Corrupción, oligarquía y republicanismo plebeyo

Reseña: Vergara, Camila (2020) <em>Systemic Corruption: Constitutional Ideas for an Anti-Oligarchic Republic. </em>Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Conceptualising Corruption in Office

This chapter tracks the evolution of the word and concept of ‘corruption’. Having explored personal, institutional and systemic types of corruption, the next two sections outline key influences on pre-modern ways of thinking about it, highlighting the role of religion and civic humanism or the ‘republican tradition’. These influences put different emphases on personal, institutional, and systemic corruption, even if they shared a common moral purpose. Focus on that moral dimension leads to a discussion about the relationship between corruption and sexual immorality, and between anti-corruption and campaigns for the reformation of manners. The second half of the chapter focuses on the legal framework to show changes in the legal definitions of corruption, which increasingly defined corruption in terms of various forms of monetary forms of crime.

Коррупция и государство в Сахеле

Начиная с 2000 гг. новые инструменты оценки борьбы с коррупцией создают нелестный образ госу-дарств Сахеля. Согласно наиболее известному из них – Списку стран по восприятию коррупции (Corruption Perception Index, CPI), составляемому международной неправительственной организацией Transparency International, в 2016 г. практически все страны региона попали в группу государств с эндемической коррупцией. Однако восприятие коррупции внутри группы варьирует: Сенегал и Буркина Фасо считаются менее коррумпированными, чем Мали и Нигер, которые, в свою очередь, вы-глядят лучше Мавритании и особенно Чада, входящего в список 20 наиболее коррумпированных стран мира – вместе с Бурунди, Гаити, Центральноафриканской Республикой и Демократической Республи-кой Конго. Однако эти чисто количественные и вырванные из контекста измерения проливают мало света на социальное и культурное обрамление повседневной коррупции. Настоящая статья опирается на качественные эмпирические полевые исследования, ведущиеся автором в Нигере, Сенегале и Мавритании. Starting in the early 2000s, new means of measurement produced by the international anticorruption indus-try cast a rather unflattering light on the Sahelian countries, stigmatizing them for their lack of public integ-rity. In 2016 the best known of these tools, Transparency International’s “Corruption Perception Index” ranked all Sahelian countries, excepting (barely) Senegal, as states with systemic corruption (a score lower than 43). Perceptions vary from country to country: Senegal and Burkina Faso are reputedly less corrupt than Mali and Niger; these two are, in turn, more virtuous than Mauritania, and even more so than Chad. These approaches, purely quantitative and decontextualized, shed little light on how corruption is socially and culturally embedded in everyday life. In contrast, this article is based on qualitative empirical studies and on the author’s own research in Niger, Senegal, and Mauritania.

Corruption and The State in the Sahel

Systemic corruption in the Sahel is the outcome of particular historical and institutional trajectories of state-building efforts, of factionalism and patronage, and of the inability of the state apparatus to rely on alternative mechanisms to ensure its survival and legitimacy. One key feature that emerges from the analysis and comparisons of multiple case studies is the extraordinary propagation of everyday corruption, to be distinguished from “big” corruption, and the ambivalent perceptions of it by citizens when dealing with the bureaucracy. Daily corruption practices manifest themselves in a variety of forms and underpin especially the delivery of basic public services. Corruption in the Sahel is an institutionalized way of managing people and exercising power in situations of limited accountability, and is closely connected with other dynamics operating within the social and economic system.

Systemic corruption and institutional multiplicity: Brazilian examples of a complex relationship

Systemic corruption is usually described as a stable self-reinforcing equilibrium that traps individuals by reducing incentives to behave honestly. This article assumes that law enforcement institutions may also be trapped in this equilibrium, leaving no alternative to individuals who want to report corruption. Would the existence of multiple institutions performing accountability functions – what we call institutional multiplicity – reduce the probability that all institutions would be trapped in a systemic corruption environment? We start by hypothesizing that even in contexts of systemic corruption there may be ‘pockets of honesty.’ If this is the case, institutional multiplicity, by increasing the number of accountability institutions available, may create avenues for individuals to report corruption. On the other hand, multiplicity may also increase the risk of ‘façade enforcement’ – that is, the mere appearance of accountability that reinforces a systemic corruption equilibrium. We illustrate these two scenarios with Brazilian examples. We end the article with a discussion of the design of accountability systems in contexts of systemic corruption, arguing that there may be advantages in preserving institutional multiplicity if its deleterious effects are addressed. While based on the Brazilian experience, this article advances theoretical hypotheses that may be useful to other countries.

Moldova’s Thirty-Year Search for Independence

Unlike in the Baltics, support for independence in Moldova was relatively low among the political elites and the general population when the Soviet Union collapsed. In the 1990s, the political parties in power pursued an incoherent program, as governments swung between reformist and conservative agendas. Economic crises and systemic corruption depleted citizens’ trust in politicians and state institutions. This low institutional trust has hampered governance at all levels, and primarily in crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic.

Hungary’s investment appeal could weaken

Significance The erosion of the rule of law and systemic corruption have not had a substantial impact on capital attraction. Despite occasional anti-capitalist rhetoric and measures to expel foreign companies in some sectors such as media, banking and energy, the government makes individual deals with multinational firms and tries to accommodate them into a 'new normal' based on loyalty to it. Impacts Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s Fidesz party has a slightly better chance of winning the elections than its main rival. Hungary would adopt a tough position towards China if the united opposition won the election. Germany’s pragmatic and economy-first approach to Hungary will not change following its own September 27 elections.