EPISTEMIC RESPONSIBILITY AND DOXASTIC AGENCY

2013 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 132-157 ◽  
Author(s):  
Conor McHugh
Synthese ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 194 (8) ◽  
pp. 2667-2671
Author(s):  
Andrea Kruse ◽  
Heinrich Wansing

Author(s):  
Sanford C. Goldberg

This chapter completes the account of the explicit criteria for epistemically proper belief. Given a belief formed through a process or processes on which the subject enjoyed a default permission to rely, the belief is epistemically proper just in case it satisfies a version of Process Reliabilism which the author calls Coherence-Infused Reliabilism (CIR). CIR requires that (i) beliefs be formed and sustained through processes that were reliable (or conditionally reliable), and (ii) the propositional content of the belief, as well as the hypothesis asserting the reliability of the processes as used on this occasion, cohere with the subject’s background beliefs. After arguing that such a view is well motivated, the author suggests that condition (ii) amounts to the exemplification of a minimal kind of epistemic responsibility, and goes on to generalize the account to cover all beliefs (not just basic ones).


Episteme ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 117-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Boaz Miller ◽  
Isaac Record

AbstractPeople increasingly form beliefs based on information gained from automatically filtered internet sources such as search engines. However, the workings of such sources are often opaque, preventing subjects from knowing whether the information provided is biased or incomplete. Users' reliance on internet technologies whose modes of operation are concealed from them raises serious concerns about the justificatory status of the beliefs they end up forming. Yet it is unclear how to address these concerns within standard theories of knowledge and justification. To shed light on the problem, we introduce a novel conceptual framework that clarifies the relations between justified belief, epistemic responsibility, action and the technological resources available to a subject. We argue that justified belief is subject to certain epistemic responsibilities that accompany the subject's particular decision-taking circumstances, and that one typical responsibility is to ascertain, so far as one can, whether the information upon which the judgment will rest is biased or incomplete. What this responsibility comprises is partly determined by the inquiry-enabling technologies available to the subject. We argue that a subject's beliefs that are formed based on internet-filtered information are less justified than they would be if she either knew how filtering worked or relied on additional sources, and that the subject may have the epistemic responsibility to take measures to enhance the justificatory status of such beliefs.


2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Mudde

This paper introduces The Challenge of Epistemic Responsibility: Essays in Honour of Lorraine Code. In this symposium of papers, invited by Feminist Philosophy Quarterly, the authors return to Code’s first book, Epistemic Responsibility (1987), to re-read it, respond to it, and rethink Code’s articulation of epistemic responsibility anew, considering it in light of her other work and drawing it into contact with their own. This symposium is the outcome of a conference panel that Anna Mudde co-organized with Susan Dieleman, held October 25, 2015, at the annual meeting of the Canadian Society for Women in Philosophy (CSWIP) at Mudde’s institution, Campion College at the University of Regina, in Saskatchewan.


Author(s):  
Sarah V. Platt

Resumen El periodismo collage desarrollado por Ryszard Kapuściński se ha tornado controversial por su difícil clasificación de género y por combinar distintas técnicas y enfoques pertenecientes a varias disciplinas. En este artículo se analizará la influencia de los principales trozos interdisciplinarios que componen la totalidad de la obra de este autor: la fotografía y la poesía, las ciencias sociales, la politología, el cine y la literatura. Como marco teórico se empleará la fenomenología y se expondrán algunos ejemplos de sus obras cumbres para mostrar cómo se ponen en práctica las técnicas interdisciplinarias del collage. La obra kapuścińskiana, a pesar de ser completamente heterogénea en cuanto a su estructura, comparte una esencia en común: retrata la realidad sociopolítica de algunos de los acontecimientos más relevantes del siglo XX, a la vez que proyecta un recuento muy íntimo de las experiencias del autor en el campo. La responsabilidad epistémica del autor para con sus sujetos de trabajo está siempre presente, dando espacio a sus lectores a juzgar por ellos mismos la credibilidad de su postura y de sus historias. Palabras clavePeriodismo literario;  Ryszard Kapuściński; interdisciplinariedad; collageAbstract Ryszard Kapuściński´s collage journalism has become a controversial topic because of its hard to define genre and because it combines different techniques and approaches that pertain to various disciplines. In this article we will analyze the principal interdisciplinary influences in the author´s work: photography and poetry, social sciences, political science, film, and literature. In order to attest how the visual collage journalism techniques are put into practice, some examples from the author’s main books will be brought to light. Although Kapuściński’s work’s structure is heterogeneous, a common essence is observed: the vivid depiction of some of the most significant events of the 20th century through the author´s intimate experiences in the field. Moreover, Kapuściński´s epistemic responsibility with his work subjects is ever-present, providing space for his readers to judge his credibility for themselves. KeywordsLiterary journalism; Ryszard Kapuściński; interdisciplinary; collage


Author(s):  
Peter J. Graham ◽  
Jack C. Lyons

Epistemic defeat is standardly understood in either evidentialist or responsibilist terms. The seminal treatment of defeat is an evidentialist one, due to John Pollock, who famously distinguishes between undercutting and rebutting defeaters. More recently, an orthogonal distinction due to Jennifer Lackey has become widely endorsed, between so-called doxastic (or psychological) and normative defeaters. We think that neither doxastic nor normative defeaters, as Lackey understands them, exist. Both of Lackey’s categories of defeat derive from implausible assumptions about epistemic responsibility. Although Pollock’s evidentialist view is superior, the evidentialism per se can be purged from it, leaving a general structure of defeat that can be incorporated in a reliabilist theory that is neither evidentialist nor responsibilist in any way.


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