Study on PRA Procedure Considering Combination of Multiple Events Using DQFM Methodology

Author(s):  
Hirohisa Yamakawa ◽  
Hitoshi Muta

Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station accident occurred by the Great East Japan Earthquake on March 11, 2011. After that, continuous enhancement of nuclear safety is being required in Japan. The accident of Fukushima was caused by the seismic induced tsunami event, namely, multiple events. The other examples of multiple events due to the seismic event are such as internal fire and internal flooding in the nuclear power plants. In addition, structures, such as a building, and piping might be damaged by the seismic event, which could impact component failure dependently. In order to consider these kinds of events, the development of PRA procedures for multiple events caused by the seismic events will be highly demanded. So, we developed a basic PRA methodology for seismic induced tsunami events using “Direct Quantification of Fault Tree using Monte Carlo simulation (DQFM) methodology”. And we verified its applicability through the evaluation.

Symmetry ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 414
Author(s):  
Atsuo Murata ◽  
Waldemar Karwowski

This study explores the root causes of the Fukushima Daiichi disaster and discusses how the complexity and tight coupling in large-scale systems should be reduced under emergencies such as station blackout (SBO) to prevent future disasters. First, on the basis of a summary of the published literature on the Fukushima Daiichi disaster, we found that the direct causes (i.e., malfunctions and problems) included overlooking the loss of coolant and the nuclear reactor’s failure to cool down. Second, we verified that two characteristics proposed in “normal accident” theory—high complexity and tight coupling—underlay each of the direct causes. These two characteristics were found to have made emergency management more challenging. We discuss how such disasters in large-scale systems with high complexity and tight coupling could be prevented through an organizational and managerial approach that can remove asymmetry of authority and information and foster a climate of openly discussing critical safety issues in nuclear power plants.


Author(s):  
Robert A. Leishear

Water hammers, or fluid transients, compress flammable gasses to their autognition temperatures in piping systems to cause fires or explosions. While this statement may be true for many industrial systems, the focus of this research are reactor coolant water systems (RCW) in nuclear power plants, which generate flammable gasses during normal operations and during accident conditions, such as loss of coolant accidents (LOCA’s) or reactor meltdowns. When combustion occurs, the gas will either burn (deflagrate) or explode, depending on the system geometry and the quantity of the flammable gas and oxygen. If there is sufficient oxygen inside the pipe during the compression process, an explosion can ignite immediately. If there is insufficient oxygen to initiate combustion inside the pipe, the flammable gas can only ignite if released to air, an oxygen rich environment. This presentation considers the fundamentals of gas compression and causes of ignition in nuclear reactor systems. In addition to these ignition mechanisms, specific applications are briefly considered. Those applications include a hydrogen fire following the Three Mile Island meltdown, hydrogen explosions following Fukushima Daiichi explosions, and on-going fires and explosions in U.S nuclear power plants. Novel conclusions are presented here as follows. 1. A hydrogen fire was ignited by water hammer at Three Mile Island. 2. Hydrogen explosions were ignited by water hammer at Fukushima Daiichi. 3. Piping damages in U.S. commercial nuclear reactor systems have occurred since reactors were first built. These damages were not caused by water hammer alone, but were caused by water hammer compression of flammable hydrogen and resultant deflagration or detonation inside of the piping.


2017 ◽  
Vol 153 ◽  
pp. 08011
Author(s):  
Hideo Hirayama ◽  
Kenjiro Kondo ◽  
Seishiro Suzuki ◽  
Shimpei Hamamoto ◽  
Kohei Iwanaga

2017 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sachiko HIRAKAWA ◽  
Nobuaki YOSHIZAWA ◽  
Kana MURAKAMI ◽  
Mari TAKIZAWA ◽  
Masaki KAWAI ◽  
...  

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