Tax Enforcement as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Empirical Evidence from China

2010 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weichu Xu ◽  
Yamin Zeng ◽  
Junsheng Zhang
2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 115
Author(s):  
Quang Linh Huynh

The existing literature has acknowledged the complicated links among external business environments, corporate governance and organisational performance. However, a large void exists in the extant research models of corporate governance, because none have discussed and empirically examined the intervenient effect of the corporate governance mechanism on the external business environments and organisational performance. A thorough review of the literature on corporate governance, external business environments and organisational performance comes to the proposed hypotheses. The indirect effect of external business environments on organisational performance via corporate governance is statistically tested. The research provides empirical evidence that organisational performance is the consequence of both corporate governance and external business environments that is, in turn, the causality of corporate governance. More importantly, it offers insight into the mediating effect of corporate governance in transforming the uncertainty of external business environments into organisational performance. The findings suggest that firms facing uncertainty in external business environments should adopt suitable corporate governance to achieve the best organisational performance.


2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Felix Felix ◽  
Hanna Hanna

This research is intended to get the empirical evidence related to the effect of corporate governance mechanism, related party disclosures and audit quality through related party transactions.  This research is conducted by using all listed manufacturing company in Indonesian Stock Exchange from 2015 – 2017 with total sample of about 270 firm years. The result shows that the corporate governance has positive and significant effect to related party transactions which is proxied by assets and liabilities related party transactions. While related party transaction disclosures has no significant effect to the related party transactions itself. Whereas, audit quality has negative significant effect to related party transactions which is proxied by assets and liabilities related party transactions. Keywords: Related party transactions, corporate governance, related party disclosure, audit quality Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk memperoleh bukti empiris mengenai pengaruh tata kelola perusahaan, tingkat pengungkapan transaksi pihak berelasi, dan kualitas audit terhadap besaran transaksi pihak berelasi. Penelitian ini dilakukan pada perusahaan sektor manufaktur yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI) pada tahun 2015 – 2017 dengan jumlah sampel sebanyak 270. Hasil penelitian ini menemukan bahwa tata kelola perusahaan berpengaruh signifikan positif terhadap besaran transaksi pihak berelasi yang diproksikan dengan transaksi pihak berelasi terkait aset dan liabilitas. Tingkat pengungkapan transaksi pihak berelasi terbukti tidak berpengaruh signifikan terhadap besaran transaksi pihak berelasi yang diproksikan dengan transaksi pihak berelasi terkait aset dan liabilitas. Sedangkan, kualitas audit terbukti berpengaruh signifikan negatif terhadap besaran transaksi pihak berelasi yang diproksikan dengan transaksi pihak berelasi terkait aset dan liabilitas. Kata kunci: Besaran transaksi pihak berelasi, corporate governance, tingkat pengungkapan transaksi pihak berelasi, kualitas audit        


2007 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-165 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen P. Ferris ◽  
Tomas Jandik ◽  
Robert M. Lawless ◽  
Anil Makhija

AbstractLegal rights of investors are recognized as an essential component of corporate governance. We assess the efficacy of these rights by examining board changes surrounding the filings of shareholder derivative lawsuits. We find that the incidence of derivative lawsuits is higher for firms with a greater likelihood of agency conflicts. We also find that derivative lawsuits are associated with significant improvements in the boards of directors. In particular, the proportion of outside representation on the board of directors increases. There is also some evidence that other board characteristics change favorably. These findings suggest that shareholder derivative lawsuits are not frivolous as is often claimed, but rather that they can serve as an effective corporate governance mechanism.


Think India ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 16-23
Author(s):  
Hitesh Shukla ◽  
Nailesh Limbasiya

Growth, progress, and prosperity of any country depend highly on the corporate governance mechanism of that country. Good governance of a country helps it to sustainable growth and consistency in progress. The good governance should contribute towards the improvement in transparency, ethics, morality, and disclosure. The principles of good governance stand on honesty, trust, integrity, openness, and performance orientation. Our honorable Prime Minister Narendra bhai Modi had given the three E for good governance during his speech on Independence Day i.e. Effective Governance, Electronic Governance, and Ethical Governance. The fundamental concern of corporate governance mechanism is to ensure the protection of minority shareholders/owners of specific firms. Mechanism of a corporate governance specifies the relations among the shareholders, board of directors, and managers. The present paper is an attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of the board by calculating the corporate governance score. The mandatory and non-mandatory guidelines have been considered while assigning points to specific parameters of the corporate governance.


