scholarly journals Knowledge Attributions and Behavioral Predictions

2016 ◽  
Vol 41 (8) ◽  
pp. 2253-2261 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Turri
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Turri

Recent work has shown that knowledge attributions affect how people think others should behave, more so than belief attributions do. This paper reports two experiments providing evidence that knowledge attributions also affect behavioral predictions more strongly than belief attributions do, and knowledge attributions facilitate faster behavioral predictions than belief attributions do. Thus, knowledge attributions play multiple critical roles in social cognition, guiding judgments about how people should and will behave.


Author(s):  
Jessica Brown

This chapter distinguishes between fallibilism and infallibilism by appeal to entailment: infallibilists hold that knowledge that p requires evidence which entails that p; fallibilists deny that. It outlines some of the recent motivations for infallibilism, including the infelicity of concessive knowledge attributions, the threshold problem, closure, and the knowledge norm of practical reasoning. Further, we see how contemporary infallibilists attempt to avoid scepticism by appeal either to a generous conception of evidence or a shifty view of knowledge, such as contextualism. The chapter explains the book’s focus on non-shifty versions of infallibilism which defend a generous conception of evidence. It ends by defending the entailment definition of infallibilism over other potential definitions, and outlining the chapters to come.


2008 ◽  
Vol 25 (12) ◽  
pp. 1131-1150 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juliette Richetin ◽  
Marco Perugini ◽  
Iqbal Adjali ◽  
Robert Hurling

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Esther X.W. Wu ◽  
Gwenisha J. Liaw ◽  
Rui Zhe Goh ◽  
Tiffany T.Y. Chia ◽  
Alisia M.J. Chee ◽  
...  

AbstractAttention is a critical cognitive function, allowing humans to select, enhance, and sustain focus on information of behavioral relevance. Attention contains dissociable neural and psychological components. Nevertheless, some brain networks support multiple attentional functions. Connectome-based Predictive Models (CPM), which associate individual differences in task performance with functional connectivity patterns, provide a compelling example. A sustained attention network model (saCPM) successfully predicted performance for selective attention, inhibitory control, and reading recall tasks. Here we constructed a visual attentional blink (VAB) model (vabCPM), comparing its performance predictions and network edges associated with successful and unsuccessful behavior to the saCPM’s. In the VAB, attention devoted to a target often causes a subsequent item to be missed. Although frequently attributed to attentional limitations, VAB deficits may attenuate when participants are distracted or deploy attention diffusely. Participants (n=73; 24 males) underwent fMRI while performing the VAB task and while resting. Outside the scanner, they completed other cognitive tasks over several days. A vabCPM constructed from these data successfully predicted VAB performance. Strikingly, the network edges that predicted better VAB performance (positive edges) predicted worse selective and sustained attention performance, and vice versa. Predictions from the saCPM mirrored these results, with the network’s negative edges predicting better VAB performance. Furthermore, the vabCPM’s positive edges significantly overlapped with the saCPM’s negative edges, and vice versa. We conclude that these partially overlapping networks each have general attentional functions. They may indicate an individual’s propensity to diffusely deploy attention, predicting better performance for some tasks and worse for others.Significance statementA longstanding question in psychology and neuroscience is whether we have general capacities or domain-specific ones. For such general capacities, what is the common function? Here we addressed these questions using the attentional blink (AB) task and neuroimaging. Individuals searched for two items in a stream of distracting items; the second item was often missed when it closely followed the first. How often the second item was missed varied across individuals, which was reflected in attention networks. Curiously, the networks’ pattern of function that was good for the AB was bad for other tasks, and vice versa. We propose that these networks may represent not a general attentional ability, but rather the tendency to attend in a less focused manner.


2021 ◽  
Vol 44 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Mikhail

Abstract Phillips et al. make a strong case that knowledge representations should play a larger role in cognitive science. Their arguments are reinforced by comparable efforts to place moral knowledge, rather than moral beliefs, at the heart of a naturalistic moral psychology. Conscience, Kant's synthetic a priori, and knowledge attributions in the law all point in a similar direction.


