A Game Analysis between GM Food Production Enterprises and Regulators in Information Asymmetry

2011 ◽  
Vol 403-408 ◽  
pp. 1960-1963
Author(s):  
Lin Ma ◽  
Hai Ying Gu
Keyword(s):  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Food Production ◽  
Market Equilibrium ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Static Game ◽  
Gm Food

Information asymmetry exists in a game relation between GM food Production enterprises and Regulators. Thus the market equilibrium depends on the strategy of GM food Production enterprises and Regulators.This paper argues that the probability of GM food Production enterprises paying attention to the propaganda and labeling GM food Consciously increase along with the probability of Regulation whether in Dynamic Game or Static Game. For the sake of Consumers,the Regulation of GM food is Essential.

The Analysis of Willingness to Cooperate for Farmers to Participate in Water Management Based on Game Theory

2013 ◽  
Vol 448-453 ◽  
pp. 1002-1010
Author(s):  
Cong Liu
Keyword(s):  
Water Management ◽  
Game Theory ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Collective Rationality ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Static Game ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Evolution Analysis ◽  
Prisoners Dilemma ◽  
Willingness To Cooperate

To analyze the willingness to cooperate of farmers to participate in water management, we base on game theory and first carry on single static game analysis of willingness to cooperate for farmers to participate in water management, and find that farmers are into a Prisoners Dilemma in a single game, individual rationality comes into conflict with collective rationality, at this time farmers have a tendency to "free riders", so it is difficult to achieve cooperation between the farmers. Then trying to break the prisoners' dilemma, we carry on the farmers repeated dynamic game, the analysis is carried on in the context of incomplete information and limited rationality, we carry on game evolution analysis for willingness to cooperate for farmers to participate in water management. In order to guarantee the rationality of the study, we conduct a survey of willingness to cooperate of farmers to participate in water management in province of Zhejiang and finally confirm that the study is reasonable. And through the analysis of the full text, we conclude six important conclusions.

The benefits of international cooperation under climate uncertainty: a dynamic game analysis

2018 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 452-477
Author(s):  
Xiao-Bing Zhang ◽  
Magnus Hennlock
Keyword(s):  
Global Warming ◽  
International Cooperation ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Stochastic Dynamic ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Climate Uncertainty ◽  
Expected Payoffs

AbstractThis paper investigates the benefits of international cooperation under uncertainty about global warming through a stochastic dynamic game. We analyze the benefits of cooperation both for the case of symmetric and asymmetric players. It is shown that the players’ combined expected payoffs decrease as climate uncertainty becomes larger, whether or not they cooperate. However, the benefits from cooperation increase with climate uncertainty. In other words, it is more important to cooperate when facing higher uncertainty. At the same time, more transfers will be needed to ensure stable cooperation among asymmetric players.

scholarly journals Static Game Models and Applications Based on Market Supervision and Compliance Management of P2P Platform

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Sulin Pang ◽  
Junkun Yang ◽  
Rongzhou Li ◽  
Jun Cao
Keyword(s):  
Influencing Factors ◽  
Market Equilibrium ◽  
Guangdong Province ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Equilibrium Solutions ◽  
Weak Supervision ◽  
Static Game ◽  
Compliance Management ◽  
P2p Lending ◽  
Good Agreement

This article focuses on the two-party static game between market supervisory organization and peer-to-peer (P2P) lending platform. Considering 4 game modes with both “strong supervision” and “weak supervision” of market supervisory organization and “compliance management” and “noncompliance management” of P2P lending platform, the paper establishes a static game model between P2P lending platform and market supervisory organization and solves the market equilibrium solutions. Based on income, cost, disguised cost, and fine of P2P lending platform and income, cost, and reward of market supervisory organization, it discusses conditional strategies that P2P lending platform selects “compliance management” or “noncompliance management” and that market supervisory organization selects “strong supervision” or “weak supervision,” respectively. Furthermore, the relevant influencing factors are analyzed which come from 18 P2P lending platforms in Guangdong Province of China, and the conclusions were in good agreement with the actual market. The research has scientific guiding significance.

scholarly journals Dynamic utility: the sixth reciprocity mechanism for the evolution of cooperation

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (8) ◽  
pp. 200891 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hiromu Ito ◽  
Jun Tanimoto
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Current Status ◽  
Cooperative Behaviour ◽  
Evolutionary Mechanism ◽  
Static Game ◽  
Chicken Game ◽  
The Difference

Game theory has been extensively applied to elucidate the evolutionary mechanism of cooperative behaviour. Dilemmas in game theory are important elements that disturb the promotion of cooperation. An important question is how to escape from dilemmas. Recently, a dynamic utility function (DUF) that considers an individual's current status (wealth) and that can be applied to game theory was developed. The DUF is different from the famous five reciprocity mechanisms called Nowak's five rules. Under the DUF, cooperation is promoted by poor players in the chicken game, with no changes in the prisoner's dilemma and stag-hunt games. In this paper, by comparing the strengths of the two dilemmas, we show that the DUF is a novel reciprocity mechanism (sixth rule) that differs from Nowak's five rules. We also show the difference in dilemma relaxation between dynamic game theory and (traditional) static game theory when the DUF and one of the five rules are combined. Our results indicate that poor players unequivocally promote cooperation in any dynamic game. Unlike conventional rules that have to be brought into game settings, this sixth rule is universally (canonical form) applicable to any game because all repeated/evolutionary games are dynamic in principle.

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