Thinking Creatively About Creativity: What Can We Learn From Recent Developments in the Philosophy of Science?

1996 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 204-211 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Cock
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Recent Developments

scholarly journals Religionsvidenskabens primitivitetsopfattelser

1994 ◽  
Author(s):  
Armin W. Geertz
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Intercultural Communication ◽  
Cultural Construction ◽  
Critical Examination ◽  
The Political ◽  
Ethical Problems ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
Implicit And Explicit

This article explores notions of primitivism through a critical examination of the implicit and explicit assumptions behind these notions against the background of recent developments in the philosophy of science. In the section on terms and definitions the empirical and theoretical problems involved in the use of these terms are raised. The section on primitivism and literacy explores the weaknes of the stance known as "The Great Divide" thesis. The problems associated with mentality and rationalism follow with recent criticisms from the philosophy of science and anthropology on the attempt to model the hunman and social sciences on the hard sciences, on the illusions of linguistic and other forms of exactitude in the natural sciences, on the mutual incompatibility of notions of rationalism used in the various sciences, and on the questionability of a too close encounter between the cultural sciences and philosophy. The section on tradition and change explores the role of the supposed dichotomy between the two in notions of primitivism and xplores the political and ethical problems involved i nthe historiography of exotic cultures. This leads to the section on the whole problem of the cultural construction of the Other and the role played by stereotypes in that construction. The article ends with a discussion of the formidable problems in intercultural communication with an appeal to Western scientists to be more reflective on and critidal of their own positions.

Is there a future for ancient science?

2001 ◽  
Vol 47 ◽  
pp. 196-210
Author(s):  
G. E. R. Lloyd
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Ancient Science ◽  
Vice Chancellor ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
The Subject

My title has a narrow and a broader reference. The narrower one relates to the question of whether the study of ancient science will continue in this University. Valedictories do not have the same well-established conventions as inaugurals. But some taking stock of what has been happening in the field of studies picked out by the title of the Professorship that I have held for fifteen years may be thought appropriate or at least will be forgiven. The very fact that I raise this as a question (‘is there a future?) may suggest that in this last public act of my professorship, I may be about to pronounce an obituary for a subject that I have cultivated ever since I first began lecturing in this University. The prospects for the study of the subject here are indeed unclear. It may not be so much a matter of après moi le déluge, as après moi – rien ne va plus. But I am more concerned here – the Vice-Chancellor may be relieved to hear – not with the narrow, so much as with the broader issues suggested by my title. Where, in the wake of recent developments in the history and philosophy of science, is there a place – and is there a place – for ancient science?

Weltanschauungsanalyse und Abduktion

Conceptus ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 38 (93) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Radler
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Explanatory Model ◽  
Abductive Inference ◽  
World Views ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
Scientific Context

SummaryErnst Topitsch’s analysis of world views is presented. His explanatory model consists of an elaborated projection-reflection-scheme. It is argued that the projection is an abductive inference. As a consequence Topitsch’s analysis of world views can be linked to recent developments in the philosophy of science. Finally the question is considered whether the projection can be interpreted as an inference to the best explanation. This is denied because an inference to the best explanation roots in a scientific context, whereas Topitsch’s (abductive) projection obviously does not.

William L. Harper. A sketch of some recent developments in the theory of conditionals. Ifs, Conditionals, belief, decision, chance, and time, edited by William L. Harper, Robert Stalnaker, and Glenn Pearce, The University of Western Ontario series in philosophy of science, vol. 15, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Boston, and London, 1981, pp. 3–38. - Robert C. Stalnaker. A theory of conditionals. A reprint of XLVII 470. Ifs, Conditionals, belief, decision, chance, and time, edited by William L. Harper, Robert Stalnaker, and Glenn Pearce, The University of Western Ontario series in philosophy of science, vol. 15, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Boston, and London, 1981, pp. 41–55. - David Lewis. Counterfactuals and comparative possibility. Ifs, Conditionals, belief, decision, chance, and time, edited by William L. Harper, Robert Stalnaker, and Glenn Pearce, The University of Western Ontario series in philosophy of science, vol. 15, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Boston, and London, 1981, pp. 57–85. (Reprinted from Journal of philosophical logic, vol. 2 (1973), pp. 418–446; also reprinted in Contemporary research in philosophical logic and linguistic semantics, Proceedings of a conference held at the University of Western Ontario, London, Canada, edited by D. Hockney, W. Harper, and B. Freed, The University of Western Ontario series in philosophy of science, vol. 4, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht and Boston 1975, pp. 1–29.) - Robert C. Stalnaker. A defense of conditional excluded middle. Ifs, Conditionals, belief, decision, chance, and time, edited by William L. Harper, Robert Stalnaker, and Glenn Pearce, The University of Western Ontario series in philosophy of science, vol. 15, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Boston, and London, 1981, pp. 87–104.

1984 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 1411-1413
Author(s):  
Barry Loewer
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
David Lewis ◽  
Publishing Company ◽  
Reidel Publishing Company ◽  
Philosophical Logic ◽  
Contemporary Research ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
The University ◽  
Excluded Middle

Naturalized Philosophy of Science and Economic Method

1998 ◽  
pp. 165-179
Author(s):  
Christoph Luetge
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Research Program ◽  
Social Epistemology ◽  
Economic Method ◽  
Recent Developments

This paper draws a connection between recent developments in naturalized philosophy of science and in economics. Social epistemology is one part of the naturalistic enterprise that has become especially important. Some approaches in this field use methods borrowed from economics, a fact that has often been overlooked. But there are also genuinely economic approaches to the problems of science and knowledge. Some of these approaches can be seen as contributions to an "economic epistemology." While these contributions are certainly fruitful, they have also raised criticism from economists. I overview of these points of criticism and outline possibilities to deal with these problems. In particular, the Buchanan research program offers some help.

Objectivity in Marketing Theory and Research

1993 ◽  
Vol 57 (2) ◽  
pp. 76-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shelby D. Hunt
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Marketing Research ◽  
Positive Case ◽  
Marketing Theory ◽  
Linguistic Relativism ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
Is Theory

Many marketers contend that recent developments in the philosophy of science imply that objectivity in marketing research is an illusion, a chimera, or impossible. Five arguments are customarily put forth that supposedly demonstrate the impossibility of objectivity: (1) linguistic relativism, (2) paradigm incommensurability, (3) theories are underdetermined by facts, (4) perception is theory-laden, and (5) epistemically significant observations are theory-laden. The author evaluates the five arguments, shows that there is nothing in the philosophy of science that dooms objective marketing research, and puts forth the “positive case” for objectivity.

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