Analysis of the flight trajectory characteristics of North Korea SLBM due to launching mode

Author(s):  
Kyoung Haing Lee ◽  
Hyeong Pil Seo

The current research aims to simulate the flight trajectory of the North Korean submarine–launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and analyze its flight characteristics based on its range control method. Recently, North Korea has completed the test flight of SLBM and it has become a significant threat to international security. North Korea obtained SLBM technologies from Russia while disbanding decommissioned Russian submarines, and it is suspected that North Korea will continue to experiment in related fields along with its continued attempts to miniaturize nuclear weapons. If North Korea completes the development of SLBM and deploys the missiles, it means the completion of the three asymmetric warfare elements (nuclear weapon, ballistic missile, and submarine) and they will be the most significant threats to northeast Asia. Therefore, it is imperative to scientifically analyze SLBM to adeptly respond to such threat. One characteristic of SLBM is capability of attacking its target in a variety of ways based on its range control method. Based on this fact, the current research derives the flight equation of North Korean SLBM and simulates its flight trajectory based on various range control methods. The flight trajectories that we derive can be used to establish an effective anti-ballistic missile defense system in northeast Asia.

1999 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter J. Stafford ◽  
Kniceley Jr. ◽  
Monteith Roger L. ◽  
Kimbrell Gregory E. ◽  
Jones Thomas W. ◽  
...  

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
James B. Michael ◽  
Philip E. Pace ◽  
Man-Tak Shing ◽  
Murali Tummala ◽  
Joel Babbitt

2002 ◽  
Vol 96 (4) ◽  
pp. 879-880
Author(s):  
David Goldfischer

As Michael O'Hanlon concludes in his excellent contribution to Rockets' Red Glare: “We should…get used to the debate over ballistic missile defenses. It has been around a long time, and no final resolution is imminent” (p. 132). In one sense, a review of these three recent books makes clear that many analysts had grown a bit too used to positioning themselves in terms of the 1972 ABM Treaty. Preoccupied with arguments over whether the treaty should be preserved, modified, or rewritten in light of a changing strategic and technological context, no one seemed to have anticipated that President George W. Bush would simply withdraw from it, invoking Article XV's provision that either party could withdraw if “extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.” Even many strategic defense supporters who deemed the treaty obsolete (as Robert Joseph persuasively maintains in his contribution to Rockets' Red Glare) generally believed that it should only—and would only—be scrapped if negotiations over U.S.-proposed changes broke down. (“The Bush Administration,” surmises O'Hanlon, “will surely try very hard to amend it before going to such an extreme”) (p. 112). In the event, the president's team disavowed even the word “negotiation,” saying they were willing only to “consult” the Russians regarding the treaty's impending demise.


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