Technology and High Reliability Organizations in Railroad Operations Safety: A Case Study of Metrolink / SCRRA and Positive Train Control (PTC) Implementation

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Greg Placencia ◽  
Najmedin Meshkati ◽  
James Moore ◽  
Yalda Khashe
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Power ◽  
High Reliability ◽  
High Reliability Organizations ◽  
Train Control ◽  
Commuter Rail ◽  
Safety Improvement ◽  
Union Pacific ◽  
Positive Train Control ◽  
Class 1 ◽  
Railroad Safety

High-risk organizations operate technologies such as in rail transportation, aviation, or nuclear power, where failure/breakdown can initiate low-probability, high consequence events. The concept of High-Reliability Organizations (HROs) was developed to avoid or mitigate such events through proper management despite the inherent risk. The September 12, 2008, Chatsworth accident is an example of such events that HROs are designed to prevent. In that case a Metrolink commuter train and Union Pacific freight train collided when the Metrolink engineer failed to recognize and react to a stop signal as a result of texting, causing 25 deaths and 135 injuries. This incident directly resulted in the Railroad Safety Improvement Act of 2008, which mandated Positive Train Control (PTC) implementation on all Class 1 rail carriers, as well as intercity / commuter rail passenger transporters. Over the past 2 years, the USC team has observed PTC implementation at the Southern California Regional Rail Authority (SCRRA) / Metrolink. This paper examines how PTC can be an integral part in developing and promoting HRO principles within the rail industry based on those observations.

Positive Train Control and the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Hartong ◽  
Rajni Goel ◽  
Duminda Wijesekera
Keyword(s):  
Control Systems ◽  
Traffic Control ◽  
High Profile ◽  
Train Control ◽  
Safety Regulations ◽  
Safety Improvement ◽  
Union Pacific ◽  
The Us ◽  
Positive Train Control ◽  
Track Circuits

A series of high profile rail accidents, culminating in a head on collision on September 12, 2008 between a Union Pacific freight train and a METROLINK passenger train in Chatsworth, California, provided the impetus for the passage of the Rail Safety Improvement Act (RSIA) of 2008 (Public Law 110–432). The RSIA mandated the installation of Positive Train Control Systems across the US rail system by December 31, 2015. These new statutory requirements represent one of the most significant changes in US signal and train control systems since the introduction of track circuits and Centralized Traffic Control in the 1920’s. This paper discusses the background which led to the passage of the RSIA, the new PTC requirements imposed by the law, and highlights the significant changes from existing federal safety regulations associated with voluntary PTC implementations that are being adopted by the to meet the law’s requirement.

Case Studies of PTC-Preventable Accidents

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dave Schlesinger
Keyword(s):  
Control System ◽  
Case Studies ◽  
Human Factor ◽  
Transportation Safety ◽  
Train Control ◽  
Detailed Case ◽  
Train Control System ◽  
Safety Improvement ◽  
Positive Train Control

A 1969 collision of two Penn Central train resulted in four fatalities and forty-five injuries. This accident could have been prevented, had some type of train control system been in place. After this accident, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) asked the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) to study the feasibility of requiring railroads to install some type of automatic train control system that would prevent human-factor caused accidents. Over the next almost four decades, a number of additional accidents occurred, culminating in the January, 2005 Graniteville Norfolk-Southern accident and the September, 2008 Metrolink Chatsworth accident. A little more than one month after the Metrolink accident, Congress passed the Rail Safety Improvement Act, which requires Positive Train Control (PTC). To better explain the positive train control requirements, this paper traces each to a detailed case study. Four different accidents are studied, each being an example of one of the four, core positive train control requirements. Included in the case study is a discussion about how positive train control would have prevented the accident, had it been present. This provides positive train control implementers and other railroad professionals with a better understanding of the factors that have caused or contributed to the cause of the positive train control preventable accidents studied.

