Degrees and measures of preference intensity

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vyacheslav V. Kolbin ◽  
Veronika A. Ledovskaya
Keyword(s):  
Preference Intensity

Influence of In-State Election Poll Reports on Candidate Preference in 1972

1976 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 457-462 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harold de Bock
Keyword(s):  
Presidential Election ◽  
Candidate Preference ◽  
Election Poll ◽  
Preference Intensity

In a one-sided presidential election, in-state election poll reports may cause the underdog to suffer a loss in preference intensity and turnout motivation.

Business advocacy in Asian PTAs: a model of selective corporate lobbying with evidence from Japan

2013 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-116 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mireya Solís
Keyword(s):  
Current Trend ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
Preferential Trade Agreements ◽  
Institutional Constraints ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Technical Expertise ◽  
Independent Variables ◽  
Business Interests ◽  
Business Lobbying ◽  
Preference Intensity

What explains the pattern of selective business interest in preferential trade agreements (PTAs) with active campaigning for and utilization of tariff preferences for some trade agreements, but not others? Under what conditions can business advocates of PTA policy mount an effective lobbying campaign to influence policy outcomes (i.e., shaping decisions onwhoto negotiate with andwhatto negotiate about)? These are important questions given that analyses of Asian PTAs frequently assign a negligible role to business interests either out of apathy or lobbying weakness. To understand the pattern of selective business lobbying for PTAs, I develop a theoretical model with three main independent variables: venue selection, preference intensity, and advocacy effectiveness, and apply it to the case of Japan to test its usefulness. My model shows that the conditions for effective business PTA campaigning are exacting: loss avoidance, high technical expertise, and influence-seeking strategies that maximize access opportunities given institutional constraints. And yet when these factors align, business interests do influence PTA outcomes. My research shows that the current trend to characterize the agency of PTA proliferation as either state-led or business-driven needs to be re-examined as it is more useful to think about state-society constellations in favor or against PTAs.

Voter Turnout and Preference Aggregation

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 548-586
Author(s):  
Kei Kawai ◽  
Yuta Toyama ◽  
Yasutora Watanabe
Keyword(s):  
Low Income ◽  
Voter Turnout ◽  
Presidential Election ◽  
Correlation Structure ◽  
Preference Aggregation ◽  
Aggregation Of Preferences ◽  
High Preference ◽  
Us Presidential Election ◽  
Preference Intensity

We study how voter turnout affects the aggregation of preferences in elections. Under voluntary voting, election outcomes disproportionately aggregate the preferences of voters with low voting cost and high preference intensity. We show identification of the correlation structure among preferences, costs, and perceptions of voting efficacy, and explore how the correlation affects preference aggregation. Using 2004 US presidential election data, we find that young, low-income, less-educated, and minority voters are underrepresented. All of these groups tend to prefer Democrats, except for the less educated. Democrats would have won the majority of the electoral votes if all eligible voters had turned out. (JEL D12, D72)

scholarly journals Simple preference intensity comparisons

2021 ◽  
Vol 192 ◽  
pp. 105199
Author(s):  
Georgios Gerasimou
Keyword(s):  
Preference Intensity ◽  
Simple Preference

scholarly journals Optimal Majority Rule in Referenda

Games ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 25
Author(s):  
Qingqing Cheng ◽  
Ming Li
Keyword(s):  
Direct Democracy ◽  
Majority Rule ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
The Status ◽  
Preference Intensity ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Two Sides

Adopting the group turnout model of Herrera and Mattozzi, J. Eur. Econ. Assoc. 2010, 8, 838–871, we investigate direct democracy with supermajority rule and different preference intensities for two sides of a referendum: Reform versus status quo. Two parties spend money and effort to mobilize their voters. We characterize the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria. We investigate the optimal majority rule that maximizes voters’ welfare. Using an example, we show that the relationship between the optimal majority rule and the preference intensity is not monotonic—the optimal majority rule is initially decreasing and then increasing in the preference intensity of the status quo side. We also show that when the preference intensity of the status quo side is higher, the easiness to mobilize voters on the status quo side is lower, or the payoff that the reform party receives is higher, the optimal majority rule is more likely to be supermajority.

Preference intensity measurement

1989 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 205-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter H. Farquhar ◽  
L. Robin Keller
Keyword(s):  
Intensity Measurement ◽  
Preference Intensity
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