Underwriting Fees and Shareholder Rights

2013 ◽  
Vol 40 (9-10) ◽  
pp. 1276-1303 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ji-Chai Lin ◽  
Bahar Ulupinar
Keyword(s):  
Shareholder Rights ◽  
Underwriting Fees

Shareholder Rights, Financial Disclosure and the Cost of Equity Capital

CFA Digest ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-5
Author(s):  
Kathryn Dixon Jost
Keyword(s):  
Equity Capital ◽  
Financial Disclosure ◽  
Shareholder Rights ◽  
Cost Of Equity Capital ◽  
Cost Of Equity ◽  
The Cost

Policy Measures for M&A Laws and Regulations in Korea: Focused on Reinforcement of Minority Shareholder Rights

2017 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kyung Suh Park ◽  
Chansik Jung ◽  
Sun Min Kim
Keyword(s):  
Minority Shareholder ◽  
Shareholder Rights ◽  
Policy Measures ◽  
Laws And Regulations

An Investigation of Underwriting Fees for Asset-Backed Securities

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aron A. Gottesman ◽  
David Puskar
Keyword(s):  
Underwriting Fees ◽  
Asset Backed Securities

Do Shareholder Rights Affect Syndicate Structure? Evidence from a Natural Experiment

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sreedhar T. Bharath ◽  
Sandeep Dahiya ◽  
Issam Hallak
Keyword(s):  
Natural Experiment ◽  
Shareholder Rights ◽  
Syndicate Structure

Trust and Regulation in Corporate Capital Markets before 1914

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leslie Hannah
Keyword(s):  
Capital Markets ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Legal Regulation ◽  
Securities Market ◽  
Market Development ◽  
Shareholder Rights ◽  
London Stock Exchange ◽  
Local Elites ◽  
Corporate Capital ◽  
Trust Networks

Historians have struggled to explain how stock markets could develop—with notable vigour in many countries before 1914—before modern shareholder protections were legally mandated. Trust networks among local elites—and/or information signalling to public investors—substituted for legal regulation, but this chapter suggests real limits to such processes. They are especially implausible when applied to giant companies with ownership substantially divorced from control, of which there were many with—nationally and internationally—dispersed shareholdings. In London—the largest pre-1914 securities market—strong supplementary supports for market development were provided by mandatory requirements for transparency and anti-director rights in UK statutory companies and by low new issue fees. There were also stringent London Stock Exchange requirements for other companies wanting the liquidity benefits of official listing. Shareholder rights were similarly achieved in Brazil and other countries and colonies dependent on British capital.

Minority Shareholder Rights in the Current Macedonian Legislation

2001 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-52
Author(s):  
Keyword(s):  
Minority Shareholder ◽  
Shareholder Rights

AbstractNo Abstract

Changing National Business Systems: Corporate Governance and Financing in the Netherlands, 1945–2005

2010 ◽  
Vol 84 (4) ◽  
pp. 773-798 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abe de Jong ◽  
Ailsa Röell ◽  
Gerarda Westerhuis
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
The Netherlands ◽  
Market Economy ◽  
Shareholder Rights ◽  
Business Systems ◽  
Foreign Investors ◽  
Corporate System ◽  
National Business Systems ◽  
National Business

This study traces the evolution of corporate governance and financing structures in the Netherlands during the second half of the twentieth century. A description of Dutch shareholder rights, fi nancing structures, and networks of directors reveals the changes that have occurred in many aspects of the Dutch corporate system over the course of six decades. The case of Royal Ahold illustrates some of the developments that have taken place. Most indicate a transition from a coordinated market economy to a more liberal system. The internationalization of the Dutch economy, which has played an important role in the transition of the system, is reflected in the expansion of Dutch firms beyond the national borders and in the growing number of foreign investors in Dutch fi rms.

The Use of Contract Adjustments to Lengthen the CEO Horizon in the Presence of Internal and External Monitoring

2013 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 199-229 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shane S. Dikolli ◽  
Susan L. Kulp ◽  
Karen L. Sedatole
Keyword(s):  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Shareholder Rights ◽  
Compensation Contracts ◽  
Job Change ◽  
External Monitoring ◽  
Increased Risk ◽  
Short Horizon ◽  
High Level ◽  
A Current

ABSTRACT We investigate whether boards of directors adjust compensation contracts to lengthen a CEO's decision horizon, and if the use of such contract adjustments depends on the levels of external (i.e., shareholder-based) and internal (i.e., board-based) CEO monitoring. Based on insights from the career-concerns literature, we identify short-horizon CEOs as those nearing retirement, at a firm with a current earnings decline or loss, and/or with an impending job change. We find that firms with a CEO identified as having a short-horizon place greater contract weight on forward-looking information. This horizon-lengthening contract adjustment is less pronounced when there is greater external monitoring (i.e., as proxied by a high level of shareholder rights), consistent with the intuition that increased shareholder rights mitigate CEO entrenchment, leading to less myopic decision making, independent of a contract adjustment. However, we also find that the horizon-lengthening contract adjustment is more pronounced when there is greater internal monitoring (i.e., as proxied by characteristics of the board), consistent with the intuition that increased employment risk from more intense internal monitoring itself creates a demand for increased incentive weights as a means of compensating the CEO for the increased risk. Data Availability: Data used for this study are derived from publicly available databases and proxy statements. JEL Classifications: M52; M41; J33.

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