Effect of Icing on Ship Maneuvering Characteristics

In this paper the effect of icing forward on the maneuvering characteristics of a small offshore supply vessel hull form, which was used for acoustic surveys in the North Atlantic by the US Navy during the Cold War, is studied. Icing is well known to compromise the roll motion stability of vessels but its effect on maneuvering and specifically path stability is not as well known. Using available empirical formulas for maneuvering coefficients and steady turning ability the effect of icing on the path stability and steady turning ability of this vessel are approximately evaluated. The results show that icing does affect the maneuverability but more study is required to more precisely quantify this effect.

Soviet Atomic Blackmail and the North Atlantic Alliance

World Politics ◽

10.2307/2008917 ◽

1957 ◽

Vol 9 (3) ◽

pp. 307-328 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Hans Speier

Keyword(s):

Cold War ◽

North Atlantic ◽

Nuclear Weapons ◽

Atomic Weapons ◽

The North ◽

The North Atlantic ◽

Future War ◽

The uncertainty about whether atomic weapons will be used in future war, whether local or general, lends itself to political exploitation in the cold war. The efficiency of nuclear weapons in wartime, and their resulting threat-value in either war- or peacetime, constitute their political-military worth. In peacetime, the threat-value of weapons can be exploited in many ways: by an ultimatum, by authoritative or inspired statements on capabilities or intentions, by studied disclosures of new weapons at ceremonial occasions, by means of maneuvers, redeployments of forces, or by so-called demonstrations.

Beyond the Cold War Chessboard

Worldview ◽

10.1017/s0084255900024323 ◽

1974 ◽

Vol 17 (6) ◽

pp. 21-22

Author(s):

John W. Holmes

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

Cold War ◽

North Atlantic ◽

North American ◽

The Other ◽

The North ◽

Common Interests ◽

The North Atlantic ◽

The problem in judging M. Servan-Schreiber's message is that he reaches some sound conclusions on the basis of dubious premises, from which he derives recommendations which could be disastrous.There may be some satisfaction in seeing a Frenchman concerned with le défi, russe instead of le défi américain, but his interpretation of one is as crude as was his interpretation of the other. The shock of revelation that there are common interests of the Atlantic countries in economic as well as strategic matters is understandably more startling to a Frenchman than to others. It was all set out in 1949 in Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty and was restated eloquently in 1973 by Mr. Kissinger. But last spring European leaders were included to see the latter as a self-interested plea from a weak United States to a prosperous Europe. The North American countries were reminded that their role in Europe was simply to defend it on request.

Power, Preferences, or Ideas? Explaining West Germany's Armaments Strategy, 1955–1972

10.1162/jcws_a_00395 ◽

2013 ◽

Vol 15 (4) ◽

pp. 55-103 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Michael H. Creswell ◽

Dieter H. Kollmer

Keyword(s):

Cold War ◽

International Relations ◽

North Atlantic ◽

Federal Republic Of Germany ◽

The North ◽

Depth Analysis ◽

Procurement Strategy ◽

Weapons Procurement ◽

The Cold War ◽

Procurement Strategies

Which major theory of international relations—neorealism, liberalism, or constructivism—best explains states' weapons procurement strategies? This article addresses that question by examining the case of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) during the Cold War. Through an in-depth analysis of the FRG's armaments strategy from the time the country was admitted into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1955 until the early 1970s, the article demonstrates that although ideas and external security concerns did play a role, economic concerns won out more often than not. IR scholars must therefore account for a variety of factors when attempting to explain the FRG's weapons procurement strategy during this period. Neorealism, liberalism, and constructivism are useful in thinking about West Germany's purchases of weapons, but none of the three theories is adequate on its own.

The War Scare That Wasn't: Able Archer 83 and the Myths of the Second Cold War

10.1162/jcws_a_00952 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 22 (3) ◽

pp. 86-118

Author(s):

Simon Miles

Keyword(s):

Cold War ◽

North Atlantic ◽

Nuclear War ◽

Post Exercise ◽

Warsaw Pact ◽

The North ◽

The North Atlantic ◽

The Stability ◽

The Cold War ◽

New Evidence

Did the Cold War of the 1980s nearly turn hot? Much has been made of the November 1983 Able Archer 83 command-post exercise, which is often described as having nearly precipitated a nuclear war when paranoid Warsaw Pact policymakers suspected that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was using the exercise to launch a preemptive nuclear strike. This article challenges that narrative, using new evidence from the archives of the former Warsaw Pact countries. It shows that the much-touted intelligence effort to assess Western intentions and capabilities, Project RYaN, which supposedly triggered fears of a surprise attack, was nowhere near operational at the time of Able Archer 83. It also presents an account of the Pact's sanguine observations of Able Archer 83. In doing so, it advances key debates in the historiography of the late Cold War pertaining to the stability and durability of the nuclear peace.

NATO Enlargement and the Problem of Value Complexity

10.1162/jcws_a_00968 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 22 (4) ◽

pp. 146-174

Author(s):

James Goldgeier

Keyword(s):

Cold War ◽

North Atlantic ◽

Recent Literature ◽

Bill Clinton ◽

German Reunification ◽

Policy Problem ◽

The North ◽

Nato Enlargement ◽

Russian President ◽

Some of the recent literature on negotiations at the end of the Cold War regarding German reunification and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has deflected attention from an important policy problem that arose during subsequent deliberations about whether to enlarge the membership of NATO. Newly released U.S. and Russian archival materials highlight this problem very clearly, namely, how leaders manage tradeoffs and uncertainty. Pursuing one set of interests can harm the achievement of other interests. At times, policies take a while to form, adding to uncertainty in relations between countries. This article highlights the ways U.S. President Bill Clinton and his top advisers convinced themselves that they could both enlarge NATO and keep Russia on a Western-oriented track, despite Russian President Boris Yeltsin's repeated warnings to the contrary.

