Comment Letter of Professors Max M. Schanzenbach and Robert H. Sitkoff on the Department of Labor's Proposed Rulemaking on Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting Plan Investments and Exercising Shareholder Rights

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert H. Sitkoff
Keyword(s):  
Shareholder Rights

Trust and Regulation in Corporate Capital Markets before 1914

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leslie Hannah
Keyword(s):  
Capital Markets ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Legal Regulation ◽  
Securities Market ◽  
Market Development ◽  
Shareholder Rights ◽  
London Stock Exchange ◽  
Local Elites ◽  
Corporate Capital ◽  
Trust Networks

Historians have struggled to explain how stock markets could develop—with notable vigour in many countries before 1914—before modern shareholder protections were legally mandated. Trust networks among local elites—and/or information signalling to public investors—substituted for legal regulation, but this chapter suggests real limits to such processes. They are especially implausible when applied to giant companies with ownership substantially divorced from control, of which there were many with—nationally and internationally—dispersed shareholdings. In London—the largest pre-1914 securities market—strong supplementary supports for market development were provided by mandatory requirements for transparency and anti-director rights in UK statutory companies and by low new issue fees. There were also stringent London Stock Exchange requirements for other companies wanting the liquidity benefits of official listing. Shareholder rights were similarly achieved in Brazil and other countries and colonies dependent on British capital.

Changing National Business Systems: Corporate Governance and Financing in the Netherlands, 1945–2005

2010 ◽  
Vol 84 (4) ◽  
pp. 773-798 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abe de Jong ◽  
Ailsa Röell ◽  
Gerarda Westerhuis
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
The Netherlands ◽  
Market Economy ◽  
Shareholder Rights ◽  
Business Systems ◽  
Foreign Investors ◽  
Corporate System ◽  
National Business Systems ◽  
National Business

This study traces the evolution of corporate governance and financing structures in the Netherlands during the second half of the twentieth century. A description of Dutch shareholder rights, fi nancing structures, and networks of directors reveals the changes that have occurred in many aspects of the Dutch corporate system over the course of six decades. The case of Royal Ahold illustrates some of the developments that have taken place. Most indicate a transition from a coordinated market economy to a more liberal system. The internationalization of the Dutch economy, which has played an important role in the transition of the system, is reflected in the expansion of Dutch firms beyond the national borders and in the growing number of foreign investors in Dutch fi rms.

The Use of Contract Adjustments to Lengthen the CEO Horizon in the Presence of Internal and External Monitoring

2013 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 199-229 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shane S. Dikolli ◽  
Susan L. Kulp ◽  
Karen L. Sedatole
Keyword(s):  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Shareholder Rights ◽  
Compensation Contracts ◽  
Job Change ◽  
External Monitoring ◽  
Increased Risk ◽  
Short Horizon ◽  
High Level ◽  
A Current

ABSTRACT We investigate whether boards of directors adjust compensation contracts to lengthen a CEO's decision horizon, and if the use of such contract adjustments depends on the levels of external (i.e., shareholder-based) and internal (i.e., board-based) CEO monitoring. Based on insights from the career-concerns literature, we identify short-horizon CEOs as those nearing retirement, at a firm with a current earnings decline or loss, and/or with an impending job change. We find that firms with a CEO identified as having a short-horizon place greater contract weight on forward-looking information. This horizon-lengthening contract adjustment is less pronounced when there is greater external monitoring (i.e., as proxied by a high level of shareholder rights), consistent with the intuition that increased shareholder rights mitigate CEO entrenchment, leading to less myopic decision making, independent of a contract adjustment. However, we also find that the horizon-lengthening contract adjustment is more pronounced when there is greater internal monitoring (i.e., as proxied by characteristics of the board), consistent with the intuition that increased employment risk from more intense internal monitoring itself creates a demand for increased incentive weights as a means of compensating the CEO for the increased risk. Data Availability: Data used for this study are derived from publicly available databases and proxy statements. JEL Classifications: M52; M41; J33.

scholarly journals The Effect of Chief Executive Officer Dominance and Shareholder Rights on Cost of Equity Capital in Pakistan

2020 ◽  
Vol V (III) ◽  
pp. 84-93
Author(s):  
Yawar Miraj Khilji ◽  
Shehzad Khan ◽  
Muhammad Faizan Malik
Keyword(s):  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Fixed Effect Model ◽  
Equity Capital ◽  
Shareholder Rights ◽  
Cost Of Equity Capital ◽  
Cost Of Equity ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
The Impact

This Research explores the effect of Chief executive Dominance and Shareholder rights on Cost of equity of listed companies in an emerging equity market, Pakistan. The research is for the period of 2012 to 2018 for which firm level data of top 100 non-financial listed firms from Pakistan Stock Exchange has been examined by using descriptive statistics, a correlation -matrix, Pooled OLS and Fixed Effect Model approach. The impact of controlled variables which includes firm size, Financial Leverage, and Book to market ratio influence on the firms cost of equity has also been investigated. Research results indicate that when Chief executive officers align their interest with that of shareholders, the risk of agency problem is mitigated thus leading to lower cost of equity.

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