The Impact of Candidates’ Profile and Campaign Decisions in Electoral Results: A Data Analytics Approach

In recent years, a wide range of techniques has been developed to predict electoral results and to measure the influence of different factors in these results. In this paper, we analyze the influence of the political profile of candidates (characterized by personal and political features) and their campaign effort (characterized by electoral expenditure and by territorial deployment strategies retrieved from social networks activity) on the electoral results. This analysis is carried out by using three of the most frequent data analyitcs algorithms in the literature. For our analysis, we consider the 2017 Parliamentary elections in Chile, which are the first elections after a major reform of the electoral system, that encompassed a transition from a binomial to a proportional system, a modification of the districts’ structure, an increase in the number of seats, and the requirement of gender parity in the lists of the different coalitions. The obtained results reveal that, regardless of the political coalition, the electoral experience of candidates, in particular in the same seat they are running for (even when the corresponding district is modified), is by large the most influential factor to explain the electoral results. However, the attained results show that the influence of other features, such as campaign expenditures, depends on the political coalition. Additionally, by means of a simulation procedure, we show how different levels of territorial deployment efforts might impact on the results of candidates. This procedure could be used by parties and coalitions when planning their campaign strategies.

Campaign Finance

The role of money in politics has long been a contentious issue. Over the last decade the amount of money given in contributions to political campaigns has grown substantially. This chapter provides an overview of both theoretical and empirical studies and the scholarly literature that has emerged on this topic over the last forty years. Further, the chapter describes the history of US campaign finance laws. Then, it documents what has been learned from the several literatures that have emerged on campaign expenditures, campaign contributions, and campaign finance regulations. This chapter also suggests shortcomings in the current literature and points to potential avenues for future research.

Help or Hindrance? Outside Group Advertising Expenditures in House Races

Super PACs, 501(c)4 social welfare organizations, and 501(c)6 professional associations are now major spenders in House elections. What remains unclear is how the strategic expenditure choices of these respective outside interest groups impact the competitive position of non-incumbent candidates running for the House – specifically do their advertising expenditures undermine or augment the expenditures made by the campaign. Using the Wesleyan Media Project datasets of 2012 and 2014 in combination with campaign finance data in a series of models, I find early television advertising expenditures by the aforementioned 501(c) dark money organizations diminish the effectiveness of non-incumbents’ campaign expenditures – both on television advertising and in general – whereas super PACs’ early television advertising expenditures have no significant impact on campaign spending. A comparison of 501(c) dark money organizations’ and super PACs’ advertising choices in 2012 and 2014 reveals these differential effects likely relate to legal constraints leading 501(c)s, and not super PACs, to devote more resources toward policy advertisements early in the general election cycle. I argue this choice by 501(c) s makes it difficult for non-incumbents’ campaigns to shape the policy agenda early in the race leading the campaign’s expenditures on television advertising and the campaign’s total disbursements to be less effective in terms of improving the candidate’s competitiveness.

The Buckley Constitution and the Strong Libertarian Paradigm of American Politics

Ironically, the strong libertarian paradigm uses wealth to constrict autonomy in ways that have interesting political theory parallels with the Lochner case. Both approaches limit participation in the democratic process. Lochner removed certain questions from democratic decision-making altogether. By affording property interests overwhelming political influence, the strong libertarian paradigm connects influence to wealth more than to votes or preference intensities. Buckley v. Valeo upheld congressional limitations on contributions to political campaigns, but struck down limitations on a candidate’s personal and total campaign expenditures. The Court also invalidated limits on independent expenditures to elect particular candidates made by others, including PACs, that were not given directly to the campaign. Buckley specifically rejected the government’s interest in equalizing the financial resources of candidates. In his partial concurrence and partial dissent, Justice White stated that the majority stood for the proposition “money talks.”

Digital Advertising Expenditures in the 2016 Presidential Election

Using 2012 and 2016 candidate disbursements and independent expenditures filing data collected by the Federal Election Commission, this study compares how much money both the presidential campaigns and outside groups spent on digital relative to traditional media. Digital campaign expenditures have increased their share of total media outlays markedly over recent election cycles, and in the 2016 presidential election, both the candidate and independent expenditures were higher than in 2012, particularly on the Republican side. This article investigates reasons for these trends and establishes a baseline for future research on the heretofore understudied topic of digital political advertising.

Postdiluvian? The Effects of Outside Group Spending on Senate Elections After Citizens United and Speechnow.org v. FEC

In 2010, the Supreme Court’s decision on Citizens United v. FEC, fueled public outcry about the growth of the cost of the political campaign and the influx of outside money in the form of independent expenditures. President Barack Obama seemed to agree with this speculation calling independent expenditures, “dark money” that “pulls our politics into the gutter” [Obama, Barack. 2015. “The Citizens United Decision was Wrong.” (Press Release). Retrieved from https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/21/statement-president.]. Indeed, signs pointing to the increase in the cost of campaigns are correct, as 2014 saw the most expensive congressional elections in history. In this paper, we examine the effects of outside group spending on Senate races in 2010, 2012, and 2014. We find that outside group spending does play a significant, though small role in determining the vote share of a candidate. We also find that outside group spending in support of a candidate is generally more effective than outside group spending against a candidate, especially for the incumbent. Still, outside group expenditures pale in comparison to campaign expenditures for the challenger in terms of overall effect.

November Madness

This Comment proposes Representative Democracy Brackets, a multi-level manner of choosing candidates in which all voters have an equal voice, but which by its structure reduces the effect of mass marketing in favor of a focus on forming and evaluating interpersonal relationships. By implementing Representative Democracy Brackets, a state or the United States can achieve the twin benefits of decreasing the undue effects of political spending and increasing the quality of the resulting decisions. The proposed brackets winnow the pool of voters until it is small enough to make an informed decision. This Comment defines the problem by reviewing the current state of campaign expenditures and the potentially negative effects of those expenditures on elections. To define the space within which changes could be made, the Comment discusses the law, including recent case law, that governs the financing and manner of holding elections. The Comment describes other decision-making processes and their features. Finally, the Comment proposes Representative Democracy Brackets as a viable solution, identifying the key success factors and the challenges to state or national implementation.