Decision-making on reverse logistics for manufacturers: an evolutionary game theory perspective

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lirong Wei ◽  
Wei Gu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Reverse Logistics ◽  
Evolutionary Game

Trust strategy simulation of corporation–NPO cross alliance using evolutionary game theory

Kybernetes ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 450-465 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yidan Chen ◽  
Lanying Sun
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Nonprofit Organizations ◽  
Bounded Rationality ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Evolutionary Strategies ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Trust Relationships

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the dynamics and evolution of trust in organizational cross alliances. Design/methodology/approach In alliances between corporations and nonprofit organizations, trust in decision-making is a dynamic process. Using the replicated dynamics model of evolutionary game theory, this paper provides a trust decision model and analyzes four scenarios under different parameters. A numerical simulation is developed to present an intuitive interpretation of the dynamic development of trust decisions and the effects of incentive and punishment mechanisms. Findings Under different parameters, bounded rationality and utilities result in different but stable evolutionary strategies; the initial probability of adopting a trust strategy leads directly to whether participants adopt the strategy when the system reaches stability after continued games; and incentive and punishment mechanisms can significantly reduce the initial probability of adopting a trust strategy where the system evolves to meet stable state needs. Practical implications The establishment of trust relationships is an important influence on the stable and coordinated development of an alliance. The proposed model can help the alliance build closer trust relationships and provide a theoretical basis for the design of the trust mechanism. Originality/value Incentive and punishment bound by some degree of trust are introduced to address the problems of trust decisions and their dynamics; the model created reflects the bounded rationality and utility of each game stage. Useful evolutionary stable strategies using different variables are proposed to address the decision-making problems of trust in cross alliances.

scholarly journals A Study of Driver’s Route Choice Behavior Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaowei Jiang ◽  
Yanjie Ji ◽  
Muqing Du ◽  
Wei Deng
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Choice Behavior ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Route Choice ◽  
Cumulative Prospect Theory ◽  
Traffic Information ◽  
Analytic Method ◽  
Route Choice Behavior

This paper proposes a route choice analytic method that embeds cumulative prospect theory in evolutionary game theory to analyze how the drivers adjust their route choice behaviors under the influence of the traffic information. A simulated network with two alternative routes and one variable message sign is built to illustrate the analytic method. We assume that the drivers in the transportation system are bounded rational, and the traffic information they receive is incomplete. An evolutionary game model is constructed to describe the evolutionary process of the drivers’ route choice decision-making behaviors. Here we conclude that the traffic information plays an important role in the route choice behavior. The driver’s route decision-making process develops towards different evolutionary stable states in accordance with different transportation situations. The analysis results also demonstrate that employing cumulative prospect theory and evolutionary game theory to study the driver’s route choice behavior is effective. This analytic method provides an academic support and suggestion for the traffic guidance system, and may optimize the travel efficiency to a certain extent.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Effects of Problem Size and the Problem Proposing Mechanism on the Problem Processing Mechanism in a New Main Manufacturer–Supplier Collaborative System

Mathematics ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (7) ◽  
pp. 588
Author(s):  
Ming Zhang ◽  
Jianjun Zhu ◽  
Ponnambalam Kumaraswamy ◽  
Hehua Wang
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Problem Size ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Collaborative System ◽  
Two Factors ◽  
Decision Making Processes ◽  
Processing Mechanism

This paper analyzed the effects of the problem size and the problem proposing mechanism on the decision-making processes, for the manufacturer and the supplier, regarding processing a problem in a new main manufacturer–supplier collaborative system using evolutionary game theory. Unpredicted problems may arise in the process of collaborative research and development (R&D) of complex products, like big passenger aircrafts, without any relative advanced contract, and either player will take risks to announce it. In addition to the factors of traditional cost and income, we take another two factors (i.e., the problem size and the problem proposing mechanism) into account in the examination of the problem processing mechanism. With evolutionary game theory applied, we can obtain the stable decision-making states of both players and how these two factors affect the problem processing mechanism. From the result, we find that the problem size has little effect on the two players’ decisions, while the problem processing mechanism has an impact when the experiences or the capacities of the manufacturer and the supplier are unbalanced. This paper contributes to manufacturer and supplier in a newly-established collaborative system to consider how to behave when unpredicted problems come.

scholarly journals An Evolutionary Game Theory Study for Construction and Demolition Waste Recycling Considering Green Development Performance under the Chinese Government’s Reward–Penalty Mechanism

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (17) ◽  
pp. 6303 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hongyu Long ◽  
Hongyong Liu ◽  
Xingwei Li ◽  
Longjun Chen
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Construction And Demolition Waste ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Demolition Waste ◽  
Green Development ◽  
Evolutionary Paths

The low efficiency of the closed-loop supply chain in construction and demolition waste (CDW) recycling has restricted the green development of China’s construction industry. Additionally, the government’s reward–penalty mechanism has a huge influence on green development. This study aimed to investigate the effect of green development performance (GDP) and the government’s reward–penalty mechanism on the decision-making process of production and recycling units, as well as to reveal the optimal strategies under different conditions. Therefore, the strategies’ evolutionary paths of production and recycling units were investigated by using evolutionary game theory. Firstly, an evolutionary game model between production units and recycling units was proposed under the government’s reward–penalty mechanism. Then, the evolutionary stability strategies in different scenarios were discussed. Finally, the effects of the relevant parameters on the evolutionary paths of the game model were analyzed using numerical simulations. The main conclusions are as follows. (1) When the range of GDP changes, the evolutionary stable strategy changes accordingly. GDP plays a positive role in promoting the high-quality development of the CDW recycling supply chain, but an increase in GDP can easily lead to the simultaneous motivation of free-riding. (2) The government’s reward–penalty mechanism effectively regulates the decision-making process of production and recycling units. An increase in the subsidy rate and supervision probability helps to reduce free-riding behavior. Moreover, the incentive effect of the subsidy probability on recycling units is more obvious, while the effect of the supervision probability on improving the motivation of active participation for production units is more remarkable. This paper not only provides a decision-making basis to ensure production and recycling units to make optimal strategy choices under different conditions but also provides a reference for the government to formulate a reasonable reward–penalty mechanism that is conducive to a macro-control market.

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