Asymmetric Information and Dividend Policy

2008 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 673-694 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kai Li ◽  
Xinlei Zhao
1985 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 1031-1051 ◽  
Author(s):  
MERTON H. MILLER ◽  
KEVIN ROCK

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seyedhossein Naslmosavi ◽  
Mohammadghorban Mehri ◽  
Mohammed Sangiru Umar ◽  
Danjuma Shehu Ibrahim

2020 ◽  
Vol 47 (6) ◽  
pp. 1507-1532
Author(s):  
Mostafa Harakeh ◽  
Ghida Matar ◽  
Nagham Sayour

PurposeThe literature of financial economics documents a causal relationship between the level of information asymmetry in the firm and its dividend policy. Nevertheless, this relationship suffers endogeneity problems arising from reverse causality and omitted variable bias. The purpose of this study is to examine how the dividend policy reacts to changes in asymmetric information in an exogenous research setting.Design/methodology/approachTo overcome endogeneity concerns, the authors employ the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in the US in 2002 as a source of an exogenous variation in the level of information asymmetry to study the potential effect that this variation might have on the dividend policy. In doing so, we utilize a difference-in-differences research design, in which the treatment group is US publicly traded firms that were exposed to the policy and the control group is publicly traded companies in the UK where SOX was not enacted. Both countries have similar institutional settings and enforcement of laws, which makes them comparable in this research context.FindingsThe authors’ findings show that, compared to UK companies, US firms increase their dividend payments following a reduction in asymmetric information as a result of the SOX enactment.Originality/valueThe study contributes to the literature of financial economics by showing that policy makers can mitigate agency conflicts and protect shareholders by improving the corporate information environment and reducing asymmetric information.


2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 300-305
Author(s):  
Seyedhossein Naslmosavi ◽  
Mohammadghorban Mehri ◽  
Mohammed Sangiru Umar ◽  
Ibrahim Danjuma

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (25) ◽  
pp. 163
Author(s):  
Riad Lamyaa ◽  
Touili Karima

The topic of the company's dividend policy has captured the interest of economists and over the last five decades has been the subject of several theoretical and empirical studies. Economists have proposed a number of theories to explain the dividend puzzle. The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of market imperfections (asymmetric information, agency costs and the impact of taxation) on corporate dividend policy. While briefly presenting the main theories of dividend policy and summarizing the empirical evidence on these theories. The paper reaches at a conclusion that the famous dividend puzzle is still unresolved. The empirical evidence is ambiguous and the search for a new explanation of dividends is continuing.


BISMA ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 118
Author(s):  
Sumani Sumani ◽  
Novi Puspitasari ◽  
Cindi Fatika Sari

The objective of this study is to analyze the effect of asymmetric information on dividend policy. Asymmetric information in this study was proxied by four variables, i.e., the bid-ask spread, earnings forecast error, firm size, and growth opportunities. Dividend policy was proxied by the dividend payout ratio. The population of this study was insurance companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2014 to 2018. The sample was selected using a purposive sampling technique. The analysis method used was multiple linear regression. The results showed that the variable of earnings forecast error had a significant positive effect on dividend policy. However, the variables of the bid-ask spread, company size, and growth opportunities did not affect dividend policy. The result of the coefficient of determination test showed that the independent variable could influence the dependent variable by 41.2%. Keywords : asymmetric information, dividend policy, insurance companies


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