scholarly journals The Government Deference Dimension of Judicial Decision Making: Evidence from the Supreme Court of Norway

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 264-285
Author(s):  
Jon Kåre Skiple ◽  
Henrik Littleré Bentsen ◽  
Chris Hanretty
Author(s):  
Miguel Á. Benedetti ◽  
M. Jimena Sáenz

Resumen: En las últimas décadas, las audiencias públicas realizadas en foros judiciales han sido señaladas como una de las innovaciones más importantes en las prácticas de los tribunales de altas instancias latinoamericanos. Estas audiencias prometen una renovación en los modos de pensar las tensas relaciones entre el poder judicial –especialmente su facultad de revisión de constitucionalidad– y la democracia a partir de la apertura del espacio judicial al diálogo y la participación de la ciudadanía, de las modalidades de intervención judicial para la protección de derechos, y de los aspectos simbólicos y políticos de herramientas que usualmente se reconocen como meramente procesales. A la luz de esos objetivos de renovación dialógica, pragmática y simbólica de las prácticas judiciales que abrieron las audiencias, este trabajo testea su grado de concreción a través de un estudio de los efectos de las audiencias públicas realizadas por la Corte Suprema de Justicia argentina en sus decisiones desde finales de 2004 hasta el 2017 inclusive.Palabras clave: Corte Suprema, audiencias públicas, participación ciudadana, deliberación, decisión judicialAbstract: The implementation of public hearings in judicial fora in the last decades has been considered from different perspectives one of the most important innovations in the practices of Latin American Courts. They promise a renovation in the ways of accommodating the tension between the role of Courts (especially their function of judicial review) and democracy; in the models of judicial decision making, and they point to the symbolic dimension of procedural rules and practices. This paper presents a study that tests the accomplishment of these promises tracing the impact of public hearings in the decisions of the Supreme Court of Argentina in the period between 2004 and 2017.Keywords: Supreme Court, public hearings, public participation, deliberation, judicial decision making.  


2013 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-24
Author(s):  
Guy Davidov ◽  
Maayan Davidov

Research on compliance has shown that people can be induced to comply with various requests by using techniques that capitalise on the human tendencies to act consistently and to reciprocate. Thus far this line of research has been applied to interactions between individuals, not to relations between institutions. We argue, however, that similar techniques are applied by courts vis-à-vis the government, the legislature and the public at large, when courts try to secure legitimacy and acceptance of their decisions. We discuss a number of known influence techniques – including ‘foot in the door’, ‘low-balling’, ‘giving a reputation to uphold’ and ‘door in the face’ – and provide examples from Israeli case law of the use of such techniques by courts. This analysis offers new insights that can further the understanding of judicial decision-making processes.


2008 ◽  
Vol 33 (03) ◽  
pp. 779-803 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Frymer

This essay reviews the recent volume edited by Ronald Kahn and Ken I. Kersch, The Supreme Court and American Political Development(2006), as well as the broader literature by law scholars interested in American Political Development (APD). The Law and APD literature has advanced our knowledge about courts by placing attention on the importance of executive and legislative actors, and by providing political context to our understanding of judicial decision making. But this knowledge would be more powerful if it would embrace the broader APD field's orientation toward the importance of state and institutional autonomy for understanding politics and political change. Law and APD scholars could go further in examining the ways in which courts and judges act institutionally, and how the legal branch as an institution impacts American politics and state-building. In doing so, Law and APD scholars would contribute not only to our understanding of judicial decision making but also to our understanding of the place and importance of courts in American politics.


2019 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 422-453 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas R Gray

Abstract State supreme court justices are often the final arbiters of cases in their jurisdictions. Yet, in states that grant governors the power to selectively reappoint supreme court justices, justices’ independence is limited. These governors are able to monitor justices’ decisions and are empowered to remove justices whose jurisprudence conflicts with the governor’s preferences. This power gives governors substantial influence over judicial decision-making by justices eligible for another term on the bench. I test this proposition on an exhaustive set of state supreme court criminal appeals from 1995 to 2010, and show that votes by justices who need to be reappointed covary with executive preferences, and more than votes by justices ineligible for reappointment. These effects are stable across time within a justice’s term so long as the serving governor may one day be their reappointer. I also show that these shifting individual votes lead to changes in outcomes for defendants.


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