Burden-sharing in the Persian Gulf War

International Organization ◽

10.1017/s0020818300000813 ◽

1994 ◽

Vol 48 (1) ◽

pp. 39-75 ◽

Cited By ~ 51

Author(s):

Andrew Bennett ◽

Joseph Lepgold ◽

Danny Unger

Keyword(s):

Cold War ◽

North Atlantic ◽

Ad Hoc ◽

Relative Size ◽

Persian Gulf War ◽

Burden Sharing ◽

Domestic Institutions ◽

The North ◽

The Persian Gulf ◽

Why do states contribute to alliances? Is relative size the principal factor influencing the size of contributions, as many studies suggest, or are perceptions of threat, dependencies on other alliance members, and domestic institutions and policies equally important? These questions hold unusual interest in the wake of the cold war. The end of bipolarity promises more ad hoc coalitions, which will widen opportunities for research on alliance burden-sharing beyond the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). At the same time, because the political fault lines of the cold war have disappeared, there are few accepted political criteria for sharing those security burdens that are perceived collectively.

Globalisation and Internationalism Beyond the North Atlantic: Soviet-Brazilian Encounters and Interactions During the Cold War

Internationalism, Imperialism and the Formation of the Contemporary World ◽

10.1007/978-3-319-60693-4_13 ◽

2017 ◽

pp. 327-352 ◽

Cited By ~ 9

Author(s):

Tobias Rupprecht

Keyword(s):

Cold War ◽

North Atlantic ◽

The North ◽

The North Atlantic ◽

Decolonization and the Cold War

10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199236961.013.0027 ◽

2013 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Cary Fraser

Keyword(s):

Cold War ◽

International Relations ◽

North Atlantic ◽

International System ◽

Global Order ◽

The North ◽

The North Atlantic ◽

The Cold War ◽

The Way

This chapter examines decolonization during the Cold War. It suggests that decolonization can be considered both as a response to the globalization of European influence and as a process of globalization which paved the way for the dismantling of the North Atlantic-centered international system. The chapter contends that decolonization during the Cold War was about the rethinking of the nature of the global order and the role of race and citizenship therein. It also argues that decolonization is the proof and constant reminder that the bipolar order pursued by the superpowers and their allies after the war was never a stable framework for the management of international relations.

Belated Decolonization and UN Politics against the Backdrop of the Cold War: Portugal, Britain, and Guinea-Bissau's Proclamation of Independence, 1973–1974

10.1162/jcws.2006.8.4.29 ◽

2006 ◽

Vol 8 (4) ◽

pp. 29-56 ◽

Cited By ~ 7

Author(s):

Norrie MacQueen

Keyword(s):

Cold War ◽

North Atlantic ◽

Military Coup ◽

Guinea Bissau ◽

The North ◽

Unilateral Declaration ◽

National Archives ◽

Un Security Council ◽

The Cold War ◽

Guerrilla Movement

When a guerrilla movement opposing Portuguese rule in Guinea-Bissau issued a unilateral declaration of independence in September 1973, it created a dilemma for Portugal's allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Although Britain, like other NATO countries, wanted to keep Portugal within the alliance, British officials were exasperated by the Portuguese regime's refusal to let go of its colonies in Africa. When the United Nations (UN) took up the issue of Guinea-Bissau, Britain came under intense pressure from Portugal to proffer its support. Declassified documents from the British National Archives underscore the difficulties that ensued. British officials were mindful of their relationship with Portugal, but they were unsure of the intentions of the other Western permanent members of the UN Security Council and were worried about damaging Britain's broader position in Africa. This dilemma was not resolved until April 1974 when a military coup in Lisbon led to the Portuguese withdrawal from Guinea-Bissau.

O Instituto Geofísico da Universidade do Porto no contexto da Guerra Fria (1960-1963)

10.21747/978-989-8969-96-5/omni6a12 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 293-314

Author(s):

Inês Monteiro

Keyword(s):

Cold War ◽

World Wide ◽

Geodetic Survey ◽

The North ◽

Scientific World ◽

The Us ◽

The Cold War ◽

The University ◽

Seismograph Network

This article aims to explore the role of the Geophysical Institute of the University of Porto (IGUP) in the context of the Cold War, between the years of 1960 and 1963. Through the analysis of the documents that are part of the IGUP archive, I intend to understand its participation in the network International Scientific World-Wide Standard Seismograph Network (WWSSN), a program created by the North-American governmental cell, the US Department of Commerce Coast and Geodetic Survey (C&GS), in the first two decades of the second half of the 20th century, designed to obtain measurements seismological calibrated and standardized at a global level, and a collection of data, subsequently made available for unclassified scientific research. Given the relevance that this program had for the scientific area of seismology, this investigation was an attempt to understand how the project developed over time, and what were the forms of its establishment, operation, as well as its direct impact for IGUP itself, for the University of Porto, for national and international science and for the context in which Portugal was inserted in the Cold War.