Beyond the Cold War Chessboard

Worldview ◽  
1974 ◽  
Vol 17 (6) ◽  
pp. 21-22
Author(s):  
John W. Holmes

The problem in judging M. Servan-Schreiber's message is that he reaches some sound conclusions on the basis of dubious premises, from which he derives recommendations which could be disastrous.There may be some satisfaction in seeing a Frenchman concerned with le défi, russe instead of le défi américain, but his interpretation of one is as crude as was his interpretation of the other. The shock of revelation that there are common interests of the Atlantic countries in economic as well as strategic matters is understandably more startling to a Frenchman than to others. It was all set out in 1949 in Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty and was restated eloquently in 1973 by Mr. Kissinger. But last spring European leaders were included to see the latter as a self-interested plea from a weak United States to a prosperous Europe. The North American countries were reminded that their role in Europe was simply to defend it on request.

1957 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 307-328 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Speier

The uncertainty about whether atomic weapons will be used in future war, whether local or general, lends itself to political exploitation in the cold war. The efficiency of nuclear weapons in wartime, and their resulting threat-value in either war- or peacetime, constitute their political-military worth. In peacetime, the threat-value of weapons can be exploited in many ways: by an ultimatum, by authoritative or inspired statements on capabilities or intentions, by studied disclosures of new weapons at ceremonial occasions, by means of maneuvers, redeployments of forces, or by so-called demonstrations.


1963 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 610-627 ◽  
Author(s):  
Livingston T. Merchant

Before considering evolving relations between the United States and the Atlantic Community, it is useful to examine briefly the meaning of the words “Atlantic Community,” a term that means different things to different people. It has no agreed definition because it is still a concept and not yet an institution. It purports to be geographically descriptive. However, when one considers the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which is generally regarded as the most important institutional reflection of a community of interests between the European and North American countries bordering the Atlantic basin, one finds Italy, Greece, and Turkey are members while Spain and Eire, both Atlantic countries, are absent. Similarly, if one looks at the membership of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which is another institution generally regarded as reflecting common interests of the “Atlantic Community,” one finds that all the NATO members belong as well as Eire, Austria, Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, and Spain. Although there are political reasons to account for all this confusion, at the present time the term “Atlantic Community” connotes neither an agreed geographic area nor a specific group of countries.


2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 86-118
Author(s):  
Simon Miles

Did the Cold War of the 1980s nearly turn hot? Much has been made of the November 1983 Able Archer 83 command-post exercise, which is often described as having nearly precipitated a nuclear war when paranoid Warsaw Pact policymakers suspected that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was using the exercise to launch a preemptive nuclear strike. This article challenges that narrative, using new evidence from the archives of the former Warsaw Pact countries. It shows that the much-touted intelligence effort to assess Western intentions and capabilities, Project RYaN, which supposedly triggered fears of a surprise attack, was nowhere near operational at the time of Able Archer 83. It also presents an account of the Pact's sanguine observations of Able Archer 83. In doing so, it advances key debates in the historiography of the late Cold War pertaining to the stability and durability of the nuclear peace.


1949 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 726-727

With the ratification of the North Atlantic treaty by France on August 24, 1949, the treaty came into force. France was the last of the seven nations drafting the alliance to file its ratification, the six other original countries – the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Canada, Belgium and Luxembourg – having previously ratified the treaty. Ratifications had also been filed by the other five nations which later became associated with the pact: Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Portugal and Italy.


Polar Record ◽  
1938 ◽  
Vol 2 (16) ◽  
pp. 124-128 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. L. S. Fleming

On April 14, 1912, the Titanic sank as the result of a collision with an iceberg and a large number of her passengers and crew were drowned. As a direct result of this disaster an International Conference on the Safety of Life at Sea was convened in London. In order to protect transatlantic shipping from dangers of icebergs and field-ice it was clear that it would be necessary to institute a systematic patrol of the North Atlantic. This work was undertaken by the United States Coast Guard who have carried it out most ably under the direction of the International Ice Patrol Board. As at present organised, the patrol is carried out by three vessels. One is an oceanographic vessel fully equipped with a seagoing laboratory which attempts to make one current map per month of the area that appears most critical at the time. The other two are patrol vessels which make cruises of two weeks' duration and relieve one another every fifteen days.


Author(s):  
Cary Fraser

This chapter examines decolonization during the Cold War. It suggests that decolonization can be considered both as a response to the globalization of European influence and as a process of globalization which paved the way for the dismantling of the North Atlantic-centered international system. The chapter contends that decolonization during the Cold War was about the rethinking of the nature of the global order and the role of race and citizenship therein. It also argues that decolonization is the proof and constant reminder that the bipolar order pursued by the superpowers and their allies after the war was never a stable framework for the management of international relations.


Author(s):  
D. A. Talagaeva

The article is dedicated to the problem of defining the term “Northern balance” as a factor of stability and interaction in the north of Europe, as well as the balance of Soviet and US interests in this region. Particular attention is paid to the analysis of practical grounds for such a definition, primarily to the peculiarities in the Northern European foreign policy in relation to NATO. Besides, the article focuses on Norwegian foreign policy and the terms of the country’s membership in the North-Atlantic alliance.


2018 ◽  
Vol 24 ◽  
pp. 136-148
Author(s):  
Patrycja Zaremba

New challenges for the North Atlantic Alliance. NATO in the face of hybrid threatsThe end of the cold war and, consequently collapsed of bipolar partition led to the situation of appearing new, unknown threats in the security and defense sphere. The representatives of North Atlantic Alliance face the challenge, which result was taking decisive steps to counteract and level newly created threats. The following article provides outline of the problem to apply a reality which NATO is. The author try to ask the question: “Do the main safety pillar have the mechanism to counteract and prevent unwanted scenarios in multimodal character as hybrid threats?”.


Author(s):  
Sara Lorenzini

This chapter assesses how modernization worked its way into Cold War politics and how it influenced public discourse and foreign policy in the United States during the second half of the 1950s. Between 1957 and 1958, several events prompted the United States to shift toward a more active foreign aid policy. These events brought a consensus that a more vigorous approach to promoting economic growth and development as a way to contain communist influence was needed. The question of improved coordination of development assistance among the Atlantic nations was also a factor. Most of Western Europe shared America's concern about Soviet penetration, and several members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) insisted on activating economic collaboration according to article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, using it to provide aid cooperatively. The chapter then considers how, with the presidency of John F. Kennedy, modernization became the representative Western ideology for waging the Cold War, even as other coexisting traditions of imperial origin offered rival methods of using development aid as a tool of foreign policy to face radicalization in the decolonizing world.


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