scholarly journals Trust in high-reliability organizations

2009 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 315-333 ◽  
Author(s):  
Markus Schöbel
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
High Reliability ◽  
Organizational Factors ◽  
Safety Performance ◽  
Chemical Plants ◽  
High Reliability Organizations ◽  
Work Settings ◽  
Potential Safety ◽  
Hospital Emergency Departments

The present article aims to highlight the effects of trust on safety performance in high-reliability organizations (HROs) like nuclear power plants, chemical plants or hospital emergency departments. The author claims that not only beneficial but also detrimental effects have to be considered in the analysis of trust within these socio-technical systems. Potential safety outcomes of trusting behavior are discussed in the light of two types of interaction underlying task management in HROs: trust in human interactions vs. trust in human—system interaction. Trust is further specified according to the constraints and requirements that may interfere with the beneficial role of trusting behavior. In particular, three distinct types of trust beliefs moderating the effect of trust on safety performance are addressed: beliefs based on shared values and norms, institution-based beliefs, and beliefs based on system reliability. Finally, the author highlights organizational factors that emerge as crucial for the development and maintenance of safe work settings in which the beneficial aspects of trust are brought to bear.

U.S. Regulatory Requirements for Positive Train Control Systems

2012 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Mark Hartong ◽  
Duminda Wijesekera
Keyword(s):  
The United States ◽  
Regulatory Compliance ◽  
Current Status ◽  
Regulatory Requirements ◽  
High Profile ◽  
Train Control ◽  
Train Control System ◽  
Positive Train Control ◽  
Risk Areas ◽  
Railroad Safety

Positive Train Control (PTC) Systems are a type of Communications Based Train Control System (CBTC) designed to enhance railroad safety. As a consequence of a series of high profile train accidents in the United States, a statutory mandate for the installation of these systems in high risk areas by the end of 2015 has been established. This chapter identifies the impetus behind the statute, the statutory requirements associated with PTC, the implementing regulations for the statutory requirements, and the current status of regulatory compliance.

scholarly journals Human and Organizational Factors of Positive Train Control Safety System The Application of High Reliability Organizing in Railroad

2019 ◽  
Vol 63 (1) ◽  
pp. 1824-1828 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yalda Khashe ◽  
Najmedin Meshkati
Keyword(s):  
High Reliability ◽  
Organizational Factors ◽  
Safety System ◽  
Train Control ◽  
Positive Train Control ◽  
Safety Recommendations ◽  
Human And Organizational Factors

On August 20, 1969, two Penn Central commuter trains collided head-on near Darien, Connecticut, killing four and injuring 43. That tragedy 45 years ago began the NTSB's call for development and implementation of Positive Train Control (PTC) systems. Since then, the NTSB has issued almost 50 PTC-related safety recommendations and has included PTC on its Most Wanted List every year from its inception in 1990 until enactment of the RSIA. Unfortunately, despite some progress in the four decades since that original recommendation, PTC preventable train collisions still occur. In this paper, we identify human and organizational factors that affect a successful PTC implementation and evaluate the application of High Reliability Organizing (HRO) characteristics in the implementation of this safety system.

scholarly journals Design of high reliability organizations in health care: Table 1

2006 ◽  
Vol 15 (suppl 1) ◽  
pp. i4-i9 ◽  
Author(s):  
J S Carroll ◽  
J W Rudolph
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Power ◽  
High Reliability ◽  
Organizational Structures ◽  
High Reliability Organizations ◽  
Healthcare Organizations ◽  
Reliability Design ◽  
Safety And Reliability ◽  
Design For Safety ◽  
Informal Practices ◽  
Formal Controls

To improve safety performance, many healthcare organizations have sought to emulate high reliability organizations from industries such as nuclear power, chemical processing, and military operations.We outline high reliability design principles for healthcare organizations including both the formal structures and the informal practices that complement those structures. A stage model of organizational structures and practices, moving from local autonomy to formal controls to open inquiry to deep self-understanding, is used to illustrate typical challenges and design possibilities at each stage. We suggest how organizations can use the concepts and examples presented to increase their capacity to self-design for safety and reliability.