2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 010-031
Author(s):  
Animah Animah ◽  
Lukman Effendy ◽  
Alamsyah M. Thahir ◽  
Erna Widiastuty

The purpose of this research is to examine the effect of corporate governance mechanisms,  firm size of financial performance. The Population of this research is the company manufacturing  in BEI. The sampling technique used is purposive sampling. The analytical tool used is using partial least  square program. The independent variables in this research are corporate governance mechanism,  firm size  while the dependent variable is the performance of the financial. The result of the research shows that firm size  influence to financial performance, while other variables such as corporate governance mechanisms have no effect negative  to financial performance.


2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 163-174 ◽  
Author(s):  
Faisal Javaid

Corporate governance is considered to have significant impact on the growth and development perspective of an economy. Sound corporate governance practices leads the economy towards the achievement of higher performance, provide sources for capital investment by increasing the creditability of shareholders. The purpose of this study is to empirically investigate the relationship of corporate governance and firm performance in terms of accounting as well as market performance i.e.to be measured by Return on asset, Return on equity and Tobin’s Q. The theoretical base to conduct the study is the demand of separation of ownership and control characterize as agency theory. The previous studies have yielded inconsistent result. To achieve the purpose 58 textile sector companies were selected listed in the Karachi stock exchange and data was taken from annual reports of the companies for the period of 2009 to 2013. Descriptive statistics, correlation analysis and regression estimation using pooled, fixed effect, random effect and Hausman specification test were carried out after developing a composite index based on 21 proxies. The result entails that corporate governance index (CGI) and firm performance has positive and significant association but the relationship for each specific index is dependent upon the measure of firm performance. The result also shows that companies having strong corporate governance mechanism has greater chances to acquire finance. The implication of study demands that the reform effort should be directed towards the improvement in internal corporate governance mechanism and regulatory framework for the governance system.


Green Finance ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 243-262
Author(s):  
Muhammad Junaid ◽  
◽  
Ye Xue ◽  
Muzzammil Wasim Syed ◽  
Muhammad Ziaullah ◽  
...  

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jyoti Dixit ◽  
Poonam Singh ◽  
Arunima Haldar

Purpose Takeovers play a critical role as an external corporate governance mechanism to ensure investor protection. There is a long-standing debate on whether the convergence of corporate governance to global standards can enable emerging economies to ensure investor protection. This paper aims to analyse the evolution of the takeover code, namely, Securities Exchange Board of India’s Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers (2011) in India from the lens of investor protection. It then compares the takeover provisions in India, the USA, the UK, Singapore and Australia to examine the extent of convergence and its implications for investor protection. Design/methodology/approach Using a cross-national comparative analysis of takeover mechanisms in common law countries, the study analyses the extent and relevance of convergence in form. The focus of the comparison is on regulations governing offer size, offer price, creeping acquisition and initial trigger limit for the mandatory open offer. Findings The findings suggest that certain provisions such as the initial trigger threshold for the mandatory offer and the offer prices of the Indian takeover code are converging with the standards in common law countries. However, the offer price determination based on market prices may not reflect true market value in an inefficient market like India. Other provisions such as creeping acquisition and offer size are not only diverging from the international standards but are also inconsistent with the key objective of investor protections of the Indian regulator. Research limitations/implications Indian takeover regulation needs to converge to higher global standards to ensure adherence to improved investor protection. This needs to be done for the initial trigger limit for mandatory bid and offer prices, after accounting for the differences in institutional structure. The Indian regulators need to revisit provisions on the initial trigger, creeping acquisition to converge to the broader principle of investor protection. Originality/value This technical paper provides a comprehensive depiction of takeover mechanisms in an emerging economy context as a means of investor protection. Further using a comparative lens, it analyses the relevance of convergence of takeover laws. Thus, advances the theoretical knowledge of limited extant work on external corporate governance mechanism in an emerging economy context.


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