2020 ◽  
pp. 171-205
Author(s):  
Jody Azzouni

How we easily slip between metacognitive thought and assertion and ground-floor thought and assertion is illustrated; how, as a result, we easily confuse the two is also illustrated. “Do you know the time?” is often speaker-meant merely as a request for information as opposed to what it literally conveys, a question about the auditor’s knowledge state. Distinctions between having concepts, grasping one’s own concepts, and metacognizing one’s propositional attitudes (in various ways) are distinguished. Why it is so easy to confuse being aware of being in pain and being in pain is explained; that it seems it isn’t possible to be in pain without being aware of it illustrates metacognitive confusions. Similarly, kinds of justifications are distinguished that are often confused, ones that involve metacognition and ones that don’t. How “level confusions” bedevil philosophical arguments is illustrated.


2020 ◽  
pp. 45-82
Author(s):  
Jody Azzouni

Widespread usage data for “know,” “learn,” “see,” “remember,” and other epistemic words are given. Such words are routinely and literally applied to animals ranging from sophisticated elephants and orcas to insects like ants and honeybees to nonconscious mechanisms like driverless cars, drones, and thermostats. Further, “S knows p” places no constraints on the agent S vis-à-vis the concepts exhibited in p: Rover need not have the concept of “cat” to know that a cat is trapped above him in a tree. How this data shows that a knowing agent need not know much, need not be self-conscious of what she knows, and need not be conscious or capable of metacognition is described. The modularity of agential knowledge is characterized: two agents may have the same sensory evidence for p, and yet one can know p while the other doesn’t because of other aspects of their methods for establishing p.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 4-20
Author(s):  
Robin McKenna

Keith DeRose’s new book The Appearance of Ignorance is a welcome companion volume to his 2009 book The Case for Contextualism. Where latter focused on contextualism as a view in the philosophy of language, the former focuses on how contextualism contributes to our understanding of (and solution to) some perennial epistemological problems, with the skeptical problem being the main focus of six of the seven chapters. DeRose’s view is that a solution to the skeptical problem must do two things. First, it must explain how it is that we can know lots of things, such as that we have hands. Second, it must explain how it can seem that we don’t know these things. In slogan form, DeRose’s argument is that a contextualist semantics for knowledge attributions is needed to account for the “appearance of ignorance”—the appearance that we don’t know that skeptical hypotheses fail to obtain. In my critical discussion, I will argue inter alia that we don’t need a contextualist semantics to account for the appearance of ignorance, and in any case that the “strength” of the appearance of ignorance is unclear, as is the need for a philosophical diagnosis of it.


2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 577-604
Author(s):  
Saskia van der Oord ◽  
Gail Tripp

Abstract Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder [ADHD] is one of the most common psychiatric disorders of childhood with poor prognosis if not treated effectively. Recommended psychosocial evidence-based treatment for preschool and school-aged children is behavioral parent and teacher training [BPT]. The core elements of BPT are instrumental learning principles, i.e., reinforcement of adaptive and the ignoring or punishment of non-adaptive behaviors together with stimulus control techniques. BPT is moderately effective in reducing oppositional behavior and improving parenting practices; however, it does not reduce blinded ratings of ADHD symptoms. Also after training effects dissipate. This practitioner review proposes steps that can be taken to improve BPT outcomes for ADHD, based on purported causal processes underlying ADHD. The focus is on altered motivational processes (reward and punishment sensitivity), as they closely link to the instrumental processes used in BPT. Following a critical analysis of current behavioral treatments for ADHD, we selectively review motivational reinforcement-based theories of ADHD, including the empirical evidence for the behavioral predictions arising from these theories. This includes consideration of children’s emotional reactions to expected and unexpected outcomes. Next we translate this evidence into potential ADHD-specific adjustments designed to enhance the immediate and long-term effectiveness of BPT programs in addressing the needs of children with ADHD. This includes the use of remediation strategies for proposed deficits in learning not commonly used in BPT programs and cautions regarding the use of punishment. Finally, we address how these recommendations can be effectively transferred to clinical practice.


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