Are Public Bureaucracies Supposed to Be High Reliability Organizations?

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Wolfgang Seibel
Keyword(s):  
Child Protection ◽  
Organization Theory ◽  
Goal Attainment ◽  
High Reliability ◽  
Human Action ◽  
High Reliability Organizations ◽  
Fine Grained ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
Public Bureaucracy ◽  
Account Standard

This article addresses the question of to what extent conventional theories of high reliability organizations and normal accidents theory are applicable to public bureaucracy. Empirical evidence suggests precisely this. Relevant cases are, for instance, collapsing buildings and bridges due to insufficient supervision of engineering by the relevant authorities, infants dying at the hands of their own parents due to misperceptions and neglect on the part of child protection agencies, uninterrupted serial killings due to a lack of coordination among police services, or improper planning and risk assessment in the preparation of mass events such as soccer games or street parades. The basic argument is that conceptualizing distinct and differentiated causal mechanisms is useful for developing more fine-grained variants of both normal accident theory and high reliability organization theory that take into account standard pathologies of public bureaucracies and inevitable trade-offs connected to their political embeddedness in democratic and rule-of-law-based systems to which belong the tensions between responsiveness and responsibility and between goal attainment and system maintenance. This, the article argues, makes it possible to identify distinct points of intervention at which permissive conditions with the potential to trigger risk-generating human action can be neutralized while the threshold that separates risk-generating human action from actual disaster can be raised to a level that makes disastrous outcomes less probable.

scholarly journals Veränderte Kompetenzanforderungen an Mitarbeitende infolge zunehmender Automatisierung – Eine Arbeitsfeldbetrachtung

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michèle Rieth ◽  
Vera Hagemann
Keyword(s):  
High Reliability ◽  
High Reliability Organizations ◽  
High Reliability Organization

ZusammenfassungBasierend auf einer Arbeitsfeldbetrachtung im Bereich der Flugsicherung in Österreich und der Schweiz liefert dieser Artikel der Zeitschrift Gruppe. Interaktion. Organisation. (GIO) einen Überblick über automatisierungsbedingte Veränderungen und die daraus resultierenden neuen Kompetenzanforderungen an die Beschäftigten im Hochverantwortungsbereich. Bestehende Tätigkeitsstrukturen und Arbeitsrollen verändern sich infolge zunehmender Automatisierung grundlegend, sodass Organisationen neuen Herausforderungen gegenüberstehen und sich neue Kompetenzanforderungen an Mitarbeitende ergeben. Auf Grundlage von 9 problemzentrierten Interviews mit Fluglotsen sowie 4 problemzentrierten Interviews mit Piloten werden die Veränderungen infolge zunehmender Automatisierung und die daraus resultierenden neuen Kompetenzanforderungen an die Beschäftigten in einer High Reliability Organization dargestellt. Dieser Organisationskontext blieb bisher in der wissenschaftlichen Debatte um neue Kompetenzen infolge von Automatisierung weitestgehend unberücksichtigt. Die Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass der Mensch in High Reliability Organizations durch Technik zwar entlastet und unterstützt werden kann, aber nicht zu ersetzen ist. Die Rolle des Menschen wird im Sinne eines Systemüberwachenden passiver, wodurch die Gefahr eines Fähigkeitsverlustes resultiert und der eigene Einfluss der Beschäftigten abnimmt. Ferner scheinen die Anforderungen, denen sie sich infolge zunehmender Automatisierung gegenüberstehen sehen, zuzunehmen, was in einem Spannungsfeld zu ihrer passiven Rolle zu stehen scheint. Die Erkenntnisse werden diskutiert und praktische Implikationen für das Kompetenzmanagement und die Arbeitsgestaltung zur Minimierung der identifizierten restriktiven Arbeitsbedingungen abgeleitet.

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