The Weak State Trap

Economica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leopoldo Fergusson ◽  
Carlos A. Molina ◽  
James A. Robinson
Keyword(s):  
2012 ◽  
Vol 35 (5) ◽  
pp. 910-917
Author(s):  
Gui-Ming ZHU ◽  
De-Ke GUO ◽  
Shi-Yao JIN

2002 ◽  
Vol 172 ◽  
pp. 1065-1103
Author(s):  
Qi Luo

This is a competent work that challenges the claim of new institutional economics and international regime theory that effective state institutions in the host country are vital to the inflow, and indeed growth, of foreign direct investment (FDI). It argues that the large amount of FDI China has attracted so far has been facilitated more by the informal societal institutions represented by strong personal networks operating in the country than by the formal state institutions manifested by the weak legal system. The author validates her arguments with a large number of anecdotes based on over 100 interviews she conducted in China.


2016 ◽  
Vol 44 (4-5) ◽  
pp. 579-594 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lamia Karim

In 2011, the government of Bangladesh began an investigation into the financial dealings of the Grameen Bank that won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006. This disciplining of a world-renowned institution and its founder by the state reconfigures the altered relationship between the state and NGOs in Bangladesh. This article investigates this about-face between the state and NGOs from the 1990s, when their relationship was characterized as ‘partners in development’, to the late 2000s when the state saw the leading NGOs and their leaders as potential political adversaries. In Bangladesh, the former relationship of a weak state vis-à-vis the powerful, western-funded NGO has been recalibrated. Under the present condition of authoritarian rule, the state is willing to accept the role of the NGO as a development actor but not as a political contender. This article examines this shifting relationship between the state and NGOs.


2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce Whitehouse

Mali's coup d'état in March 2012 and the subsequent occupation of northern Mali by Islamist and separatist rebels took many observers by surprise. How could an erstwhile model of peaceful democratic transition collapse so swiftly? Why did so few ordinary Malians stand up in defence of their 20-year-old democracy? Combining accounts from Malian and foreign journalists with observations made in Bamako leading up to and during the dramatic events of early 2012, this article assesses the failures of Mali's pre-coup political system. A combination of the tenuous rule of law, weak state institutions, and perceptions of systemic corruption deeply eroded Malians' faith in their democracy. The junta that ousted Mali's elected president in March 2012, despite its international isolation, skillfully manipulated public frustrations with the government as well as local symbols and discourses pertaining to heroic leaders to gain support and legitimacy at home. The crisis in Mali was preceded by certain warning signs, some of which might be applied to gauge the health of democratic transitions elsewhere in Africa.


2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (5) ◽  
pp. 501-519

Under the "weak state" regime of modern China, it was difficult for the country’s modernization process to develop without the effective intervention of a centralized state. In the process of government governance, absorbing social organizations and civil forces as agents had proved to be an effective method. Beiyang government’s governance strategy of ‘using agents to regulate agents’ in the documentary railway billing business could be regarded as typical of the diversity of government management. Qing Dynasty, government departments were not directly responsible for railway freight for various reasons, instead, they allowed railway transshipment companies to act as agents for freight management. Then transshipment companies gradually became an obstacle to Beiyang government’s reform on freight transport. However, under the Republic of China, the new-style bank discovered a benign opportunity to develop documentary railway billing service and created a bottom-up institutional reform model. Through the service, the bank became the new agent for the supervision of the transshipment company, which not only regulated the operation, but also forced railroad bureaus in the Yangzi Delta to be primarily responsible for railway freight. The Central Ministry of Transportation of Beiyang Government decided to promote this agency governance model and billing service nationwide. Received 11th January 2021; Revised 2nd June 2021; Accepted 20th July 2021


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