The community plan implementation strategy to carry out its comprehensive plan in the United States

2016 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-133
Author(s):  
Masaaki Shibata ◽  
Hideki Koizumi
Author(s):  
Steven Hurst

The United States, Iran and the Bomb provides the first comprehensive analysis of the US-Iranian nuclear relationship from its origins through to the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015. Starting with the Nixon administration in the 1970s, it analyses the policies of successive US administrations toward the Iranian nuclear programme. Emphasizing the centrality of domestic politics to decision-making on both sides, it offers both an explanation of the evolution of the relationship and a critique of successive US administrations' efforts to halt the Iranian nuclear programme, with neither coercive measures nor inducements effectively applied. The book further argues that factional politics inside Iran played a crucial role in Iranian nuclear decision-making and that American policy tended to reinforce the position of Iranian hardliners and undermine that of those who were prepared to compromise on the nuclear issue. In the final chapter it demonstrates how President Obama's alterations to American strategy, accompanied by shifts in Iranian domestic politics, finally brought about the signing of the JCPOA in 2015.


Author(s):  
Nicholas L. Miller

This chapter analyzes US efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons from the 1970s until the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2015. Iran initially began exploring nuclear weapons when it was an American client in the 1970s, prior to the development of a US sanctions policy. Once the United States strengthened its nonproliferation policy, a credible threat of sanctions helped convince Iran to scale back its nuclear plans. After the Iranian Revolution led to a complete break in relations with the United States, Iran again began seeking nuclear weapons, undeterred by the threat of sanctions due to its low dependence on the United States. After two decades of unilateral US pressure failed to alter Iran’s plans, stringent multilateral sanctions led Iran to agree to strict limits on its nuclear program.


2019 ◽  
Vol 113 (1) ◽  
pp. 173-182

In the wake of President Trump's decision to withdraw the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and reimpose sanctions, Iran instituted proceedings against the United States before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In its application, filed on July 16, 2018, Iran alleged that the re-imposition of sanctions constituted a violation of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights (Treaty of Amity) between Iran and the United States. In order to prevent “irreparable damages” to the Iranian economy, Iran simultaneously filed a request for provisional measures. After the ICJ issued an order unanimously granting limited provisional measures on October 3, 2018, the United States announced its intention to terminate the Treaty of Amity. The United States issued its first phase of sanctions on August 7, 2018, and the remaining sanctions took effect on November 5, 2018.


Significance European-backed negotiations in Vienna to bring the United States and Iran back into compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear deal have changed the strategic environment for the Gulf states. They look to the US-promised ‘follow-on negotiations’ to meet their regional security concerns, but are also opening direct lines to Tehran. Impacts If direct Iran-GCC negotiations proceed, they will likely focus on practical confidence-boosting measures within the Gulf itself. Reconciliation with Qatar and a new Kuwaiti GCC Secretary General may allow the GCC to play a larger role in any follow-on talks. Emirati and Bahraini (and possibly Saudi) representatives may coordinate US messaging on Iran with Israeli counterparts.


2019 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elena Chachko

On October 3, 2018, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued a unanimous order indicating limited provisional measures against the United States. Iran initiated the case, Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights (Iran v. United States), after the United States announced its decision to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and revoke related sanctions relief for Iran. While the ICJ found that it had prima facie jurisdiction to hear the case—contrary to the U.S. position—the provisional measures it granted fell significantly short of the relief Iran sought. The Court also hinted that it might accept a significant element of the U.S. jurisdictional objection at the merits stage of the case.


2017 ◽  
Vol 111 (3) ◽  
pp. 776-781

Iran, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, Germany, and the European Union agreed to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in July 2015. Under the JCPOA, Iran agreed to limit the scope and content of its nuclear program in exchange for relief from various nuclear-related sanctions imposed by the other signatories. Throughout his campaign, President Donald Trump denounced the JCPOA. He said that, if elected, he would “renegotiate with Iran—right after … enabl[ing] the immediate release of our American prisoners and ask[ing] Congress to impose new sanctions that stop Iran from having the ability to sponsor terrorism around the world.” So far, however, the Trump administration has kept the agreement in place. The United States has continued to acknowledge Iran's compliance with the terms of the JCPOA and has waived various sanctions against Iran in compliance with its own obligations thereunder. Iran, by contrast, has charged the United States with failing to live up to its own JCPOA commitments.


2021 ◽  
Vol 115 (1) ◽  
pp. 140-146

The United States withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on May 8, 2018, and subsequently reimposed a range of unilateral sanctions on Iran. Throughout mid-2020, the Trump administration sought multilateral support for renewed UN sanctions against Iran, but the Security Council rejected those efforts. In response, the administration moved to initiate snapback sanctions under the terms of the JCPOA and UN Security Council Resolution 2231. However, JCPOA participants and the Security Council largely rebuffed the administration's contention that it could activate the snapback mechanism, instead taking the position that U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA means that it is no longer a “participant state” as required to invoke snapback sanctions.


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