Controls on Establishing Private Universities and Colleges in the Saudi Legal System: Legal Descriptive Analytical Study

Education at all levels (general/university) aims to develop plans worldwide, whether in the governmental and private sectors. It is the same as what we will find in the Saudi system, which has paid great attention to the education sector. Due to the importance of the private university’s role, we aim to present the regulating provisions of establishing private universities and colleges considering the most crucial objective and formal controls mentioned in the relevant laws and regulations. We also present some judicial applications issued by the competent judiciary. Our research scope is limited to the legal provisions in force of the Saudi legal system. It is strongly recommended to launch unified provisions for establishing private universities and colleges in the Saudi system. Received: 4 March 2021 / Accepted: 6 May 2021 / Published: 8 July 2021

Announcement of formal controls as phase-shifting perceptions: their determinants and moderating role in the context of mobile loafing

PurposeMobile loafing, or non-work-related mobile computing, is deviant workplace behavior that can reduce productivity and increase cybersecurity risks. To thwart mobile loafing, organizations often adopt formal controls that encompass rules and policies. These formal controls can serve as a phase-shifting event. Phase shifting is a process where individuals reevaluate and revise their perceptions of the regulation of deviant behaviors. Despite the importance of understanding this process, little research has examined the announcement of formal controls as an impetus for phase shifting. The primary objectives of this study were to induce a phase-shifting perception in an organizational setting and explore its determinants and moderating role in the context of mobile loafing.Design/methodology/approachThe authors proposed and tested a model using two-wave data collected from 231 Amazon Mechanical Turk workers. To test the research hypotheses, they used covariance-based structural equation modeling and logistic regression.FindingsThe authors found that peer's mobile loafing and neutralization positively influence mobile-loafing intention before and after the announcement of formal controls. This research also shows that the higher an employee's neutralization, the likelier they perceive the announcement of formal controls as phase shifting. Also, the authors found that the moderating effect of phase-shifting perceptions functions in such a way that the relationship between T1 and T2 mobile-loafing intention is weaker when employees perceive the announcement of formal controls as a phase-shifting event.Practical implicationsThe authors’ results provide managers with useful insights into effectively using formal controls to mitigate employees' deviant behavior. To effectively use formal controls, managers should articulate formal controls that can trigger employees to revise their perceptions of counterproductive workplace behavior policies.Originality/valueThis study is one of the first in information systems research to empirically examine the announcement of formal controls as a phase-shifting event and explore its antecedents and moderating role in the context of deviant workplace behavior in general and mobile loafing in particular.

The Influence of Institutional Differences on Control Mechanisms in Alliances

Cross-border alliances expose firms to heightened risks, posing different governance and control challenges than domestic alliances. We examine the impact of differences in alliance partner countries' institutional environments. Analysis of survey data supports our contention that cross-border alliances involve a greater reliance on formal controls, particularly when firms collaborate with partners in countries with a weaker institutional environment. These relations exist regardless of governance structure (i.e., equity or nonequity alliance) that prior research considers a critical choice for addressing cross-border alliance risks. Additional analyses show that four sub-dimensions of institutional characteristics (voice and accountability, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption) and one sub-dimension of formal controls (behavior controls) are the main drivers in the association between institutional distance and reliance on formal controls. These findings demonstrate the distinct impact of institutional environment as a country-level determinant of alliance control choices.

Managerial Controls in Private Family Firms: The Influence of a Family’s Decision Premises

In most studies, the affiliation of the manager (family-affiliated or non-family affiliated) and supposedly related behavior (agent or steward) is considered the sole antecedent to explain a family business’ (non) professionalization of managerial controls. This paper, based on Luhmann’s new system theory, examines whether a family’s decision premises influence the design of managerial controls in family firms in addition to a manager’s family affiliation status. Using survey data of 135 large and medium-sized Brazilian family firms and testing the hypotheses with SEM, this study provides evidence that a family’s decision premises significantly influence the design of managerial controls in family firms. This study provides evidence that when a family’s intention to transfer the firm to next generation (TGO) is high, more formal controls, as well as controls of a more participative nature are adopted in a family firm. Moreover, the results do not indicate that the level of family involvement in management affects the design of controls in firms with high TGO. The results only showed a significant relationship between a family’s intention to control and influence (FCI) the firm and the absence of participative controls. In addition, these findings also illustrate that each single family-induced decision premise has the potential to explain family firm behavior, since each of the two premises considered in our study is related to a different design of the controls adopted by the family firm.

