Tail Dependence and Systemic Risk in Operational Losses of the US Banking Industry

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-204 ◽  
Author(s):  
Azamat Abdymomunov ◽  
Ibrahim Ergen
2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mary L. Ma ◽  
Gary C. Biddle ◽  
Yanyan Wang

2016 ◽  
Vol 76 (4) ◽  
pp. 512-531 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoguang Feng ◽  
Dermot Hayes

Purpose Portfolio risk in crop insurance due to the systemic nature of crop yield losses has inhibited the development of private crop insurance markets. Government subsidy or reinsurance has therefore been used to support crop insurance programs. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the possibility of converting systemic crop yield risk into “poolable” risk. Specifically, this study examines whether it is possible to remove the co-movement as well as tail dependence of crop yield variables by enlarging the risk pool across different crops and countries. Design/methodology/approach Hierarchical Kendall copula (HKC) models are used to model potential non-linear correlations of the high-dimensional crop yield variables. A Bayesian estimation approach is applied to account for estimation risk in the copula parameters. A synthetic insurance portfolio is used to evaluate the systemic risk and diversification effect. Findings The results indicate that the systemic nature – both positive correlation and lower tail dependence – of crop yield risks can be eliminated by combining crop insurance policies across crops and countries. Originality/value The study applies the HKC in the context of agricultural risks. Compared to other advanced copulas, the HKC achieves both flexibility and parsimony. The flexibility of the HKC makes it appropriate to precisely represent various correlation structures of crop yield risks while the parsimony makes it computationally efficient in modeling high-dimensional correlation structure.


2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hao Meng ◽  
Wen-Jie Xie ◽  
Zhi-Qiang Jiang ◽  
Boris Podobnik ◽  
Wei-Xing Zhou ◽  
...  

2015 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arash Riasi

<p>This paper tries to find out why shadow banking system has become so competitive in the global financial system and how it can be controlled. For this reason we use Porter’s diamond model to find the competitive advantages of shadow banking. Based on the results of this study it can be concluded that factor conditions, chance and government do not contribute to the competitiveness of shadow banking industry. On the other hand the results suggested that related and supporting industries, firm strategy, structure and rivalry, and demand conditions contribute to the competitiveness of shadow banking industry. It is important to regulate the activities of shadow banking industry in order to prevent this industry from creating systemic risk.</p>


2007 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 171-212
Author(s):  
Man Cho ◽  

This study is structured around two objectives: surveying the 180 years’ evolution of the US mortgage intermediation system (MIS); and, extracting the lessons to be learned by emerging mortgage markets. To that end, I first discuss three pillars of a well-functioning MIS as a conceptual underpinning - intermediation efficiency, affordability enhancement, and risk management. The historical survey proceeds based on four reasonably distinct time periods – (1) the era of exploration (pre-1930s or pre-Great Depression era), (2) the era of institutionalization (1930s to 1960s), (3) the era of market-making (1970s and 1980s), and (4) the era of expansion and efficiency gain (1990s to Present). Based on the survey done, the lessons for other countries are organized under five topics: developing conforming mortgage product and market; extending the service to nonconforming segments; managing default and prepayment risks; managing systemic risk; and, developing an efficient intermediation process. The concluding remarks in the final section comprise the issue of right sequencing: that is, through what steps an MIS in a given country can be evolved toward a more market-based one that can deliver a higher degree of consumer welfare.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document