The Forgotten Legacy of the New Deal: Fiscal Conservatism and the Roosevelt Administration, 1933-1938

2000 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 332-359 ◽  
Author(s):  
JULIAN E. ZELIZER
Author(s):  
Julian E. Zelizer

This chapter examines fiscal conservatism under the Roosevelt administration. Fiscal conservatism has been linked to liberalism since the construction of the New Deal state. Indeed, a pragmatic alliance between liberals and moderate fiscal conservatives has played a key role in some of the most durable state-building efforts in U.S. history. This alliance produced bold federal initiatives in a nation historically resistant to centralized government. Building on the work of James Savage and David Kennedy, this chapter argues that fiscal conservatism constituted a key component of the New Deal during the years 1933–1938. It looks at two members of the administration who maintained pressure on Franklin Roosevelt to balance budgets: Lewis Douglas, who served as Director of Budget from 1933 to 1934, and Henry Morgenthau Jr., secretary of the treasury from 1934 to 1945. The chapter concludes with an assessment of Roosevelt's fiscal policy in relation to Keynesianism.


Author(s):  
Kiran Klaus Patel

This chapter assesses the medium- and long-term effects of the New Deal through 1945 and beyond. Seen from this perspective, discontinuities leap to the eye. With World War II, American society lost the markedly civilian nature that had characterized it during most of the interwar years. The concept of security, so central during the early Roosevelt administration, acquired a fundamentally different meaning, shifting from domestic welfare to international warfare. But there were significant continuities. Many features of the New Deal lived on or hibernated during the war. The global conflict even saved and strengthened many existing programs that peace might have seen canceled or shelved. State attempts at social control over the body loomed large. The military, government, and other institutions worked to overcome the crisis of masculinity of the 1930s and create a hypermasculinized ideal, reflecting the country's rising status as a world power.


1945 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 280-296
Author(s):  
M. A. Fitzsimons

At his death Franklin Roosevelt's domestic program had long been subordinated to the demands of war, and the toils of establishing a world peace settlement were still to be faced. The relief, recovery and reform measures of the New Deal had been put into effect before the end of the second Roosevelt Administration, several years before he formally abandoned Doctor New Deal. Thereafter, the President's attention was overwhelmingly devoted to preparations for the defense of America, to the maintenance of possible allies, and to the even more difficult task of winning popular and congressional support for these and further measures. In a speech at Chicago, during the campaign of 1944, Roosevelt returned to the theme of social security, but it is hard to believe that even he in all his enormous confidence and vitality could have expected to live through the labors of war and a peace settlement to fight the battles of another New Deal.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Monika E. Berenyi

Since the conclusion of World War II, the ethos of the Roosevelt administration (1933-1945) and the achievements of the New Deal era have been celebrated by official rhetoric.


Author(s):  
Harvey G. Cohen

This chapters shows how the Warner Bros. movie, Footlight Parade, part of a trilogy of Great Depression made in 1933 and also featuring 42nd Street and Gold Diggers of 1933, epitomised the studio’s support for Franklin D. Roosevelt administration and the New Deal programme of the first Hundred Days. It also marked James Cagney’s break from being typecast as a gangster to present him as a FDR-figure overcoming a crisis. The chapter further explores how Jack and Harry Warner forsook FDR shortly after the filming of Footlight Parade to join other moguls in opposition to the National Recovery Administration’s efforts to promote the interests of organized labour. Thereafter the pro-New Deal message in the studio’s productions became muted and it reverted to escapism in its post-1933 musicals.


1996 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 533-551
Author(s):  
Keith J. Volanto

Every government policy has positive and negative externalities: offshoots and spin-offs that either are unplanned or exceed calculated expectations. New Deal agricultural policy was no exception. One controversial aspect of it is the alleged role of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) in southern tenant and sharecropper displacement. Whether or not the officials of the AAA underestimated or even cared about this phenomenon, many contemporaries and most historians have criticized the Roosevelt administration for it.


1995 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 393-415
Author(s):  
Mary M. Stolberg

On 28 July 1994 President Bill Clinton called his $30.2 billion anticrime bill “the toughest, largest, smartest Federal attack on crime in the history of our country.” If Clinton could have turned the clock back sixty years to 18 May 1934, he would have heard President Franklin Delano Roosevelt making similar claims about the nation's first federal anticrime package. In the intervening decades, the federal government's role in crime fighting has become an accepted reality, but in 1934 it was still novel. For most of U.S. history, politicians believed that crime was a local matter. That changed dramatically during the New Deal, when crime became a national obsession, and the Roosevelt Administration developed a sweeping anticrime program that challenged accepted notions of federalism.


2010 ◽  
Vol 70 (1) ◽  
pp. 195-220 ◽  
Author(s):  
Todd C. Neumann ◽  
Price V. Fishback ◽  
Shawn Kantor

We examine the dynamic relationships between relief spending and local private labor markets using a panel data set of relief, private employment, and private earnings. Positive shocks to relief during the First New Deal were followed by increased private employment and earnings, consistent with demand stimulus in that period. On the other hand, increases in work relief spending during the Second New Deal were followed by decreased employment and increased earnings, consistent with crowding out. The timing of spending is consistent with claims that the Roosevelt administration used relief spending to sway elections.


2020 ◽  
pp. 61-86
Author(s):  
John W. Compton

This chapter shows how mainline Protestant religious leaders, often working in conjunction with Jewish and Catholic groups, were instrumental in building popular support for New Deal programs including unemployment insurance, the National Recovery Administration, and the Wagner Act. It shows that Protestant elites offered the Roosevelt administration a variety of tangible forms of assistance—from local educational sessions to letter-writing campaigns to “NRA Sundays”—that went well beyond their public expressions of support. Arguably the churches’ greatest contribution to the construction of the New Deal-era welfare state, however, was to serve as a bulwark against attacks from a growing cadre of proto-libertarian entities on the far right. So long as most Protestants attended mainline churches, and so long as mainline leaders were monolithic in their support of social welfare programs, claims that there was something un-American about redirecting resources to aid the downtrodden remained an exceedingly tough sell.


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