A Theory of Assurance: Balancing Costly Formal Control with Tone at the Top

Informal tone at the top (TATT) is widely regarded as a fundamental ingredient of organizational control, yet because of its soft nature, the scholarship on TATT has not emphasized mathematical modeling. Observing that TATT refers to the example set by top management, I model TATT as, ceteris paribus, reflecting the expectation that the chief executive officer (CEO) will not divert organizational resources for personal benefit. The setting assumes that CEOs are randomly drawn from a labor pool containing candidates who either value career prospects (high type) or who do not value career prospects (low type). The fear of dismissal and a damaged career mean that high types tend to be less opportunistic than low types, who divert for personal gain. Contrary to the belief that trust and vulnerability go hand in hand, I identify conditions where TATT and optimal costly formal controls are complements. But I also show in the same setting that TATT and optimal formal controls can be substitutes. The results also explain why high levels of TATT may not be welcomed by the external auditor or certain stakeholders and explain ambiguous Sarbanes-Oxley reports. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting.

How Corporate Charitable Giving Reduces the Costs of Formal Controls

Formal control systems are a common instrument to align employees’ interests with those of managers and companies. However, research shows that employees perceive formal controls as a sign of distrust and restraint, which can lead to costs of control in the form of lower employee cooperation and effort (e.g., Falk and Kosfeld 2006; Christ 2013). We propose that charitable giving reduces these costs of control. We draw on the halo effect and propose that corporate charitable giving alters employees’ perception of and reaction to formal controls. In a laboratory experiment, we find that charitable giving by a company creates a higher level of employee trust in a manager who decides to implement a control and a more positive assessment of formal control. These positive effects of charitable giving lead to lower costs of control compared to the absence of charitable giving. We thereby provide an example of how charitable giving as a corporate social responsibility (CSR) activity yields positive benefits by altering the behavior of internal company stakeholders.

Regulation and Regulators, 1970–92

Before 1970 regulators had relied on the principle of divide and rule as a way of keeping financial systems in order. What this meant in practice was that even in market-based economies authority was exercised behind national boundaries, aided by controls on international financial flows, and by insisting upon a degree of internal compartmentalization not only between banks and markets but also within the banking sector. By the 1970s it was becoming apparent that a growing proportion of financial activity was taking place away from those centres, markets, and institutions over which regulators could exercise some control. The result led governments to abandon formal controls and regulators to search for ways of supervising financial markets. Increasingly the solution was seen to lie with the megabanks as they had the capacity to monitor and police their own behaviour, and were closely supervised by central banks.

In control we trust!? Exploring formal control configurations for municipally owned corporations

PurposeThis study examines the interplay of formal types of control (input, behavior and outcome) exercised on municipally owned corporations (MOCs). It further investigates whether particular informal contingencies (trust and interdependence) predict affiliation to the derived municipal control configurations.Design/methodology/approachThe paper applies an exploratory cluster analysis based on survey data from 243 top-level managers of German MOCs. It then investigates the clustered municipal control configurations using binomial logistic regression.FindingsThe exploratory analysis reveals four municipal control configurations: (1) input-dominated control, (2) outcome-dominated control, (3) mixed input/outcome control and (4) “neglect of formal control”. As expected, both of the informal contingencies demonstrate strong predictive power. More precisely, trust increases the likelihood of belonging to the dominant outcome control cluster and interdependence increases the likelihood of belonging to the mixed input/outcome control cluster. Surprisingly, the neglect of formal control cluster is characterized by low trust and low interdependence.Originality/valueThe study sheds light on the widely assumed but understudied interplay of different formal controls in hybrid governance settings. Furthermore, the analysis stresses the importance of trust and interdependence when explaining hybrid control configurations.