit comprised of these equalizers. The feasible control of each equalizer was obtained by solving a series of linear equations for the Nash Equilibrium of the model among the states of charge of the battery cells. The complexity of equations grows linearly with the cell number. The equivalent simulation model for the four-cell equalization is established in the PISM software, where the operational data and simulation results justify the static game model and verify the control validation, respectively. It is concluded that the proposed inductor equalizer is suitable for large-scale battery strings in energy storage systems, electrical vehicles, and new energy power generation applications.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Sulin Pang ◽  
Junkun Yang ◽  
Rongzhou Li ◽  
Jun Cao

This article focuses on the two-party static game between market supervisory organization and peer-to-peer (P2P) lending platform. Considering 4 game modes with both “strong supervision” and “weak supervision” of market supervisory organization and “compliance management” and “noncompliance management” of P2P lending platform, the paper establishes a static game model between P2P lending platform and market supervisory organization and solves the market equilibrium solutions. Based on income, cost, disguised cost, and fine of P2P lending platform and income, cost, and reward of market supervisory organization, it discusses conditional strategies that P2P lending platform selects “compliance management” or “noncompliance management” and that market supervisory organization selects “strong supervision” or “weak supervision,” respectively. Furthermore, the relevant influencing factors are analyzed which come from 18 P2P lending platforms in Guangdong Province of China, and the conclusions were in good agreement with the actual market. The research has scientific guiding significance.


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