Dynamic Game Analysis of the Pure Public Welfare Project in the Concession Management Process

Author(s):  
Shan-shan Zhong ◽  
Fei-lian Zhang
2013 ◽  
Vol 448-453 ◽  
pp. 1002-1010
Author(s):  
Cong Liu

To analyze the willingness to cooperate of farmers to participate in water management, we base on game theory and first carry on single static game analysis of willingness to cooperate for farmers to participate in water management, and find that farmers are into a Prisoners Dilemma in a single game, individual rationality comes into conflict with collective rationality, at this time farmers have a tendency to "free riders", so it is difficult to achieve cooperation between the farmers. Then trying to break the prisoners' dilemma, we carry on the farmers repeated dynamic game, the analysis is carried on in the context of incomplete information and limited rationality, we carry on game evolution analysis for willingness to cooperate for farmers to participate in water management. In order to guarantee the rationality of the study, we conduct a survey of willingness to cooperate of farmers to participate in water management in province of Zhejiang and finally confirm that the study is reasonable. And through the analysis of the full text, we conclude six important conclusions.


2018 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 452-477
Author(s):  
Xiao-Bing Zhang ◽  
Magnus Hennlock

AbstractThis paper investigates the benefits of international cooperation under uncertainty about global warming through a stochastic dynamic game. We analyze the benefits of cooperation both for the case of symmetric and asymmetric players. It is shown that the players’ combined expected payoffs decrease as climate uncertainty becomes larger, whether or not they cooperate. However, the benefits from cooperation increase with climate uncertainty. In other words, it is more important to cooperate when facing higher uncertainty. At the same time, more transfers will be needed to ensure stable cooperation among asymmetric players.


2011 ◽  
Vol 403-408 ◽  
pp. 1960-1963
Author(s):  
Lin Ma ◽  
Hai Ying Gu

Information asymmetry exists in a game relation between GM food Production enterprises and Regulators. Thus the market equilibrium depends on the strategy of GM food Production enterprises and Regulators.This paper argues that the probability of GM food Production enterprises paying attention to the propaganda and labeling GM food Consciously increase along with the probability of Regulation whether in Dynamic Game or Static Game. For the sake of Consumers,the Regulation of GM food is Essential.


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