AbstractThe present essay provides a new metaphysical interpretation of Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) in terms of mereological bundle theory. The essential idea is to claim that a physical system in RQM can be defined as a mereological fusion of properties whose values may vary for different observers. Abandoning the Aristotelian tradition centered on the notion of substance, I claim that RQM embraces an ontology of properties that finds its roots in the heritage of David Hume. To this regard, defining what kind of concrete physical objects populate the world according to RQM, I argue that this theoretical framework can be made compatible with (i) a property-oriented ontology, in which the notion of object can be easily defined, and (ii) moderate structural realism, a philosophical position where relations and relata are both fundamental. Finally, I conclude that under this reading relational quantum mechanics should be included among the full-fledged realist interpretations of quantum theory.
AbstractFor a 2-category 2C we associate a notion of a principal 2C-bundle. For the 2-category of 2-vector spaces, in the sense of M.M. Kapranov and V.A. Voevodsky, this gives the 2-vector bundles of N.A. Baas, B.I. Dundas and J. Rognes. Our main result says that the geometric nerve of a good 2-category is a classifying space for the associated principal 2-bundles. In the process of proving this we develop powerful machinery which may be useful in further studies of 2-categorical topology. As a corollary we get a new proof of the classification of principal bundles. Another 2-category of 2-vector spaces has been proposed by J.C. Baez and A.S. Crans. A calculation using our main theorem shows that in this case the theory of principal 2-bundles splits, up to concordance, as two copies of ordinary vector bundle theory. When 2C is a cobordism type 2-category we get a new notion of cobordism-bundles which turns out to be classified by the Madsen–Weiss spaces.
http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2016v20n3p315Hume’s Treatise, with its celebrated bundle theory of the self, is a significant contribution to the embryonic Newtonian experimental philosophy of the enlightenment. But the theory is inadequate as it stands, as the appendix to the Treatise makes clear. For this account of the self, apparently, rests on contradictory principles — propositions, fortunately, that can be reconciled, according to Hume. My paper is a critical exploration of Hume’s argument for this intriguing suggestion.
What I propose in the present article are some theoretical adjustments for a more coherent answer to the legal “status question” of artificial intelligence (AI) systems. I arrive at those by using the new “bundle theory” of legal personhood, together with its accompanying conceptual and methodological apparatus as a lens through which to look at a recent such answer inspired from German civil law and named Teilrechtsfähigkeit or partial legal capacity. I argue that partial legal capacity is a possible solution to the status question only if we understand legal personhood according to this new theory. Conversely, I argue that if indeed Teilrechtsfähigkeit lends itself to being applied to AI systems, then such flexibility further confirms the bundle theory paradigm shift. I then go on to further analyze and exploit the particularities of Teilrechtsfähigkeit to inform a reflection on the appropriate conceptual shape of legal personhood and suggest a slightly different answer from the bundle theory framework in what I term a “gradient theory” of legal personhood.
The Bundle Theory Approach to Relational Quantum Mechanics
