scholarly journals SCADA vs. the Hackers

2002 ◽  
Vol 124 (12) ◽  
pp. 37-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan S. Brown

This article focuses on United States’ power grid vulnerability to cyber attack. None of the industrial control systems used to monitor and operate the nation's utilities and factories were designed with security in mind. Moreover, their very nature makes them difficult to secure. Linking them to networks and the public Internet only makes them harder to protect. The Internet made it easy. Instead of installing expensive private telecommunications links, companies let the Internet carry SCADA messages. Encryption may prevent a remote attack on data, but also may leave utilities vulnerable to attacks over corporate networks that are often linked to facilities. Someone on the inside may be able to unscramble encrypted data. Similarly, drive-by hackers will still be able to take advantage of security flaws in a wireless system to sneak into a plant network behind any encryption device. Stronger IT policies and encryption are good first steps. But the US power grid—and the entire nation’s utility and industrial infrastructure—remain vulnerable to cyberattack from terrorists and angry employees.

Author(s):  
Claudia ARAUJO MACEDO ◽  
Jos MENTING

Cybersecurity in industrial control system environments has become a significant concern and is even more relevant in the context of critical infrastructures where control system disruption could have a profound impact on health, safety and the environment. This makes this type of system a major target for malicious activities. Notwithstanding an organization’s interest in protecting its industrial control systems against cyber-attacks, the implementation of security measures, whether technical, organizational or human, still faces resistance and is often seen as a constraint. Using the best technology to protect industrial control systems makes no sense if persons with access do not act attentively and protectively. Technical and human cybersecurity measures are intrinsically linked, and it is essential that all persons with access to these systems are fully aware of the inherent cyber risks. Organizations must also act so that staff receive appropriate training on how to keep systems continuously protected against cyber-attack when carrying out their daily tasks. These educational processes can contribute to building an effective cybersecurity culture fully reflective of management and staff attitudes, so that the availability, integrity and confidentiality of information in industrial control systems can be assured.


2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (2.14) ◽  
pp. 145 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qais Saif Qassim ◽  
Norziana Jamil ◽  
Razali Jidin ◽  
Mohd Ezanee Rusli ◽  
Md Nabil Ahmad Zawawi ◽  
...  

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system is the underlying control system of most national critical infrastructures such as power, energy, water, transportation and telecommunication. In order to understand the potential threats to these infrastructures and the mechanisms to protect them, different types of cyber-attacks applicable to these infrastructures need to be identified. Therefore, there is a significant need to have a comprehensive understanding of various types of cyber-attacks and its classification associated with both Opera-tion Technology (OT) and Information Technology (IT). This paper presents a comprehensive review of existing cyber-attack taxonomies available in the literature and evaluates these taxonomies based on defined criteria.  


2020 ◽  
pp. 1672-1685
Author(s):  
Timo Kiravuo ◽  
Seppo Tiilikainen ◽  
Mikko Särelä ◽  
Jukka Manner

The developed society depends on many critical infrastructure processes, such as power generation, water treatment, many types of manufacturing, and smart buildings. These processes need control and the automation industry has embraced the Internet to connect all these controls. However, the controlling devices thus opened to the world do not always have adequate safeguards to withstand malicious users. Many automation systems have default passwords or known and unknown backdoors. Also, often those systems are not updated to close security weaknesses found after original installation. The authors argue that while the industry is familiar with the notion of safety of equipment and processes, it has not focused enough on IT security. Several years ago the Shodan search engine showed how easy it is to find these control devices on the Internet. The authors followed this research line further by targeting one nation's IP address space with Shodan and found thousands of control systems, many of which represent models and versions with known vulnerabilities. Their first contribution is presenting these findings and analyzing their significance. Their study started in 2012 and the most recent results are from the end of 2015. To gain further knowledge, they have built a prototype scanner capable of finding industrial control systems. This lets the authors evaluate the possibility of performing routine scans to gauge the vulnerability of a nation. Their second contribution is to present a template for a national Internet scanning program. The authors discuss the technology, performance, and legality of such a program. Based on their findings and analysis they argue that nations should continuously monitor their own Internet address space for vulnerabilities. The authors' findings indicate that the current level of vulnerabilities is significant and unacceptable. Scanning a nation's critical infrastructure can be done in minutes, allowing them to keep a tight control of vulnerabilities. Yet, in addition, the authors need to extend current legislation and the rights of government officials to bring more security in national critical infrastructures; this discussion is their third contribution. The cyber-space has become a playing field for criminals, terrorists and nation states, all of which may have a motive to disrupt the daily life of a nation, and currently causing such disruptions is too easy.


Energies ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (13) ◽  
pp. 2598
Author(s):  
Asif Iqbal ◽  
Farhan Mahmood ◽  
Mathias Ekstedt

In today’s connected world, there is a tendency of connectivity even in the sectors which conventionally have been not so connected in the past, such as power systems substations. Substations have seen considerable digitalization of the grid hence, providing much more available insights than before. This has all been possible due to connectivity, digitalization and automation of the power grids. Interestingly, this also means that anybody can access such critical infrastructures from a remote location and gone are the days of physical barriers. The power of connectivity and control makes it a much more challenging task to protect critical industrial control systems. This capability comes at a price, in this case, increasing the risk of potential cyber threats to substations. With all such potential risks, it is important that they can be traced back and attributed to any potential threats to their roots. It is extremely important for a forensic investigation to get credible evidence of any cyber-attack as required by the Daubert standard. Hence, to be able to identify and capture digital artifacts as a result of different attacks, in this paper, the authors have implemented and improvised a forensic testbed by implementing a sandboxing technique in the context of real time-hardware-in-the-loop setup. Newer experiments have been added by emulating the cyber-attacks on WAMPAC applications, and collecting and analyzing captured artifacts. Further, using sandboxing for the first time in such a setup has proven helpful.


2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kieran McLaughlin ◽  
Sakir Sezer ◽  
Paul R. Smith ◽  
Zhendong Ma ◽  
Florian Skopik

Author(s):  
Konstantin Knorr

Worm epidemics such as Stuxnet and Conficker have raised great interest in the public and media lately and stressed the question of how our critical infrastructure can be protected against such attacks. Besides reactive measures like incident response, pro-active counter measures are required. Patch management is such an essential pro-active measure for the secure operation of our critical infrastructure. It is an indispensable activity which is required in many standards. This chapter focuses on patch and update management for industrial control systems that are part of our critical infrastructure. Standards for the automation of patch management and selected operational security standards are discussed in the context of patch management. The main contribution of the chapter is the definition and description of a standard conform patch management process for industrial control systems with special focus on the interaction between operator and vendor of such systems.


Author(s):  
Hunor Sándor ◽  
Béla Genge ◽  
Zoltán Szántó ◽  
Lőrinc Márton ◽  
Piroska Haller

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