WON BUDDHISM: A SYNTHESIS OF THE MORAL SYSTEMS OF CONFUCIANISM AND BUDDHISM

1988 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 425-448
Author(s):  
BONGKIL CHUNG
Keyword(s):  
2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (Supplement_1) ◽  
pp. 16-16
Author(s):  
Sungsim Lee

Abstract This presentation describes a supportive mindfulness practice for caregivers of older adults based on the principles of Won Buddhism (an integrative, a modernized Buddhism). As the aging population grows, there is a significant increase in recognition of the negative impact of caregiver stress on older adults’ quality of life. The ability for caregivers to deal compassionately with stress is essential, as caring for older adults can awaken feelings about one’s own vulnerability and mortality. The ‘Mindful Gratitude Practice’ offers a way to cope with stress, cultivate self-care, and improve the care of others. Relevant research will be summarized, which shows mindfulness and gratitude practice respectively benefit positive influence in both physical and emotional well-being. Mindful Gratitude Practice as a spiritual approach that fosters caregivers' emotional stability, reduces their stress and improves the relationship between older adults and their caregivers. In this presentation, three processes of Mindful Gratitude Practice will be described: 1. Understanding a mindfulness practice by establishing intention, attention, and attitude, 2. Learning the principles of a gratitude practice and implementation, and 3. Incorporating mindfulness into a gratitude practice. Research results have demonstrated that through this learning process, caregivers have acquired the concept of interconnectedness, experience grateful moments, and a deep feeling of appreciation in their caregiving relationships. The presenter will guide participants in a short experience of Mindfulness Gratitude Practice. Further readings and resources will be provided for those who are interested.


Author(s):  
Daniela Goya Tocchetto

Abstract: The overwhelming majority of contemporary theories of justice is grounded in the rationalist tradition (Frazer, 2010). As a consequence, political philosophers such as John Rawls (1971) have interpreted moral systems as axiomatic, substantially based on concepts of inalienable rights and duties—usually guided by the core value attached to human dignity. Once ethicists started working under an axiomatic framework, empirical evidence has become less and less useful. This road has been conducive to the current prevalence of ideal theories in the field. On a dissonant note, recent debate in political philosophy has rekindled our attention to the development of nonideal theories of justice. Yet before one argues in favor of nonideal (or comparative) theories of justice, one has to be certain that all arguments against the broader incorporation of empirical evidence in the development of political philosophical theories are not valid. Therefore the focus of the present paper is the assessment—and dismissal—of these arguments.Keywords: Theories of Justice; Nonideal Theories; Empirical Evidence; MethodologyResumo: A grande maioria das teorias de justiça contemporâneas se baseiam na tradição racionalista (Frazer, 2010). Como consequência, filósofos políticos como John Rawls (1971) têm interpretado sistemas morais como axiomáticos, baseados substancialmente em conceitos de direitos e deveres inalienáveis – geralmente guiados pelo valor central concedido à dignidade humana. Uma vez que os eticistas começaram a utilizar uma moldura axiomática, as evidências empíricas se tornaram cada vez menos úteis. Esse caminho foi relevante para a atual prevalência de teorias ideais nesse campo. De maneira dissonante, o debate recente na filosofia política reacendeu a atenção para o desenvolvimento de teorias de justiça não ideais. Contudo, antes que alguém argumente em favor de teorias de justiça não ideais (ou comparativas), é preciso estar certo de que todos os argumentos contrários a uma incorporação mais ampla de evidências empíricas no desenvolvimento de teorias políticas filosóficas não são válidos. Portanto, o foco deste artigo é a avaliação – e rejeição – destes argumentos.Palavras-chave: Teorias de justiça; Teorias não ideais; Evidência empírica; Metodologia.


2000 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 189-201 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth E. Goodpaster

Abstract:This paper explains and defends three basic propositions: (1) that our attitudes (particularly American attitudes) toward organizational ethics are conflicted at a fairly deep level; (2) that in response to this conflict in our attitudes, we often default to various counterfeits of conscience (non-moral systems that serve as surrogates for the role of conscience in organizational settings); and (3) that a better response (than relying on counterfeits) would be for leaders to foster a culture of ethical awareness in their organizations. Some practical suggestions are made about fostering such a culture, and a comparison is made between this late-20th-century response to the problem of counterfeits and the classic “naturalistic fallacy” identified in early-20th-century ethics by G. E. Moore.


Author(s):  
John Danaher

Human societies have, historically, undergone a number of moral revolutions. Some of these have been precipitated by technological changes. Will the integration of robots into our social lives precipitate a new moral revolution? In this keynote, I will look at the history of moral revolutions and the role of techno-social change in facilitating those revolutions. I will examine the structural properties of human moral systems and how those properties might be affected by social robots. I will argue that much of our current social morality is agency-centric and that social robots, as non-standard agents, will disrupt that model.


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