NATO Enlargement, Russia, and Balance of Threat

This paper explores the causes of Russian revanchism alongside phases of NATO expansion, and concludes that evidence of Moscow’s reflexive revanchism is sparse. Russian foreign policy is tested and correlated with Russian rhetoric, military strategy and Russian balancing actions, in light of each phase of actual and potential NATO expansion. The paper concludes that, first, Russia balances against perceived threats, only in areas where it has entrenched material and military interests. Otherwise, Russia is aware of relative military inferiority, and is agnostic about NATO and EU enlargement. These findings have enormous policy relevance, as both NATO and EU plans further enlargement, American and British isolationism grows, and European security scenario alters rapidly.

NATO After the End of the Cold War

The article analyses the process of the NATO enlargement after 1990. It starts by a detailed analysis of the secret negotiations which have been started just after the end of the Cold War. In the light of the institutional liberalism, the NATO enlargement is a positive process which satisfied especially new member states. But in the light of the American neorealism, this process resulted into profound changes in the balance of the security threats and into a large militarisation and tension at the new Eastern frontier of NATO in a direct neighbourhood with the Russia. New military units with the modern arms systems are deployed over there and we are witnessing a growing number of dangerous military incidents. As a result, the contemporary situation needs new political negotiations between two competitors and a shift from the contemporary negative Peace towards the positive Peace.

HOW THE WEST WON: Post-Cold War negotiations on NATO enlargement in the 1990-2000s

With the disappearance of the Soviet Union, in 1991, the American-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) became the triumphant military alliance in Europe. Following prolonged deliberations, NATO eventually conducted a systematic enlargement of the alliance into Central and Eastern Europe. This expansion of the alliance was fiercely contested, and according to many critics was based upon a ‘broken promise’ of no-NATO expansion east of a newly-reunified Germany, an assurance given during the negotiations on German reunification by the leaders of the Western alliance. This paper will explore the enlargement of NATO in the 1990s, whether or not it was indeed based on a broken promise of non-expansionism, how this enlargement was accomplished, and how it has affected the subsequent geopolitics of Europe. In doing so, this paper shall argue that a multitude of false assurances on NATO expansion were given to Soviet officials during the negotiations on German reunification.

Russian Bases Abroad: Security Policy or Power Projection?

After the collapse of the bipolar system, the Soviet Union, and then its heir, the Russian Federation, lost its position as a global player in favour of US hegemony. The arms race was abandoned, reduction of military spending began, and Russian troops were withdrawn from most bases outside the country. The changing conditions of Russia’s security, NATO enlargement, and loss of influence in many regions of the world have prompted the Russian authorities to change their security policy and restore the former balance. The security policy of the Russian Federation aimed at rebuilding its superpower position in the world is implemented, among others, through their military presence outside its borders. The use of this instrument in foreign policy serves both to regain a dominant role and to pursue particular interests – including internal ones. A critical analysis based on the literature on the subject, strategic documents of the Russian Federation, and reports and articles available on the Internet confirms the assumption that the Russian Federation successfully strengthens its position in the world, thus strengthening not only the security of the state, but also manifesting its power.