PATENT OWNERSHIP FRAGMENTATION AND MARKET VALUE: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (02) ◽  
pp. 1950012
Author(s):  
MAHDIYEH ENTEZARKHEIR
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property Rights ◽  
Market Value ◽  
Manufacturing Firms ◽  
Time Effect ◽  
Bargaining Position ◽  
Ownership Fragmentation ◽  
Portfolio Size ◽  
Patent Thickets ◽  
Patent Portfolio ◽  
The U.S

Patent ownership Fragmentation following the U.S. pro-patent shifts has built overlapping intellectual property rights or patent thickets. This has made the use of others’ innovations costlier due to transaction costs, licensing fees, and hold-up. Using panel data on 2,441 public U.S. manufacturing firms for 1976–2002, I find that patent thickets lower firms’ expected profit and their market value. I also find that firms with a large patent portfolio experience a smaller effect, likely because stronger bargaining position lowers the hold-up likelihood. There is no systematic time effect from patent thickets on firms’ market value with a large patent portfolio size.

Effects of technical innovation on market value of the U.S. semiconductor industry

2010 ◽  
Vol 77 (8) ◽  
pp. 1322-1338 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chen-Chi Lou ◽  
Tsung-Pei Lee ◽  
Shang-Chi Gong ◽  
Shu-Ling Lin
Keyword(s):  
Semiconductor Industry ◽  
Market Value ◽  
Technical Innovation ◽  
The U.S

scholarly journals Patent Pools: Intellectual Property Rights and Competition

2010 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 62-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Victor Rodriguez
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Intellectual Property Rights ◽  
Broad Context ◽  
Patent Pools ◽  
Patent Thickets ◽  
The Relationship

Patent pools do not correct all problems associated with patent thickets. In this respect, patent pools might not stop the outsider problem from striking pools. Moreover, patent pools can be expensive to negotiate, can exclude patent holders with smaller numbers of patents or enable a group of major players to form a cartel that excludes new competitors. For all the above reasons, patent pools are subject to regulatory clearance because they could result in a monopoly. The aim of this article is to present the relationship between patents and competition in a broad context.

The Exploitative Abuse Prohibition

2017 ◽  
Vol 62 (4) ◽  
pp. 737-751 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tadashi Shiraishi
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Intellectual Property Rights ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Sharing Economy ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Bargaining Position ◽  
Functional Equivalent ◽  
Japanese Law ◽  
Holistic Research

The prohibition of exploitative abuse has attracted increasing attention in recent years, activated by many modern issues, also involving intellectual property rights. This article takes a bird’s-eye view of the policy distance between the United States, a core supporter of nonintervention, and the European Union, a core supporter of modest intervention. The article also examines the response of Japanese law, which includes the prevention of abuse of a superior bargaining position, a functional equivalent to the prohibition of exploitative abuse in this context. The provision against abuses of a superior bargaining position in Japan has been recently enforced in the context of private lawsuits as well. Such a holistic research framework will enable us to explore the potential responses of competition law to the challenges raised by data protection, the sharing economy, and other modern issues.

Turning Trips on Its Head: An "IP Cross Retaliation" Model for Developing Countries

2010 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Shamnad Basheer
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
International Trade ◽  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Intellectual Property Rights ◽  
The United States ◽  
Public Performance ◽  
Trade Disputes ◽  
Suspension Model ◽  
The U.S

The biblical David vs. Goliath paradigm plays out very frequently in international trade disputes. In 2003, a tiny island state, Antigua and Barbuda (hereafter Antigua) took on the United States (hereafter U.S.) in a WTO (World Trade Organization) dispute, alleging that the U.S. violated the General Agreement on Trade in Services (hereafter GATS) obligations by effectively foreclosing its borders to overseas internet gambling services. It won at both the panel and the appellate levels. However, to this date, it has been unable to secure compliance by the U.S.This paper considers “cross retaliation" by suspending intellectual property rights under the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (hereafter TRIPS) as a viable remedy for developing countries such as Antigua that often find themselves at the receiving end of WTO inconsistent measures maintained by countries that are economically more powerful.Towards this end, it proposes a “Tiered IP suspension model," where certain kinds of Intellectual Property (hereafter IP) are targeted first for suspension before others, depending on the ease of objectively ascertaining the harm caused by the unauthorized use of such IP and/or the potential to induce compliance by the defaulting state. Illustratively, copyrights over sound recordings that have established rates for public performance are targeted first. If working with this tier of IP subject matter does not yield desired results, then the complaining state moves on to other IP where it is relatively more difficult to compute the loss caused to the IP owner (such as pharmaceutical patents) but which may be a more powerful tool to induce compliance. Such a model could be useful for a large number of developing countries, such as India and Brazil, that often find that, despite WTO victories, scofflaw states such as the U.S. and EU fail to comply. Towards this end, this paper offers a very concrete “development" oriented international trade law remedy.

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