ABSTRACT Section 5 of the International Trade Administration Act 71 of 2002 (ITAA) provides that the Minister of Trade, Industry and Competition has the power to issue "Trade Policy Directives" subject to the procedures and requirements of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Constitution) and other laws. However, there is uncertainty as to how trade policy is formulated under section 5 of the ITAA and the rights of affected parties in this regard. Thus, this article offers an exposition of the process of trade policy formulation under section 5 of the ITAA. To this end, it is my view that trade policy formulation under section 5 must be guided by section 195 of the Constitution, which requires that the public must be "encouraged" to participate in policy formulation and that this must occur in a climate of openness, transparency and accountability. In the narrower sense, it is also my view that interested parties must be given an opportunity to participate in trade policy formulation on the ground of procedural rationality and to avoid a charge of arbitrariness as twin components of the rule of law. Keywords: Trade policy; International Trade Administration Act; rule of law; legality; rationality; arbitrariness; transparency; accountability; governance.
John Jackson pioneered international trade law, helped to establish the WTO, and taught legions of professors and trade policy officials who continue to promote his goals of a multilateral trading system based on the rule of law, transparency, fairness, and non-discrimination. A great man, he was also a very dear man – humble, quiet, unassuming, kind, and private. In his writings, he had the unique ability to distill very complex issues down to a few, readily comprehensible paragraphs for students and readers.
AbstractThis article examines how fragmentation of the global trade regime into preferential agreements, built on a multilateral baseline of World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, affects trade governance. The analysis relies on 105 interviews with trade policy professionals in core WTO members and a conceptual distinction between ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ institutionalism to capture institutional changes in the global trade governance architecture. The WTO's thick institutionalism facilitates institutionalized interactions among members of the trade policy community that are essential for transparency and dialogue and the rule of law character of the trade regime. It secures the continued belief of trade policy professionals in the WTO's centrality in trade governance. The thin institutionalism of the network of preferential agreements spells the return toà la carteforms of trade governance and benefits those with the technical and political capacity to successfully navigate the fragmented governance architecture. Ongoing institutional transformations shift global trade governance away from rules-based back to more power-based forms.
There have been seven general elections, under Ghana's Fourth Republic, to elect presidents and members of parliament. There are laws regulating the electoral process and election results have generally been accepted and, in a few cases, challenged through the laid-down process. Elections in Ghana are nonetheless reportedly flawed with irregularities tainting the outcome and creating tensions and sometimes pockets of violence. This article examines the electoral process under Ghana's Fourth Republic, namely the adoption of regulations for each electoral cycle, voters’ registration and the voters’ register, nomination of aspirants, voting, counting of votes and declaration of the results. To ensure the integrity of the electoral process, the laws regulating elections should comply with the dictates of the procedural requirements of the rule of law and the Electoral Commission's actions must be consistent with these laws.
The WTO in an Era of Preferential Trade Agreements: Thick and Thin Institutions in Global Trade Governance
